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Abstract 
Religion has been the most important phenomenon that has influenced and even 
controlled the culture, customs, law, and governmental and judicial activities of 
multicultural English society and continues to play an important role in this country. This 
thesis examines the role and degree to which religion – particularly the Church of 
England and Islam – and secularism have historically impacted, and continue to 
influence, the assisted suicide debate. The significance of this examination lies in the fact 
that a decision to seek an assisted suicide is greatly influenced by the ideology that 
person identifies with. Furthermore, the ideology, whether religious or secular, that the 
government and judiciary espouse has a significant influence on the law on assisted 
suicide, and, thus, has a considerable impact on the lives of every citizen that falls under 
the remit of the law. Therefore, as this thesis argues, it is vital that the beliefs and 
viewpoints of both religious and secular communities be included in this debate. This 
thesis establishes that even though the Christian faith, which has always opposed assisted 
suicide in order to protect the doctrine of sanctity of life, has deep-seated ties with 
English society; the dominant culture of the country is now secular, which seeks a reform 
of the law. The thesis concludes that the criminal embargo on assisted suicide is morally 
and legally is flawed, unreasonable and untenable. Whilst arguing that it should be 
decriminalised in England on the basis that every individual has the right to self- 
determination, which allows them to choose the time and manner of their death, under 
human rights law; this thesis deduces that there is a diminishing inclusion and influence 
of religious beliefs in the debate on assisted suicide, which is now predominantly guided 
by secular values such as autonomy and the need to protect vulnerable individuals.  
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Chapter 1. Overview, Purpose and Research Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the role of faith and secularism in assisted suicide policy making. 
Both opponents and advocates of reform raise ethical, philosophical and religious issues 
when debating this area of the law. The issue of whether and how to reform the law has 
been the subject of intermittent political attention and societal debates in England since 
1935.1 However, controversy exists on whether or not reform should eventuate. The 
arguments made in favour of reform are generally underpinned by secular values. For 
example, the notions of dignity and autonomy – which are grounded in human rights law 
and on which a reform of the law can be based – are driving the debate on this area of the 
law in a new direction. Proponents of assisted suicide tend to emphasise the need to provide 
compassionate assistance to terminate an undignified life as it respects a patient’s 
autonomous decision to end their pain and suffering.2 On the other hand, arguments made 
against allowing assisted suicide have been historically rooted in religious ideology, even 
though they are now shifting and transforming to become increasingly secular. For 
example, opponents tend to emphasise the risk that allowing assisted suicide will lead to the 
erosion of the respect for human life.3 In their view, not allowing an assisted suicide 
protects the religious sanctity, or non-religious intrinsic value, of human life.4 Central to all 
the legislative attempts to reform the law has been a consideration of these competing 																																																								
1 Sheila McLean, Assisted Dying: Reflections on the Need for Law Reform (Routledge-
Cavendish 2007) 3-4 
2 Lawrence Gostin, ‘Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law 
Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying’ (1993) 21 J L Med & Ethics 94, 98; David 
Thomasma, ‘An Analysis of Arguments For and Against Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: 
Part One’ (1996) 5 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 62, 73; Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives 150th Congress 1st 
Session (SHECCHR), Assisted Suicide: Legal, Medical, Ethical and Social Issues (1997) 
Serial No 105-7 135; and Craig Paterson, The Contribution of Natural Law Theory to 
Moral and Legal Debate Concerning Suicide, Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia 
(Universal Publishers 2010) 364 
3 Dan Brock, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide – The Worry About Abuse’ in Loretta Kopelman 
and Kenneth DeVille (eds), Physician-Assisted Suicide: What are the Issues? (Kluwer 2001) 72 
4 Jess McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford University 
Press (OUP) 2002) 332. There are other objections to allowing assisted suicide – such as 
the need to protect vulnerable people, changing the doctor-patient relationship etc – which 
are traced in ch 6. 
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values and principles that inform the debate on this area of the law; namely, the need to 
preserve the value of life,5 and the notion of autonomy that allows an individual to choose 
the time and manner of ending their undignified life.6 These values and principles emanate 
from religious and non-religious ideologies, which indubitably have had a significant effect 
on the law of suicide and assisted suicide. With the recent momentum for reforming the law 
on assisted suicide, society and its representatives are compelled to decide which values 
should guide the law in this area.7 
 
As Worchel and Gearing establish in an empirical study that depending on the ideology an 
individual adopts, whether religious or secular, it influences their decision to commit 
suicide: “degree of religiosity is directly related to degree of suicidality, with greater 
religiosity predicting decreased risk of suicidal behaviour”.8 This thesis argues that the 
relationship between “degree of religiousity and suicidality” can be extended to include 
instances of assisted suicide. More importantly, the ideology that the government or 
judiciary adopt on assisted suicide impacts the law, policies and case-law in this area and 
has a serious effect on all individuals and communities who fall under the remit of the law. 
Thus, this thesis argues that even though a significant majority of governmental activities, 
particularly policy-making, tend to adopt a secular approach, they should not be 
unconcerned with religion. Both religious and non-religious beliefs and principles should 
be included in societal debates on this issue as it has a direct impact on the lives of every 
citizen within society. Therefore, it is essential to include the opinions of both religious and 
non-religious groups. It should be noted here that this thesis argues that a change in the law 
would be based on the societal and cultural shift that now has a favourable approach 
towards assisted suicide; and not dictated by religious values, which have historically 
influenced the law in this area. Thus, in a liberal democracy, where the viewpoints and 
beliefs of both non-religious and religious groups are taken into consideration, a change in 
the law and the inclusion of various ideologies is no longer mutually exclusive. 																																																								
5 For greater discussion on the need to protect life: Brock (n 3) 72; and McMahan (n 4) 332. 
6 For a detailed discussion on autonomy: Gostin (n 2); Thomasma (n 2); SHECCHR (n 2); 
and Paterson, Contribution of Natural Law (n 2). 
7 John Barry Mitchell, Understanding Assisted Suicide: Nine Issues to Consider (University 
of Michigan Press 2007) 6 
8 D Worchel and RE Gearing, Suicide Assessment and Treatment: Empirical and Evidence-
Based Practices (Springer 2012) 76-77 
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There is significant literature on the law on assisted suicide. For example, this thesis does 
not seek to argue whether and how reform can be achieved, To this end, various studies 
have been conducted such as Margaret Otlowski’s 1997 study that critically reviews the 
common law jurisdictions that allow the practice of assisted suicide or euthanasia, such as 
the Netherlands, and analyses its effects on patients, doctors and the legal and social 
landscape of those countries.9 Other academics, such as Sheila McLean and John Keown, 
extensively critique the arguments both in favour and against reform and the values that are 
taken into consideration in the academic debates and legislative attempts to reform the 
law.10 There is even extensive literature on the Christian perspective on this issue, in the 
medical ethics context, such as Elizabeth Wicks’ 2009 article;11 the position of the 
Christian faith, namely the Catholic Church, on the issue of assisted suicide in Peter De 
Cruz’s 2003 article;12 and even an examination of the competing religious values such as 
preserving the sanctity of life and providing compassion for those who are suffering an 
undignified life by Robin Griffith-Jones to name a few.13 
 
However, there is very limited academic literature that traces the opposition of the Christian 
and Islamic faiths through their Holy Books and texts on the issues of suicide and assisted 
dying, and examines why there is a need to include their views in the law in a multicultural 
English liberal democratic setting. The majority of the literature – such as A Majid Katme’s 
2015 response article14 and Sophie Strickland 2012 article,15 examine the views of medical 																																																								
9 Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Clarendon 1997) 
10 For example: Mc Lean (n 1); and John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An 
Argument Against Legislation (Cambridge University Press (CUP) 2002) 
11 ‘Religion, law and medicine: legislating on birth and death in a Christian state’ (2009) 
17(3) Med L Rev 410-437 
12 ‘Assisted suicide, Christian theology and the law’ (2003) 150 Law & Just 51-66 
13 ‘To ease the passing?’ 2016 Jan Counsel 28-30. For literature on the Christian 
perspective: Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (Pilgrim 
Press 2004); Paul Badham, Is there a Christian Case for Assisted Dying: Voluntary 
Euthanasia Reassessed (Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge 2009); Timothy J 
Demy and Gary Stewart, Suicide: A Christian Response: Crucial Considerations for 
Choosing Life (Kregel 1998); and Kieran Beville, Dying to Kill: A Christian Perspective on 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Christian Publishing House 2014). 
14 A Majid Katme’s reponse to Fiona Godlee, ‘Assisted dying – time for a full and fair 
debate’ [2015] h4517 BMJ 351 
15 Sophie Strickland, ‘Conscientious objection in medical students’ (2012) 38(1) J Med 
Ethics 22, 23. Also see: Amer Aldeen, ‘The Muslim ethical tradition and emergent medical 
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students in various universities in England and Wales to determine their attitude towards 
assisted suicide. However, these articles have a medical undertone and are predominantly 
directed at healthcare professionals, medical students and patients. Furthermore, there is 
some literature that examines the role of Islamic law in Western societies, particularly 
European countries, and its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights 
such as Katerina Dalacoura’s 2007 study16 and Dominic McGoldrick’s 2013 publication.17 
However, there is negligible literature on the effect of Islamic cultures in a multicultural 
liberal democracy, such as England, and why, in an increasingly secular society, there is a 
need for inclusion of religious values – traced back to religious texts, namely the Bible and 
the Quran – in Parliamentary debates.18 There is very little literature that examines the 
religious viewpoints on assisted suicide and the extent of their inclusion in Parliamentary 
debates. One such example is Ekaterina Kolpinskaya’s conference paper, titled, ‘Playing 
roulette with the human life: Religion and parliamentary debate on assisted dying and 
euthanasia, 1997-2012’.19 However, this paper explores the religious background of MPs, 
particularly those of the Catholic and Jewish faiths, and the impact their association with 
religion has on the amount of contribution and their voting styles in Parliamentary debates. 
In contrast, this thesis seeks to fill that gap in knowledge by establishing the viewpoint of 
the Islamic and Christian religion – by examining their core religious texts – and contrasts 
their beliefs with the secular principles on these issues in order to determine which religious 
and non-religious values drive the contemporary debate on assisted suicide in multicultural 
English society. 
 																																																																																																																																																																									
care: an uneasy fit’ (2007) 14(3) Acad Emerg Med 277-278; and Taher Foggo, ‘Muslim 
medical students get picky’ Sunday Times (7 October 2007) 
16 Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights: Implications for International 
Relations (3rd edn, I B Tauris 2007) 
17 ‘The compatibility of an Islamic/shari’a law system or shari’a rules with European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)’ in Robin Griffith-Jones (ed), Islam and English 
Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a (CUP 2013) 
18 For example, Daniel Price, Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights: A 
Comparative Study (Praeger 1999) attempts to study the impact of Islam on a democratic 
setting and human rights law and practices, primarily in Middle Eastern countries; and 
Peter Danchin, ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2011) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 663 explores the case-law in the 
Strasbourg Court relating to the freedom of belief in an Islamic context. 
19 (PSA Annual Conference, Sheffield, March 2015) 
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It is worth noting at this juncture that the views and principles of the Church of England, 
Islam and secularism are discussed in equal measure throughout the thesis: evaluating their 
beliefs and doctrines – in order to determine why their views should be included in societal 
debates – forms part of the original contribution to knowledge.20 For example, this thesis 
establishes that the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is a significant principle that informs 
the debate on assisted suicide by opposing the idea of reforming the law in this area, is 
grounded in both Christianity and Islam. This opposition, based on the doctrine of sanctity 
of life, has been significantly impacted by the introduction of secularism in English society, 
which has led to this doctrine being transformed into a non-religious principle that attaches 
an intrinsic value, rather than a religious sanctity or holiness, to life; and more recently, 
takes on quality of life considerations. This thesis remedies the gap in knowledge by 
providing the first in-depth doctrinal, socio-legal study of the gradually changing nature 
and understanding of the principles and values that inform the debate on assisted suicide 
and their relationship with the law on this area by examining the discursive shift in 
language of religious and non-religious bodies and their representatives. 
 
This thesis also examines the significant impact human rights law has had on furthering 
reform of the law of assisted suicide. This area of the law is well-trodden,21 with a number 
of publications, such as Sapiro and Ungoed-Thomas’ 2001 article that examine the impact 
of the Human Rights Act of 1998 on healthcare law and the compatibility of human rights 
provisions with the law on assisted suicide and euthanasia in England.22 Other academics 
have analysed the role human rights provisions, in the context of assisted suicide law, have 
played in domestic judicial decisions such as Dickinson’s 2013 study,23 and the McCarthy 
et al 2011 study that examines a range of values and principles that academics and experts 
have identified that are taken into consideration, in the human rights context, during end-of-																																																								
20 Some literature can also be found on the various secular schools of thought on this issue: 
Kevin Yuill, Assisted Suicide: The Liberal, Humanist Case Against Legalization (Palgrave-
Macmillan 2013); and Craig Paterson, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Natural Law 
Ethics Approach (Ashgate 2008). 
21 Howard Davis, Human Rights Law: Directions (OUP 2007) 
22 Jeff Sapiro and Angie Ungoed-Thomas, ‘Euthanasia and the Human Rights Act 1998’ in 
Austen Garwood-Gowers et al (eds), Healthcare Law: Impact of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (Cavendish 2001) 273-294 
23 Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court (OUP 2013) 114-118 
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life decision making.24 However, as this thesis argues, not all human rights provisions, 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, have had an influence on the 
momentum for reform, especially Articles 3, 9 and 14, which have a very restrictive scope. 
There is negligible literature on why the freedom of thought, conscience and religion ought 
to cover an individual’s belief in assisted suicide. Similarly, there is very little literature on 
the impact on the rights and freedoms of citizens due to the failure of the Strasbourg Court 
to allow Article 14 to be used independently and to extend it to cover situations of indirect, 
indistinct and obscure forms of discrimination. One notable exception is McClogan’s 2000 
article that examines the various forms of discrimination against women and Article 14’s 
failure to protect them due to it not being a freestanding Convention right.25 This thesis 
extends these arguments, by examining them in the context of assisted suicide debates and 
forms part of the original contribution to knowledge by contending that Article 9 ought to 
protect an individual’s belief in assisted suicide for themselves; and the scope of Article 14 
ought to be extended to transform it into an independent Convention right to allow disabled 
individuals the same freedom, by providing them with a lawful option to end their lives, as 
is enjoyed by able-bodied individuals. Lastly, this thesis also examines the idea of dignity, 
which is arguably grounded in religion particularly the Christian faith, as demonstrated by 
John Frederic Kilner et al in their 1996 publication, but has evolved into a non-religious 
idea that provides individuals with the inherent quality of being worthy of honour and 
respect and is protected by Article 3.26 
 
To encapsulate, this thesis attempts to fill the gap in knowledge by examining three 
unexplored objectives. Firstly, it examines the extent to which secularism and religion, 
particularly Christianity and Islam, have shaped, and continue to shape, the debate and the 
law on assisted suicide in multicultural English society. Secondly, it evaluates the shifting 
nature of these debates and what this shift signifies about the legal approach to religion and 
secularism in this context. Lastly, it explores the impact of human rights law on reforming 																																																								
24 Joan McCarthy, Mary Donnelly and Dolores Dooley, End-of-life Care: Ethics and Law 
(Cork University Press 2011). Also see: Stefania Negri, Self-Determination, Dignity and 
End-of-Life Care: Regulating Advance Directives in International and Comparative 
Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (MNP) 2012) 
25 Aileen McColgan, ‘Women and the Human Rights Act’ (2000) 51 (3) NILQ 417, 433 
26 John Kilner et al, The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity Presents Dignity and 
Dying: A Christian Appraisal (Wm B Eerdmans (WBE) 1996) 112-113 
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the law on assisted suicide in a pluralistic, liberal democracy such as England. To develop 
these discussions, a set of research questions have been formulated, which are discussed in 
this chapter, along with an explanation of the methodology used and how the chapters are 
structured in a manner that resolves the aims and objectives of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
The three research questions addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
 
1. What role is there for faith in policy-making on assisted suicide in multicultural and 
increasingly secular English society? 
 
This thesis argues that there is a liberal momentum towards permitting, or at least not acting 
against, assisted suicide. It analyses how this momentum can accommodate the non-
Western beliefs and needs of multicultural Britain and why there is a need for such an 
accommodation. To develop this discussion, this thesis examines the historic and present 
influence of religion on the legal regulation of assisted suicide in England and the extent of 
inclusion of religious and non-religious values in contemporary policy-making, particularly 
Bills on assisted suicide (which are compared to the amount of inclusion given to these 
values in debate on euthanasia). 
 
2. What impact have human rights provisions had on reforming the law on assisted suicide 
in England? 
 
This thesis argues that human rights law has had the most significant effect on the 
movement to reform the law on assisted suicide. It examines whether human rights law 
protects and defends different beliefs and non-religious viewpoints under the movement 
towards accepting assisted suicide. In developing this discussion, it examines the 
movement to reform the law, in a human rights context, which has led to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) drafting “interim guidelines” to include a new, offence specific 
policy about when to prosecute people who provide assistance in another person’s suicide. 
Paradoxically, the Parliament, to tighten up policy, implemented and changed section 59 of 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and amendments to section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, to 
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include “encouragement” of suicide. This thesis examines why these contradictory and 
paradoxical policies and laws are being simultaneously created. 
 
3. Is there a discursive shift in language, over time, which demonstrates the changing 
relationship of law and religion in assisted suicide policy implementation? 
 
This thesis analyses the shifting nature of the debate on assisted suicide and critically 
reviews what this shift demonstrates in relation to the legal approach to religion in this 
debate. To develop this discussion, the shift in language is traced – with special reference to 
non-religious and religious terminology – in historic and modern governmental activities, 
such as Parliamentary debates and statements from religious and non-religious groups and 
institutions. Religion is an integral element to the discursive shift in language and even 
though the terminology largely remains the same, the understanding of certain terms, such 
as the sanctity of life, has changed over time from a religious to non-religious notion. 
 
1.3 Definitions 
It is worth addressing at this juncture what meaning is being attributed to the terms that are 
used throughout this thesis. Other academics and experts may attribute different meanings 
to the terms examined in this section, however, as this thesis argues, especially in Chapter 
Six, the reasons behind the failure of the Bills that sought to change the law is a lack of 
distinction between the ideas of assisted suicide and euthanasia. Thus, these definitions 
attempt to classify the role played by a third party in the death of another person. 
Contemporary understandings of the term “euthanasia” imply another person bringing 
about a painless death to patients who are in constant mental or physical suffering due to 
their disease or disability.27 The House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics 1993, 
defined euthanasia as “a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of 
ending a life to relieve intractable suffering”.28 Euthanasia is where an individual helps 
another to die, by directly administering lethal means such as medication:29 it is the 
individual who takes the final action that brings about the death of another person. In 																																																								
27 Hazel Biggs, Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law (Hart 2001) 12 
28 Select Committee, Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics (HL Paper 1993-94, 
21-I) para 20 
29 Paterson, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (n 20) 174 
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contrast, assisted suicide is where an individual assists another person to commit suicide; 
for example, by setting up equipment or picking up a lethal prescription.30 However, the 
person seeking the assistance always performs the final action that ends life. When a doctor 
assists a person to end life, particularly a patient, in this manner, in a professional capacity, 
then it is called physician-assisted suicide.31 The definition of “encouraging suicide” should 
be noted here. A defendant’s intention is the determining factor of whether or not they are 
guilty of that offence. According to Smith and Hogan: 
 
Encouraging suicide involved urging or supporting another to commit suicide. The 
offence is committed if a person encourages someone to commit suicide, whether or 
not they actually do so. To be guilty of the offence, the defendant must intend to 
encourage another to commit, or to attempt to commit, suicide. So the writer of a 
novel who describes a suicide in a way that helps someone to commit suicide will 
not be guilty of the offence because (presumably) the writer did not intend to assist 
or encourage a suicide.32 
 
Euthanasia can be effectuated either through active or passive means. Active euthanasia 
occurs when active steps are taken to end the life of an individual, for example, a direct 
administration of a lethal injection.33 An example of a doctor ending the life of a patient 
through active steps is the Cox case.34 Dr Nigel Cox was charged with attempted murder for 
injecting potassium chloride into the vein of his patient of 13 years, Lillian Boyes, a 70-
year-old woman who was in constant pain and suffering due to her rheumatoid arthritis and 
begged Dr Cox to end her life. Ognall J summed up the case to the jury as follows: 
 
…a doctor’s life-long professional duty… [is] to save and not to take life… he did 
so only because he was prompted by deep distress at Lillian Boyes’ condition; by a 
belief that she was totally beyond recall and by an intense compassion for her 																																																								
30 The umbrella term “assisted dying” is used to refer to euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
31 Stephen Smith, End-of-Life Decisions in Medical Care: Principles and Policies for 
Regulating the Dying Process (CUP 2012) 12-13 
32 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (5th edn, OUP 2014) 490 
33 Gail Tulloch, Euthanasia: Choice and Death (Edinburgh University Press (EUP) 2005) 33 
34 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38 
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fearful suffering. Nonetheless… if he injected her with potassium chloride for the 
primary purpose of killing her, or hastening her death, he is guilty of the offence 
charged.35 
 
Dr Cox was convicted, as his intention was proved because he used potassium chloride, 
which has no pain relieving effects, and is not an opiate.36 However, since her body was 
cremated, the charge – and subsequent 12-month suspended sentence – was only attempted 
murder (and not murder) as there was no evidence to definitively confirm that it was the 
potassium chloride that had caused Mrs Boyes death (other than Dr Cox’s notes detailing 
his actions).37 It is concluded that, under English law, any form of “active euthanasia” is 
regarded as intentional killing of a person, which amounts to murder.38 
 
In contrast, “passive euthanasia” occurs when an individual’s death takes place without 
taking active steps, for example, a doctor withholding life support treatment or medical care 
such as antibiotics or food and hydration. These actions are called “omission”; as the term 
“passive euthanasia” is not recognised by English law.39 The Tony Bland case should be 
noted here; which was the first of its kind and concerned a petition – from a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) patient Anthony Bland’s doctors – to withdraw artificial food and 
water.40 Submissions, made in support of withdrawal, explained that the case: 
 
																																																								
35 ibid 
36 Ann Orme-Smith and John Spicer, Ethics in General Practice: A Practical Handbook for 
Personal Development (Radcliffe Medical Press 2001) 204 
37 ibid 204. The Cox case must be distinguished from R v Bodkin Adams [1957] Crim LR 
365, which is an example of “double effect”, a doctrine that judicially entitles a physician 
“…to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures 
he takes may incidentally shorten life”. See: Patrick Devlin, Easing the Passing (The 
Bodley Head 1985) 171. Double effect is outside the scope of this thesis and will not be 
discussed in greater detail. 
38 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (n 10) 11. Also see: Hazel Biggs and 
Caroline Jones, ‘Tourism: A Matter of Life and Death in the UK’ in I Glenn Cohan (ed), 
The Globalization of Health Care: Legal and Ethical Issues (OUP 2013) 166 (“Euthanasia 
is prohibited under the common law of homicide in the UK”). 
39 Tulloch (n 33) 33 
40 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 
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…seems to require the court to reject the vital principle of sanctity of life in favour 
of value judgments as to the quality of the further artificial prolongation of the life 
of Anthony Bland… however… there is no inherent conflict between having 
regards to the quality of life and respecting the sanctity of life; on the contrary, they 
are complementary; the principle of sanctity of life embraces the need for full 
respect to be accorded to the dignity and memory of the individual human being. 
The meaning and criteria of quality of life should focus on benefit to the patient.41 
 
In light of these submissions, the House of Lords made an exception into the doctrine of 
sanctity of life and held that “there is no therapeutic, medical or other benefit to Anthony 
Bland in continuing to maintain his ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial 
means”.42 The doctors were allowed to discontinue all treatment to enable him “to end his 
life and to die peacefully with the greatest dignity and the least distress”.43 To encapsulate, 
under English law, a mentally competent patient can refuse medical treatment.44 On the 
other hand, a mentally incompetent patient, such as an individual in a persistent vegetative 
state, would need the court to adjudicate whether their artificial food and water can be 
withdrawn (especially in instances where this withdrawl would lead to death).45 
Euthanasia can be further characterised as voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary.46 
Voluntary euthanasia occurs when an individual freely requests assistance in their death. 
Non-voluntary euthanasia occurs when an individual’s death is brought about without their 
choice or consent as they lack the mental competency to make such a choice.47 Such a 
person could be a child, an unconscious adult, someone with a mental or psychotic 
																																																								
41 ibid [802] 
42 ibid [805] 
43 ibid [805]. For greater discussion on the concept of omission: Biggs (n 27) 51-54 
44 As decided in Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity) [2002] 1 FLR 1090; and Re T 
(Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 95 
45 Robin Howard, ‘Coma and Stupor’ in Gordon Bryan Young and Eelco Wijdicks (eds), 
Disorders of Consciousness (3rd series, Elsevier 2008) 73 
46 Tulloch (n 33) 33; and Frank Lewins, Bioethics for Health Professionals: An 
Introduction and Critical Approach (Macmillian 1996) 114 
47 Lawrence Hinman, ‘Euthanasia: An Introduction to the Moral Issues’ in Nancy Loucks et 
al (eds), Why We Kill: Understanding Violence Across Cultures and Disciplines 
(Middlesex University Press 2009) 103 
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disorder, or even temporarily discomposed due to certain medication they may be taking.48 
Finally, involuntary euthanasia occurs when the individual’s death is brought about against 
that person’s choice and wishes; or without the consent of a competent individual whose 
contrary wishes were known or could have been known.49 The notion of slippery slope 
should be noted here. This idea, which is frequently used against allowing the legalisation 
of euthanasia, dictates that even if euthanasia was morally acceptable, it will inevitably lead 
to practices that are not allowable,50 such as vulnerable individuals and patients being 
exploited or coerced into an unwanted death.51 For example, if voluntary euthanasia is 
allowed, it is only a matter of time before non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia will be 
carried out. This is called the “slippery slope” effect.52 
 
To reiterate, the following definitions will be used most frequently throughout the thesis: 
“assisted suicide” is when an individual (a medical or non-medical professional, such as a 
family, friend or even an unknown individual) makes a means of suicide available; for 
example, picking up a lethal prescription or setting up equipment for another person to 
utilise who may or may not be physically capable of ending their life themselves.53 
“Physician assisted suicide” is when a doctor makes those means of suicide available to the 
patient. However, in both instances, the patient must commit the final act that ultimately 
ends their life in order to ensure that the suicide is voluntary.54 On the other hand, “suicide” 
has been defined as “the termination of an individual’s life resulting directly from a positive 
or negative act of the victims themselves which they know will produce a fatal result”.55 In 																																																								
48 Lewins (n 46) 114 
49 Hinman (n 47) 103; Lewins (n 46) 114; and Biggs (n 27) 12 
50 John Griffiths, Alex Bood and Heleen Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands 
(Amsterdam University Press 1998) 177 
51 Willem Landman, ‘A Proposal for Legalizing Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in South 
Africa’ in Kopelman and DeVille (n 3) 215 
52 The slippery slope argument is outside the scope of this thesis and will not be looked at 
in detail. See: John Keown, ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands: sliding down the slippery 
slope?’ in John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal 
Perspectives (CUP 1997) 261-263 
53 James Young, ‘A Coroner’s View Regarding the ‘Right to Die’ Debate’ in Antoon 
Leenaars et al, Suicide in Canada (University of Toronto Press 1998) 438 
54 ibid 438 
55 J M Williams, Suicide and Attempted Suicide: Understanding the Cry of Pain (2nd edn, 
Penguin 2001) 18 
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contrast, an “attempted suicide” is when an individual, whether physically capable or not, 
tries to end their life but does not succeed. 
 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters, which are described as follows. 
 
Chapter One introduces the main aims and objectives of this thesis along with how it forms 
an original contribution to research on this area of the law. The chief objective of this thesis 
is to analyse the extent to which the phenomena of religion and secularism have historically 
shaped, and continue to influence, the debate, policy-making and the law on assisted 
suicide in multicultural, pluralistic English society. It also sets out the research questions 
and methodology adopted to answer them along with a list of definitions for the recurrent 
terminology used throughout this thesis. 
 
Chapter Two sets out the Christian, Islamic and secular viewpoints, in equal measure, on 
the issues of suicide and assisted suicide to determine how they have affected the 
movement and development of the law in this area; and whether their views should be 
included in societal debates, which forms part of the original contribution to knowledge. 
This Chapter examines whether the religious doctrine, of both faiths, has changed over the 
years and establishes that the principle of sanctity of life is the main value – which is deep-
seated in both Christianity and Islam – on which an opposition to reforming the law is 
based. It then contrasts these religious beliefs with the secular perspective on these issues 
and establishes that the values, which inform the modern debate, are autonomy, dignity and 
the intrinsic value of life. 
 
Chapter Three provides a theoretical background of the current societal landscape of the 
country. It establishes that English society contains various religious and non-religious 
groups within it that have amassed via immigration and have significantly contributed to 
society becoming diverse and multicultural. It investigates the benefits and disadvantages 
of multiculturalism and examines the role of minority subcultures, particularly the Islamic 
community, in English society, along with governmental and judicial activity that has 
attempted to accommodate and integrate these subcultures into English society. It even 
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examines whether religion, particularly the beliefs of the Islamic faith, run counter to the 
historical and contemporary culture of English society. This Chapter differentiates the way 
of life of minority subcultures from the dominant culture, which was historically influenced 
by the Christian faith but has now become predominantly secular. It should be noted here 
that this thesis is first and foremost a legal analysis, and, thus, the sociological evaluation of 
the historic and current political and societal landscape of the country is set out in a 
succinct, curtailed and compact manner. For example, the history of colonialism, neoliberal 
global politics, identity politics, new political formations in nation states and setting out the 
connection of the research questions within a liberal democracy setting have been reduced 
and curtailed. Furthermore, even though the notion of secularism is not a single or uniform 
idea (instead it is multidimensional), it is used in this thesis to denote a non-religious, 
temporal stance and approach towards the Parliamentary, judicial and societal debates on 
assisted suicide. 
 
Chapter Four examines the history of the movement to reform the law on suicide and 
assisted suicide, particularly section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961, and the recent update to it, in 
the form of section 59(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which changes the wording 
of the 1961 Act and has been enacted to protect vulnerable individuals from the influence 
of modern technology, namely the Internet. It considers the religious and secular influences 
affecting these laws, by examining the Parliamentary debates, and establishes that this 
legislation does not change the law on assisted suicide. Chapter Four evaluates the DPP’s 
policy in respect of cases of encouraging or assisting suicide that was created in accordance 
with the House of Lords’ decision in Purdy56 and argues that this policy effectively allows 
assisted suicide if the individual who provides the assistance has benevolent, 
compassionate motives. It also gauges the reactions of various religious groups on the 
publication of this policy and concludes that even though governmental and judicial 
representatives claim that the Purdy case and the subsequent DPP Policy have not changed 
the law on assisted suicide, they have created considerable impetus to reforming the law on 
this area. 
 																																																								
56 R (on the application of Debbie Purdy) (Appellant) v DPP (Respondent) & Omar Puente 
(Interested Party) & Society for the Protection of Unborn Children [HL] [2009] UKHL 45 
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Chapter Five analyses the impact that human rights law has had on reforming the law on 
assisted suicide in England. It examines certain human rights provisions, which have been 
invoked in assisted suicide cases, how they function and operate and the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence around them. Significant emphasis has been placed on evaluating the intrinsic 
link between these provisions and the religious and non-religious values they are grounded 
in, particularly the doctrine of sanctity of life (and its association with Article 2, which 
protects the right to life) and the notion of individual autonomy (which is grounded in 
Article 8); and the Strasbourg and domestic courts’ application of these values and 
provisions. The Pretty57 case has been examined in significant detail – as it was the first 
English case of its kind to reach the Strasbourg Court and has been applied to subsequent 
domestic cases such as Purdy and Nicklinson58 – to determine the affect it has had on the 
law on assisted suicide in England. This chapter also answers a series of questions, in a 
human rights context, for example, does not providing a lawful option of assisted suicide 
breach an individual’s inherent human dignity (which is grounded in Article 3 and provides 
a right against ill-treatment and torture). Does the lack of Article 14, which prohibits 
discrimination, existing as a free-standing provision infringe the rights of those who need 
assistance to end their lives as this freedom is available to able-bodied individuals? It also 
analyses whether Article 9, which provides every individual with the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, ought to protect their belief in assisted suicide for themselves. 
 
Chapter Six, firstly, examines the extent to which religious and non-religious values receive 
inclusion in the historic and contemporary debate on assisted suicide and contrasts them 
with the values and principles that drive the debates on euthanasia to determine why 
allowing assisted suicide, instead of euthanasia, would be a more beneficial and 
safeguarded option. It evaluates the historical attempts, which began in 1935, to make 
euthanasia lawful and continued through the subsequent decades, with the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Bill 1969 having the greatest chance to be enacted in light of the fact that 																																																								
57 R v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent), ex parte Diane Pretty (Appellant) & 
Secretary of State for the Home Department  (Interested Party) [2001] UKHL 61; and 
Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 (ECtHR, 29 April 2002) 
58 R (Nicklinson and Lamb) v Ministry of Justice, R (AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[2014] UKSC 38. Note that this claim went to the European Court of Human Rights 
(Nicklinson and Lamb v UK App nos 2478/15 and 1787/15 (ECtHR, 16 July 2015)) and the 
application was unanimously declared as inadmissible. 
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Parliament had decriminalised suicide.59 This Chapter establishes that the movement to 
reform the law diminished after the defeat of the 1969 Bill and was revived by cases such 
as Bland,60 Pretty and Re B,61 which led to Lord Joffe introducing a series of Bills from 
2003 to 2005 to legalise euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. All these Bills are 
critically reviewed, by conducting archival and historical research of Parliamentary debates 
and comparing those with the modern debates on assisted dying, to establish the role of 
faith and secularism in policy-making and determine the religious and non-religious values 
that influence these debates along with the discursive shift in language, particularly by 
contrasting the debates around the Joffe Bills to those in 1936, 1969 and recently in 2015. 
This Chapter also demonstrates that in the contemporary debate on assisted dying, there is 
more inclusion of the beliefs of minority religious communities and the viewpoints of non-
religious groups, especially compared to the historic debate on these issues, which is a 
result of the societal shift discussed in Chapter Three. Secondly, given the focus of this 
thesis is assisted suicide, this chapter takes a snapshot approach in examining the 
Parliamentary debates around abortion and same-sex marriage in order to determine the 
amount of inclusion the Christian religion and Islamic faith receive within these debates, 
establishes the role of faith in policy making in England and compares it to the extent of 
inclusion and the role religion plays within the assisted suicide debate. Lastly, this Chapter 
examines the aims and objectives of the Commission on Assisted Dying, which was set up 
to establish whether the current law on assisted dying is satisfactory, and the religious and 
non-religious viewpoints it considered when creating its final report. It also analyses the 
Assisted Dying Bill 2014-2015, which the Chair of the Commission, Lord Falconer, 
subsequently introduced in Parliament and the Parliamentary debates on it to establish that 
there has always been a significant amount of inclusion of religion in the debate on 
euthanasia, however, there is a decreasing amount of inclusion of religious values and 
principles in the debate on assisted suicide.62 
 																																																								
59 Discussed in ch 4 
60 Bland (n 40) 
61 Re B (Adult, Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449 
62 Note: A new “Assisted Dying Bill”, which would “enable competent adults who are 
terminally ill to be provided at their request with specified assistance to end their own life” 
was introduced by Lord Hayward on 9 June 2016 (HL Deb 9 June 2016 Vol 773); but has 
not had a second reading (as of 18 May 2017). 
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Chapter Seven encapsulates the issues and analysis set across this thesis. It examines 
whether the aims and objectives of this thesis along with the research questions, set out in 
Chapter One, have been met and answered. It reiterates the historic and present role of 
religion and secularism in multicultural English society, particularly in the debate on 
assisted suicide, why there is a need to include both viewpoints in the debate and which 
values influence this debate. It concludes that even though the debate on assisted suicide is 
now influenced by secular values; society, the law, and the policy-making process should 
not exclude the views and beliefs of various religious groups on this issue in order to 
maintain equality, fairness, objectivity and harmony in society. However, a change in the 
law and inclusion of faith are not mutually exclusive. Thus, this chapter concludes whether 
or not, given the individual nature of assisted suicide affecting only the person requesting it, 
assisted suicide ought to be a lawful option. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
Salter and Mason argue that it is not necessary: 
 
…to decide between either a single disciplinary approach of a purely black-letter 
analysis, or an entirely interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary orientation. This is because 
there are numerous degrees of interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity within a 
broad spectrum of possibilities.63 
 
Thus, an inter-disciplinary, mixed methods approach is taken to answer the research 
questions set out in Section 1.2. The main method of research adopted in this thesis is a 
socio-legal technique, which is supplemented by a doctrinal approach, archival and 
historical research and a brief comparative law analysis, which are all examined in turn. 
 
1.5.1 Comparative Law 
The comparative law analysis is only briefly conducted in order to understand the legal 
structure, regulations and approach of other legal systems and the societal and cultural 
																																																								
63 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide 
to the Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson 2007) 134-135 
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landscape they operate in.64 However, this aspect was excluded because the comparative 
law approach has a significant weakness. The historical, religious, cultural, social and legal 
terrain of every country is different and unique.65 The sui generis nature of the history, 
religious and philosophical traditions, heritage, customs and culture of every country has a 
significant impact on its governmental, judicial and legal systems.66 Thus, the only reason a 
comparative law approach was taken is to identify common themes on assisted suicide 
laws, determine the religious and non-religious values that inform this area of the law in 
other jurisdictions. To this end, Tallon explains that the objective of conducting a 
comparative law analysis: 
 
…is not to find a foreign institution which could be easily copied, but to acquire ideas 
from a careful survey of similar foreign institutions and to make a reasonable 
transportation of those which may be retained, according to local conditions.67 
 
Due to the limitations and weaknesses of this method, the research conducted on the legal 
and judicial landscape of the United States of America, which is a secular country – cases 
such as Baxter v Montana,68 Death with Dignity Act enacted in Oregon in 1997, the public 
attention brought to the issue of assisted suicide by Jack Kevorkian, an American 
pathologist and right-to-die activist who assisted approximately 130 patients to end their 
lives, and the Terri Schiavo saga – has been excluded from this thesis. Similarly, the 
research conducted on the legal and societal landscape of Pakistan, which is a Muslim 
country, to establish the values that drive judicical and governmental decisions have also 
been excluded (along with the research conducted on the criminal, societal and medical 
landscape of Pakistan, in order to establish a comparative timeline with the events in 
England). Also, the research conducted on the reasons behind Switzerland being able to 
provide a lawful option of assisted suicide, and why England cannot do the same, which are 																																																								
64 Alan Watson, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge LJ 313, 317; 
and Tamara Hervey et al, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 
2011) 28 
65 Peter DeCruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (Cavendish 1995) 211 
66 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, ‘Comparative and International Health Law’ (2003) 14 Health 
Matrix 141 
67 Denis Tallon, ‘Comparative Law: Expanding Horizons’ (1969) 10 J Soc Pub T L 265, 266 
68 MT DA 09-0051, 2009 MT 449 
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primarily grounded in the varying political, religious and social perspectives has been 
excluded along with the examination of the law in Scotland and Ireland, due to the 
relationship between the Church and the States being so significantly different because of 
the very dissimilar political and societal landscape of each territory from England. 
 
1.5.2 Doctrinal Approach 
Another auxillary research method applied in this thesis is the doctrinal approach. The most 
important element of the doctrinal approach is that the material and content used for 
evaluation and investigation are predominantly primary sources, in order to understand the 
conceptual reasoning behind the case law, legislation and legal principles and policies on 
assisted suicide.69 To this end, Hutchinson explains that in this approach: 
 
…the essential features of the legislation and case law are examined critically and 
then all relevant elements are combined or synthesized to establish an arguably 
correct and complete statement of the law on the matter in hand.70 
 
This approach is often described as the study of case law and legal texts, which is why it is 
often, informally, referred to as “black-latter law”.71 To this end, McConville and Chui 
explain that: “…the black-latter law approach or doctrinal research relies extensively on 
using court judgments and statutes to explain law”.72 They go on to explain that “black-
letter research aims to synthesise, rectify and clarify the law on a particular topic by a 
distinctive mode of analysis to authoritative texts that consists of primary and secondary 
sources”.73 
 
This approach also lies at the heart of this thesis as it has been used to identify, evaluate, 
condense and critically review the content and material of the law – predominantly primary 
sources, such as policies and legislations (for example the Suicide Act 1961, the Coroner 																																																								
69 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal research: researching the jury’ in Dawn Watkins and 
Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 10 
70 ibid 9-10 
71 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Blackwell 2008) 28, 29 
72 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (EUP 2007) 3 
73 ibid 4 
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and Justice Act 2009 and the DPP’s Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of 
Encouraging or Assisting Suicide), governmental activities, policy-making (for example the 
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2014-2015) and case law (such as the Pretty, 
Purdy and Nicklinson cases) along with secondary sources to gather the commentary and 
views of academics and experts (in the form of legal dictionaries, textbooks, journal and 
newspaper articles to name a few) – on assisted suicide. Most of these resources were 
accessed from online sources, such as official websites, Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, and 
HeinOnline, along with books from University libraries. All the primary resources were 
read fully in order to ensure the originality, validity, reliableness of the sources and the 
subsequent analysis. Secondary resources were considered to provide background 
information, to ensure this thesis’ research is focused and original and to gather the 
opinions and views of various academic and experts. 
 
The doctrinal approach is “library-based” and focuses on the reading and analysis of 
primary and secondary sources of the law.74 A doctrinal approach is in stark contrast to 
empirical research. King and Epstein argue that purely theoretical, library-based research is 
never empirical and go on to explain that:75 
 
What makes research empirical is that it is based on observations of the world, in 
other words, fata, which is just a term for facts about the world. These facts may be 
historical or contemporary, or based on legislation or case law, the results of 
interviews or surveys, or the outcomes of secondary archival research or primary data 
collection… As long as the facts have something to do with the world, they are data, 
and as long as research involves data that is observed or desired, it is empirical.76 
 
Due to the limitations of the empirical method as it tends to be “the most time-consuming 
part of the investigation” (along with the arduous procedure to receive ethical approval),77 																																																								
74 Wing Hong Chui, ‘Quantitative Legal Research’ in McConville and Chui (n 72) 47 
75 Lee Epstein and Gary King, ‘Empirical Research and the goals of Legal Scholarship: The 
Rules of Inference’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review I, 3 
76 ibid 2-3 
77 Hilla Brink et al, Fundamentals of Research Methodology for Health Care Professionals 
(2nd edn, Juta and Co 2006) 54 
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the empirical research that sought to interview terminally-ill patients and their family and 
friends on whether or not they would want an assisted suicide for themselves or their loved 
ones, the religious or non-religious values that fuelled their decision, and their potential 
reaction if assisted suicide was hypothetically decriminalised and an available option to 
them was not conducted. Also, a media-analysis of newspapers, to gauge how the issues of 
suicide and assisted suicide are reported, depicted and represented in the news media in 
Pakistan (an Islamic country) and England (a Christian country, with a predominantly 
secular culture) was also performed and excluded from this thesis. The news media’s 
representation is significant to fuel a case of reform, to examine if it has impacted the 
momentum for reform of assisted suicide, the religious and non-religious values that are 
included in the reports and articles and analyse the reporting style of Pakistani and English 
newspapers to scope out the difference in reporting of the same issues, namely suicide and 
assisted suicide. However, as mentioned before, the empirical element in relation to this 
research has either not been conducted or excluded from this thesis, which also forms a 
limitation to this thesis.78 
 
1.5.3 Archival and Historical Research 
This thesis does conduct a significant amount of archival and historical research. Wesseling 
explains that the benefits of historical research is that, “A historic viewpoint… renders it 
possible to identify and analyse more carefully the factors which have affected, and which 
may still affect, the decisions made within the system”.79 Archival research is “the back-
bone of the traditional legal research”.80 In order to trace the discursive shift in language, 
archival material – particularly Parliamentary debates and statements from various 
representative bodies and members of faith groups such as the Church of England – as a 
historical resource forms the basis of this research methodology. 
 
 																																																								
78 Note: Research was conducted on the “conscientious objection clause”, in order to 
determine whether such a clause could sufficiently protect the religious and non-religious 
beliefs of individuals (if assisted suicide is allowed), which has been excluded but can form 
the basis for further research and development of this thesis. 
79 Rein Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Hart 2000) 4 
80 Naorem Sanajaoba, Law and Society: Strategy for Public Choice 2001 (Mittal 
Publications 1991) 89 
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Archival research, which is a qualitative method of research, allows for the examination of 
the archival and historical materials, particularly primary resources in the form of historical 
Hansard. These are then contrasted with contemporary Parliamentary debates, which then 
provides for a detailed understanding of the changing conceptions of the values that drive 
the debate on assisted suicide, such as the doctrine of sanctity of life and individual 
autonomy. It also allows the shift in language, over time, to be traced; which establishes the 
changing relationship between religious and non-religious values and the law in assisted 
suicide policy implementation. Jackson notes the advantages and limitations of the archival 
method: 
 
…involves describing data that existed before the time of the study… One of the 
biggest advantages of archival research is that the problem of reactivity is minimized 
because the data have already been collected and the researcher does not have to 
interact with the subjects in any way… [However] This second-hand collection 
means that the researchers can never be sure whether the data are reliable or valid. In 
addition, they cannot be sure that what is currently in the archive represents 
everything that was originally collected. Some data may have been purged at some 
time, and researchers will not know this… Thus as a research method archival 
research typically provides a lot of flexibility in terms of what is studied but no 
control in terms of who was studied or how they were studied.81 
 
This limitation only partially applies to this thesis. Some of the secondary resources –such 
as historic statements from faith groups, their members, clergymen and institutions – fall 
within this limitation. However, the significant majority of historical resources that have 
been examined are primary sources in the form of historic Hansard, which is contrasted 
with modern Parliamentary debates, and are accessible in their entirety without any parts 
being eradicated or expunged. 
 
 
 																																																								
81 Sherri L Jackson, Research Methods: A Modular Approach (3rd edn, Engage Learning 
2015) 105 
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1.5.4 Socio-Legal Evaluation 
A socio-legal evaluation, which is the main approach adopted in this thesis, allows of 
analysing the law and is directly linked to the examination of the social situation to which 
the law applies.82 Tamanaha argues that: 
 
The label socio-legal studies has gradually become a general term encompassing a 
group of disciplines that applies a social scientific perspective to the study of law, 
including the sociology of law, legal anthropology, legal history, psychology and the 
law, political science studies of courts, and science-oritented comparativists.83 
 
This thesis investigates how governmental, judicial and social institutions interact with 
each other and society and its citizens, particularly in relation to their extent of involvement 
on the area of assisted suicide (for example, the inclusion of the views of various religious 
and non-religious groups on assisted suicide in the policy-making process, which Chapter 
Six demonstrates). This approach is adopted to enable for a much wider analysis of the 
legal, religious, moral and ethical arguments and influences on the law on assisted suicide. 
This approach allows for the examination of the social, religious and secular influences that 
currently and have historically affected the debate on assisted suicide in England. 
According to Wheeler and Thomas, this approach represents “an interface with a context 
within which law exists”.84 The relationship between religion and law has historically been 
examined via two models. The first being the relationships between the Church and State 
model and the second between the State and the Individual. However, this thesis also 
analyses the relationship between the law and religion in the context of a third model: the 
connection between the individuals and various religious and non-religious communities 
present in multicultural English society.85 
 
 																																																								
82 David Schiff, ‘Socio-Legal Theory: Social Structure and Law’ (1976) 39 MLR 287, 287 
83 Brian Z Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of 
Law (OUP 1997) 2 
84 Sally Wheeler and Phil Thomas, ‘Socio-legal studies’ in David Hayton (ed), Law’s 
Future(s): British Legal Developments in the 21st Century (Hart 2000) 271 
85 A similar study was conducted in  Peter Edge and Graham Harvey ,  Law and Religion in 
Contemporary Society: Communities, Individualism and the State (Ashgate 2000) .  
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Banakar explains that “socio-legal research… offers an added value to both law and 
sociology by highlighting issues that neither law nor sociology can articulate or study 
alone”.86 This is demonstrated in Chapter Three of this thesis, which examines the 
phenomena of pluralism, multiculturalism and globalisation and how their relationship with 
the law on assisted suicide. It is necessary to take this approach because, as Banakar 
explains: 
 
Today, legal problems increasingly transcend the traditional national boundaries and 
jurisdictions of sovereign states begging for a new understanding of the role of law in 
society and a new approach to regulatory challenges… which is in tune with the new 
reality of the global society in which we live.87 
 
This thesis attempts to effectively coordinate and examine the relationship between the 
sociological landscape of globalised England along with the religious and secular values 
and beliefs in its multicultural and pluralistic society, with the doctrines and principles that 
guide the legal, judicial and governmental activities on the area of assisted suicide.88 The 
socio-legal approach described in this section guides the examination of the social, 
religious and ethical influences that have historically and continue to affect the debate on 
the legalisation of assisted suicide in multicultural England. 
 
All the research was continuously updated and is valid up until the 9th of June 2017. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
86 Reza Banakar, Normativity in Legal Sociology: Methodological Reflections on Law and 
Regulation in Late Modernity (Springer 2015) 38 
87 ibid 28 
88 Bhrigu Nath Pandey, Socio-legal Study of Cultural and Educational Rights of the 
Minorities (APH Publishing 2000) 14. For greater discussion on the relationship between 
law and politics, see: Mauro Zamboni, The Policy of Law: A Legal Theoretical Framework 
(Hart 2007) 29; and A Hunt, ‘The Politics of Law and the Law of Politics’ in K Tuori et al 
(eds), Law and Power: Critical and Socio-Legal Essays (Deborah Charles Publications 
1997) 51-53; and M Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of 
Embeddedness’ 91 (1985) American Journal of Sociology 495. 
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Chapter 2. Christian, Islamic and Secular Perspectives on Suicide and 
Assisted Suicide 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical background of the Christian and Islamic faiths by 
directly looking at religious texts, such as the Bible and the Quran, to determine their 
viewpoint on the issues of suicide and assisted suicide, which informs the remainder of this 
thesis. These two religions are chosen because they are the largest faiths in England and 
Wales. Particular importance is placed on the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is the main 
value, grounded in both religions, on which opposition to a reform in the law is based. 
 
The consistent opposition of the Christian faith, particularly the Church of England, is 
traced over the years along with the discursive shift in language of official bodies and their 
members to demonstrate how the meaning of sanctity of life has transformed over the years 
but the main principle, which attaches great value to human life and is always sought to be 
preserved by opponents of assisted suicide, remains the same. This shift, in both the 
understanding of the sanctity of life and secularism gaining ground, has led to this doctrine 
now being used in favour of reform on the basis that it is subjective and takes on quality of 
life considerations to ensure that individuals do not needlessly suffer and continue living in 
an undignified and deplorable state due to their illness. 
 
To develop this argument further, the position of the Church of England is contrasted with 
that of the Catholic Church, due to the historical ties of England with Catholicism before 
the Reformation period,89 and still continues to be a significant minority subculture in 
modern English society. It establishes that both the Church of England and Catholic Church 
maintain the same stance on this issue except Catholic clergy and official bodies continue 
to make significant religious references. 																																																								
89 For a detail discussion on Catholicism in the context of the Reformation: Lucy EC 
Wooding, Rethinking Catholicism in Reformation England (OUP 2003); Peter Marshall, 
Religious Identities in Henry VIII’s England (Ashgate 2006); Anthony Milton, Catholic 
and Reformed: The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Thought 1600-1640 (CUP 
1995); and G W Bernard, The King’s Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the 
English Church (Yale University Press 2005). 
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The position of the largest religion, Christianity, is compared with the views of the second 
largest religion, and the largest religious minority group, in England and Wales. It traces 
the views of the Islamic faith using religious texts to establish that the sanctity of life is also 
a deep-seated principle in the Islamic faith and is the main value against suicide and 
assisted suicide. 
 
Finally, this chapter contrasts these religious beliefs with the views of secularism on 
assisted suicide. This includes the influence secularism has had on the current 
understanding of the doctrine of sanctity of life, along with the secular values that influence 
this debate, such as the notion of autonomy, which is the most important value in favour of 
reform, as it provides every individual with the freedom to choose the time and manner of 
their death and the idea of human dignity that is used by both opponents and advocates of 
reform that seeks to preserve the ban on assisted suicide to protect the inherent dignity 
attached to life and is grounded in religion, especially the Christian faith. Opponents, 
particularly those whose objections are grounded in religious doctrine, argue that this 
inherent dignity is indestructible even if that life is diseased or debilitated and allowing 
assisted suicide is viewed as an attack on this human dignity. On the other hand, 
proponents, who predominantly identify with a secular school of thought, argue that 
allowing a lawful option of assisted suicide by respecting the autonomous decision of an 
individual to end life cherishes what they perceive to be an ignominious, demeaning and 
humiliating life. 
 
2.2 Christian understanding of suicide and assisted suicide 
Around one-third of the world’s population identifies with Christianity as their religion.90 It 
is the largest religion in England and Wales with 33.2 million followers.91 However, these 
followers do not actively practice it, with an average of less than 800,000 worshippers 
																																																								
90 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘The World Factbook’ (29 February 2016) 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
91 Office of National Statistics (ONS), ‘Religion in England and Wales 2011’ (11 
December 2012) <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_290510.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
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attending a Church of England service every Sunday.92 Even with this dramatic decline in 
Church attendance in Britain, its teachings have shaped and influenced the law in England 
for centuries and continue to do so since not practicing a religion does not undermine the 
strength of an individual’s or community’s religious beliefs.93 
 
The primary source of all religious doctrines for most Christians is the Bible.94 The Bible 
names six specific persons who committed suicide.95 Samson who committed murder-
suicide,96 Judas97 and Achitophael98 who hanged themselves, Zimri the King who burned 
his palace and died in the fire,99 Saul100 and Saul’s armour-bearer101 who died by falling on 
their own swords. The Bible even provides us with an example of an assisted suicide. 
Abimelech, who ordered his armour-bearer to run a sword through him.102 Toscano 
explains that: 
 
Abimelech was killed during the siege of Thebez. His forces broke through the city 
defences. All that was left was the fort inside the city. As he was preparing to burn 
the fort, a woman on the roof threw down a millstone. The stone landed on 
Abimelech’s head, crushing it. Abimelech tells his young armour-bearer [to kill 																																																								
92 Steve Doughty, ‘Just 800,000 worshippers attend a Church of England service on the 
average Sunday’ Daily Mail (22 March 2014) <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2586596/Just-800-000-worshipers-attend-Church-England-service-average-Sunday.html> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
93 Callum Brown, The Death of Christian Britain (Routledge 2013) 16 
94 Norman Doe, ‘The apostolic constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus: an Anglican juridical 
perspective’ (2010) 12(3) Ecc LJ 304, 316; Vicki Black and Peter Wenner, Welcome to the 
Bible (Continuum International Publishing 2007) 14; Bernard Vincent Brady, The Moral 
Bond of Community: Justice and Discourse in Christian Morality (Georgetown University 
Press 1998) 16; David Bauer and Robert Traina, Inductive Bible Study (Baker Academic 2011); 
and Millard Erickson, Introducing Christian Doctrine (2nd edn, Baker Academic 2006) 21 
95 Nila Retterstol, Suicide: A European Perspective (CUP 1993) 16; and Donal O’Mathuna, 
‘But the Bible Doesn’t Say They Were Wrong to Commit Suicide, Does It?’ in Demy and 
Stewart (n 13) 349 
96 The Holy Bible (King James Version) Judges 16:26-30 
97 ibid Matthew 27:5 
98 ibid 2 Samuel 17:23 
99 ibid 1 Kings 16:18 
100 ibid 1 Samuel 31:4 
101 ibid 1 Samuel 31:4-6 
102 ibid Judges 9:54 
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him]… So, here we have a case of assisted suicide. Abimelech was going to die 
anyway, so he might as well die like a warrior and eliminate the agony.103 
 
The Bible has not ratified a direct injunction against suicide or assisted suicide.104 It has 
been interpreted by its followers as providing support for the sanctity of life doctrine,105 
which, for most Christians, is based on the notion that human life is sacred: God gives life 
and only He can take it away.106 Even though this doctrine is not absolute neither does it 
seek to be preserved at all costs, it does form the foundation for the Christian religion’s 
generally held belief against suicide and assisted suicide.107 
 
Even though there are different interpretations by various denominations, most Christian 
denominations argue that the Bible expresses an embargo on suicide in Ecclesiastes 3:1-3. 
It provides that, “There is a time for everything. A time to be born and a time to die”. Many 
followers believe even the worst pain and suffering does not justify ending life.108 Certain 
denominations of Christianity, especially the Church of England and the Roman Catholic 
Church, believe that God has created human beings in His image.109 For example, Genesis 
																																																								
103 Thomas Toscano, You Are Evil (iUniverse 2006) 41. Also see: William Cutrer et al, 
Basic Questions on Suicide & Euthanasia: Are They Ever Right? (Kregel 1998) 35 
104 Kathryn Greene-McCreight, ‘Receiving Communion: Euthanasia, Suicide and Letting 
Die’ in Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Christian 
Ethics (2nd edn, Blackwell 2011) 433; and Margaret Pabst Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide 
(Prentice Hall 1995) 67 
105 James Keenan, ‘The Concept of Sanctity of Life and Its Use in Contemporary Bioethical 
Discussion’ in Kurt Bayertz (ed), Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity (Kluwer 1996) 3-4 
106 Bible, 1 Corinthians 6:19 and Romans 14:7-8. For greater discussion on sanctity of life 
in a Christian perspective: Jillel C Gray, ‘Foreign Features in Jewish Law: How Christian 
and Secular Moral Discourses Permeate Halakhah’ (DPhil thesis, University of Chicago 
2009) 130-142. Also see: David Smith and Timothy Sedwick, ‘Theological Perspectives’ in 
David Smith and Cynthia Cohen (eds), A Christian Response to the New Genetics: 
Religious, Ethical and Social Issues (Rowman and Littlefield (R&L) 2003) 4; and Lynn 
Bridgers, Contemporary Varieties of Religious Experience (R&L 2005) 181-182 
107 Mary Rowell, ‘Christian Perspectives on End-of-Life Decision Making: Faith in a 
Community’ in Kathryn L Braun, James H Pietsch, and Patricia L Blanchette (eds), 
Cultural Issues in End-of-Life Decision Making (Sage Publications 2000) 158 
108 Edmund Pellegrino, ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide’ in Kilner et al (n 26) 105-109 
109 Richard Scott Thorton, Inclusive Christianity: A Progressive Look at Faith (Hope 
Publishing House 2009) 162; James Noland, ‘Reframing the Abortion Question’ in Jeremy 
Evans and Daniel Heimbach (eds), Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously: The 
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1:27 provides that, “So God created people in His own image; God patterned them after 
Himself; male and female He created them”. Life is sacred because it is created in God’s 
image and should be preserved. It is belief in this doctrine of sanctity of life that leads 
devotees to acknowledge that it is unacceptable to end your own life or to end the life of 
another.110 It is accepted that ending the life of another is a sin and also implies that ending 
your own life by committing suicide is “self murder”,111 which is also a sin, against the 
sanctity of life doctrine and against the teachings of God. 
 
Various philosophers who identify with the Christian faith have based their ideas and 
theories on Christian doctrine. For example, St Thomas Aquinas, a thirteenth century 
Christian theologian, opposed suicide on the teachings of Christianity and the reasoning of 
pagan philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato;112 because suicide is contrary to natural 
law, or nature, which wants humans to survive, flourish and preserve life.113 In his book, 
Summa Theologica, he argues, firstly, that human life is the property of God and only His 
to destroy.114 Secondly, suicide is wrong as it is against the natural purpose of human 
life.115 Lastly, suicide causes a significant degree of societal harm hence is unjustifiable.116 																																																																																																																																																																									
Legitimacy of Religious Beliefs in the Marketplace of Ideas (B&H Publishing Group 2011) 
121; and Kim Gaines Eckert, Stronger Than You Think (InterVarsity Press 2007) 122 
110 Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics: Contemporary Issues and Options (2nd edn, Baker 
Academic Publishing 2010) 187 
111 Greene-McCreight (n 104); and H Tristram Engelhardt Jr, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
An Orthodox Perspective’ in Mark Carr (ed), Physician-Assisted Suicide: Religious 
Perspectives on Death with Dignity (Loma Linda University Press 2009) 74 
112 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Volumes 1-5 (Reprint, Cosimo Classics 2013); 
Judith Stillion and Eugene McDowell, Suicide Across the Life Span (2nd edn, Taylor and 
Francis (T&F) 1996) 8; and William Barclay, The Ten Commandments (Westminster John 
Knox Press 1998) 67 
113 Michael Cholbi, Suicide: The Philosophical Dimensions (Broadview Press 2011) 42; 
and Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: A Text with Readings (12th edn, Wadsworth 2014) 
479-480. For a detailed discussion on natural law and morality: Raymond Wacks, 
Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory (4th edn, OUP 2015) 14-67. 
For a detailed discussion the link between natural law and assisted suicide: Paterson, 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (n 20) 1-7, 15-47 and 167-172; and Paterson, Contribution 
of Natural Law (n 2) 137-330. 
114 Stillion and McDowell (n 112) 8; and Barclay (n 112) 67 
115 The notion of natural law, which seeks to preserve life, is relevant here; however, the 
original element of this research is to look at the role of religion (and not natural law) 
within the debate on assisted suicide. For a detailed discussion on the Natural Law Theory 
on Assisted Suicide: Paterson, Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (n 20) 
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Leget argues that: 
 
Aquinas’ threefold argumentation became incredibly successful in the history of 
thought. It became one of the classical arguments against suicide. Developing his line 
of reasoning according to the pattern of the triple structure of the sin, Aquinas’ line of 
reasoning was not original. The structure he used is an ancient one: it was commonly 
used by the Stoics. It can even be tracked back to Plato’s argument against suicide.117 
 
However, Leget does not acknowledge that Plato’s arguments were based on pagan 
understanding. In contrast, for Aquinas, the ultimate goal of followers of the Christian faith 
was to theologically and spiritually grow.118 Suicide was an act against God. It breached an 
individual’s obligations and duties to their community. Individuals and society have a 
natural inclination to preserve innocent human life. Thus, they should not violate it by 
ending life.119 
 
The Church of England teaches that the commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill”120 prohibits 
taking the life of another or committing self-murder. The Church of England teaches the 
inviolability of the doctrine of sanctity of life and is incontrovertibly against the idea of a 
change in the law on assisted suicide in England.121 To this end, the Chair of the Church of 
England’s group on Mission and Public Affairs, Philip Fletcher, stated “…the Church’s 
opposition… to a change in the law on assisted suicide, has been clearly, consistently and 
repeatedly stated.”122 Even though Christian doctrine has remained the same on this issue, 
there is a shift in language used by the Church to express its opposition. For example, in 																																																																																																																																																																									
116 Stillion and McDowell (n 112) 8; and Barclay (n 112) 67 
117 Paul van Geest et al (eds), Aquinas as Authority: A Collection of Studies Presented at 
the Second Conference of the Thomas Instituut Te Utrecht, December 14-16, 2000 (Peeters 
Publishers 2002) 280 
118 Robert Barry, ‘The Catholic Condemnation of Rational Suicide’ in James Werth (ed), 
Contemporary Perspectives on Rational Suicide (T&F 2013) 32 
119 ibid 32 
120 Bible 1 Exodus 20:13 
121 Mark Friedman, Assisted Suicide (Raintree 2012) 36; and Edward Dowler, Theological 
Ethics (SCM Press 2011) 14 
122 Church of England, ‘General Synod – November Group of Sessions’ (16 February 
2015) vol 45(3) Report of Proceedings 2014 1, 80 
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2015, Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury – who is the senior bishop and principal 
leader of the Church of England, the symbolic head of the worldwide Anglican 
Communion and the diocesan bishop of the Diocese of Canterbury – explained that: 
 
…respect for the lives of others goes to the heart of both our criminal and human 
rights laws and ought not to be abandoned… To change the law, however, to give 
individuals access to medically prescribed lethal drugs risks replacing the type of 
personal compassion that is forged in a lifetime relationship for a “process” marked 
by clinical and judicial detachment… the legal understanding of the “right to life” 
would have to be fundamentally rewritten and for no good effect... Once a law 
permitting assisted suicide is in place there can be no effective safeguard against 
this worry, never mind the much more insidious pressure that could come from a 
very small minority of unsupportive relatives who wish not to be burdened… the 
current law is not “broken”. There is no need to fix it.123 
 
Archbishop Welby’s explains that in order to preserve the sanctity of life, assisted suicide is 
prohibited by the Church of England, which is against a change in law on the basis that the 
notion of ‘right to life’ would fundamentally change, which would alter the moral fabric of 
society and ultimately lead to terminally ill, weak and elderly patients being pressured into 
a premature death.124 The manner in which Archbishop Welby explains the current position 
of the Church of England on assisted suicide is significantly different to the Geoffrey 																																																								
123 Justin Welby, ‘Why I believe assisting people to die would dehumanise our society for 
ever’ (The Guardian, 5 September 2015) 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/05/assisted-dying-suicide-bill-justin-
welby-archbishop-canterbury> accessed 21 May 2017. Note: In 2010, the former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, addressed the General Synod of the Church of 
England, stating that allowing assisted suicide (and autonomy to supersede the doctrine of 
sanctity of life) would lead to terminally ill patients and elderly individuals being pressured 
into a premature death. See: Rowan Williams, Archbishop’s Presidential Address to the 
General Synod of the Church of England (9 February 2010) 
<http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/590/the-archbishops-
presidential-address-general-synod-february-2010> accessed 21 May 2017 
124 For a detailed discussion on the reasons behind this opposition: Church of England, 
‘Protecting life – opposing assisted suicide’ <https://www.churchofengland.org/our-
views/medical-ethics-health-social-care-policy/assisted-suicide/protecting-life-opposing-
assisted-suicide.aspx> accessed 21 May 2017 
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Fisher, who was the Archbishop of Canterbury from 1945 to 1961, when he emphasised the 
doctrine of sanctity of life by stating that: 
 
Christian belief is that human life is to be treated as a sacred thing, as a trust from 
God, and not, save in utmost need, to be wittingly ended by man. That belief is 
being assaulted from many different directions… It must be asserted against 
suicide; it must be asserted against ideas for legalising euthanasia”.125 
 
It is submitted here that the two statements demonstrate a clear shift in language and 
approach to the doctrine of sanctity of life. Justin Welby does not use any religious 
terminology or reference to the tenets of the Christian faith. In contrast, Geoffrey Fisher 
discusses the beliefs of the Christian faith in relation to end-of-life issues. Even though this 
doctrine was never an absolute one, it was grounded in the Christian religion and had 
subsequently deeply embedded itself in English society by dictating that taking the life of 
another human being is wrong. For example, this doctrine was reflected in the criminal 
embargo on suicide, which was lifted in 1961, and it is still retained by the criminality 
attached to assisted suicide. However, the preeminence of this doctrine has weakened over 
time in line with the constantly changing and evolving moral, societal, political and cultural 
landscape of society, which is discussed in greater detail throughout the next chapter. In a 
western liberal democracy, such as England, where the dominant culture is now 
predominantly secular, the doctrine of sanctity of life is not stringently applied and has 
been separated from Christian tenets and religious traditions, which is reflected in the 
current Archbishop’s statement. 
 
In recent years, notable members of the Church of England clergy have changed their 
stance on the issue, which further demonstrates the shifting stance of the Christian religious 
community.126 In July 2014, former Archbishop of Canterbury and Life Peer in the House 
of Lords, George Carey, spoke out in favour of reforming the law. Lord Carey stated that: 																																																								
125 HL Deb 1 June 1948 vol 156 col 48 (Discussing the Criminal Justice Bill) 
126 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, ‘When my time comes, I want the option of an assisted 
death’ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/archbishop-desmond-tutu-
when-my-time-comes-i-want-the-option-of-an-assisted-death/2016/10/06/97c804f2-8a81-11e6-
b24f-a7f89eb68887_story.html?utm_term=.e2b910a77b1d> accessed 21 May 2017 
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The fact is that I have changed my mind. The old philosophical certainties have 
collapsed in the face of the reality of needless suffering… It was the case of Tony 
Nicklinson that exerted the deepest influence on me… Had I been putting doctrine 
before compassion, dogma before human dignity... In strictly observing accepted 
teaching about the sanctity of life, the church could actually be sanctioning anguish 
and pain.127 
 
Lord Carey’s momentous change in opinion – which is at odds with the official position of 
the Church of England – was based on the idea that upholding the doctrine of sanctity of 
life without any regard for the suffering and poor quality of life of individuals is against 
Christian teaching and that dignity in death, mercy and compassion should be enshrined in 
law.128 According to Lord Carey’s statement, the values that inform the debate on this issue 
have shifted from religious principles to quality of life considerations. The notion of quality 
of life encompasses the idea of autonomy (to allow individuals the freedom to choose the 
time and manner of their death) and the notion of preserving human dignity (to ensure that 
individuals do not needlessly suffer),129 and the idea of administering compassion by 
ending the life of an individual who is undergoing mental or physical pain and suffering.130 
 
However, the Church of England remains opposed to assisted suicide even if it is based on 
compassion for an individual going through pain and suffering and respecting their 
autonomous decision to end an undignified life. In 2012, the Church issued a statement 
supporting the current law on assisted suicide: 
 
 
 																																																								
127 Nicholas Watt, ‘Former archbishop lends his support to campaign to legalise right to 
die’ The Guardian (12 July 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/12/archbishop-canterbury-carey-support-
assisted-dying-proposal> accessed 21 May 2017. Note: For a detailed discussion on the 
Nicklinson case, refer to ch 5. 
128 John Bingham, ‘Lord Carey: I support assisted dying’ The Telegraph (11 July 2014) 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10963195/Lord-Carey-I-support-assisted-dying.html> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
129 Discussed in ch 2 
130 Discussed in ch 6 
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For the good of society and individuals, it is essential that both the law and medical 
practice embrace a presumption in favour of life... no one ought to be permitted 
actively to end another person’s life… every human being is of intrinsic value… 
eroding this principle would have a marked, detrimental effect on many aspects of the 
law, health and social care and on community cohesion… It is understandable that 
some people might wish to bring their lives to an end for a variety of reasons and the 
Church would wish to extend empathy and compassion to them, but this does not 
mean that the law ought to be changed to facilitate their wishes… The wishes and 
aspirations of individuals are important, but it is not possible to view these in 
isolation from the effects that they might have on other individuals and on society in 
general.131 
 
The entire statement demonstrates the clear shift in language that this thesis seeks to trace. 
It excludes any reference to Biblical or traditional religious views. The Church of England 
is increasingly using religious neutral language in order to convey their stance on assisted 
suicide. The Church is adapting to the changing society and basing its stance on secular 
values rather than religious tenets. The Church recognises the right to self-determine the 
time and manner of death as the central value in favour of allowing assisted suicide. 
However, the Church identifies other non-religious values – such as the need to protect the 
intrinsic value of human life, along with the need to protect vulnerable individuals from 
abuse and the rights of individuals and communities who do not support assisted suicide – 
which forms the basis for not allowing assisted suicide in a pluralistic society. This may be 
an attempt to relate to and preserve the beliefs of not only Christian denominations but also 
non-religious individuals and other religious groups in a pluralistic society who are 
opposed to allowing assisted suicide.132 																																																								
131 Revd Dr Brendan McCarthy, ‘Why the Church of England Supports the Current Law on 
Assisted Suicide’ <http://www.churchofengland.org/media/1747118/assistedsuicide.pdf> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
132 Note: A shift such as this has not been seen and is highly unlikely to occur in other 
faiths, particularly Islam, which, as discussed in ch 2 has a fixed and rigid structure 
(Sebastian Poulter, ‘Cultural Pluralism and its Limits: A Legal Perspective’ (Report of a 
Seminar, London, 1990) 1-3; and accepted by The Strasbourg Court (that Shari’ah law is 
invariable, non-negotiable and unchangeable) in the Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare 
Party) and others v Turkey App nos 41340/98, 41342/98 and 41344/98 (ECtHR, 31 July 
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2.2.1 The Catholic Church’s understanding of suicide and assisted suicide 
Like the Church of England, the primary source of all Catholic doctrines and teachings is 
the Bible. The paramount difference between the two Churches is that the Pope has 
supreme ecclesiastical authority in Catholicism.133 The Pope uses “encyclical letters” as a 
means to address Catholic bishops around the world.134 These letters deal with doctrinal or 
moral matters, exhortations, warnings or recommendations and provide counseling, 
guidance and shed greater light on points of religious doctrine.135 
 
Pope John Paul II issued an encyclical letter, on the 25th of March 1995, dubbing the 
practice of assisted suicide as a “tragedy” and described suicide and assisted suicide as a 
threat to every Christian’s life.136 The Pope decreed that, “Suicide is always as morally 
objectionable as murder. The Church’s tradition has always rejected it as a gravely evil 
choice… In its deepest reality, suicide represents a rejection of God’s absolute sovereignty 
over life and death”.137 The Pope interchanges the term “assisted suicide” with 
“euthanasia”. He declares: 
 
To concur with the intention of another person to commit suicide and to help in 
carrying it out through so-called assisted suicide means to cooperate in, and at times 
to be the actual perpetrator of, an injustice which can never be excused, even if it is 
requested… euthanasia appears all the more perverse if it is carried out by those, like 
relatives, who are supposed to treat a family member with patience and love, or by 																																																																																																																																																																									
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those, such as doctors, who by virtue of their specific profession are supposed to care 
for the sick person even in the most painful terminal stages.138 
 
The Pope goes on to state that “The height of arbitrariness and injustice is reached when 
certain people, such as physicians or legislators, arrogate to themselves the power to decide 
who ought to live and who ought to die”.139 The Pope warns that the civilised world would 
be adopting a “culture of death” by allowing assisted suicide.140 According to the Pope, 
every individual is a creation of God and created in His image.141 God’s image is inviolable 
ergo so is human life.142 Every follower has the responsibility to preserve the doctrine of 
sanctity of life and should always choose life over death. The Pope uses religious 
terminology along with very fervid language. The use of such powerful terms and phrases – 
such as equating the decriminalisation of assisted suicide as the adoption of a “culture of 
death” – occurs as a consequence of being in a social vacuum created by a staunch belief 
and conservation of religious tenets and not considering the views of those who tend to 
support the notion of assisted suicide. 
 
Like the Church of England, the Catholic Church believes in preserving the sanctity of life 
from its conception to its natural end.143 In Pope John Paul II’s encyclical letter, religious 
terminology and the argument that the doctrine of sanctity of life should always be 
preserved takes centre stage.144 The Catholic Church categorically prohibits suicide and 																																																								
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assisted suicide.145 As the law currently stands, it is in line with the viewpoint of the 
Christian faith and prohibits assisted suicide. However, the highly conservative and 
traditional views of the Catholic Church on assisted suicide are not in harmony with the 
viewpoint of the dominant, secular culture of multicultural English society, which seeks to 
reform the law on assisted suicide, and display the concerns and trepidation that Catholic 
citizens have about a change in the law on assisted suicide.146 The official position of the 
Catholic Church is arguably different to that of individuals who identify with Catholicism 
as their faith. A YouGov survey of 4500 people revealed that 75% of Catholics who took 
part in the survey supported a change in the law on the basis that individuals should have 
the right to choose when and how they end their lives.147 The remaining Catholics cited the 
need to protect vulnerable individuals as the main reason to retain the criminal embargo on 
assisted suicide.148 It is submitted that identifying with a religion that opposes assisted 
suicide and seeking to change the law on assisted suicide are no longer mutually exclusive. 
Individuals who support a change in the law may belong to a non-religious school of 
thought or may identify with a religion. Similarly, individuals who do not support a reform 
of the law may identify with either religion or secularism. Thus, as this thesis argues, both 
religious beliefs and non-religious viewpoints ought to be included in the debate; and the 
law on assisted suicide can be changed under the current liberal democratic, secular societal 
and cultural landscape of England, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
It can be concluded that the Catholic view seems to prioritise the preservation of life over 
the need to end the physical or mental suffering of a patient. However, doctors, for 
example, who assist their patient to end their life are wholly motivated by compassion and 
choose to respect the autonomous decision of the patient and may not view it as a breach of 
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the doctrine of sanctity of life and committing a cardinal sin.149 Every individual is the 
author of their own life, through the principle of individual autonomy, and has the inherent 
prerogative to choose the time and manner of their death.150 However, the Catholic Church 
refuses to acknowledge this inherent prerogative of every human being to make 
autonomous decisions and have full control of their life; thus they seek to maintain the 
criminal embargo on assisted suicide.151 
 
2.3 Islamic Tenets on Suicide and Assisted Suicide 
This section compares the tenets of the Christian faith with those of the second largest 
religious group in England and Wales, namely Islam, on suicide and assisted suicide. The 
teachings of Islam are the more lucid, consistent and transparent, compared to the views of 
the largest religion in the country, Church of England, on both issues; with a wealth of 
information in its Holy Books along with comments and explanations from Islamic 
scholars, who share the same viewpoint on these issues.152 With 22.74% of the entire 
world population153 (and 2.7 million people in England and Wales)154 following it, Islam is 
the second largest of all religions. Islamic law is called “Shari’ah”, which loosely translates 
to “the right path”.155 The two primary sources of Shari’ah law are the Quran and the 
Sunna.156 The Quran is the most important source of Shari’ah law;157 and is invariable and 																																																								
149 Anthony Fisher, ‘Why do Unresponsive Patients Still Matter?’ in Christopher Tollefsen 
(ed), Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The New Catholic Debate (Springer 2008) 31; and 
Melanie Williams, ‘Death rites: assisted suicide and existential rights’ (2005) Int J L C 183 
150 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon 1986) 369 
151 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, The Common Good and the 
Catholic Church’s Teaching (1996) para 36. Also see: Michael Manning, Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Killing or Care? (Paulist Press 1998) 30 
152 Christian Joppke, Veil: Mirror of Identity (Polity Press 2009) 9; and Manni Crone, 
‘Shari’a and Secularism in France’ in Jorgen Nielsen and Lisbet Christoffersen (eds), 
Shari’a as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with Europe (Ashgate 2010) 141 
153 CIA (n 90) 
154 ONS, ‘Religion in England and Wales 2011’ (n 91) 
155 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Law and Society: The Interplay of Revelation and Reason 
in the Shariah’ in John Esposito (ed), The Oxford History of Islam (OUP 1999) 108; and 
Bill Warner, Sharia Law for the Non-Muslim (Centre for the Study of Political Islam 2010) 
156 Kamali (n 155); and Shaheen Sardar Ali, ‘The Twain Doth Meet! A preliminary 
exploration of the theory and practice of As-Siyar and international law in the 
contemporary world’ in Javaid Rehman and Susan Breau (eds), Religion, Human Rights 
and International Law: A Critical Examination of Islamic State Practices (MNP 2007) 82. 
Note: A third source of Shari’ah law is commentaries by Islamic experts and jurists, over 
	 39	
unchangeable.158 Ahdar and Leigh note that in global terms, one of the most “dynamic 
religious movements” is Islam, which is “a more traditional, conservative and reactionary” 
faith as it has “not tried to adapt [itself] to the requirements of a scientific, secularized 
worldview” and, thus, has survived and flourished.159 Muslims, regardless of their 
denomination believe that the Quran was sent directly by Allah, through Angel Gabriel, to 
Prophet Mohammed over a span of 23 years.160 The Quran is primarily a religious text;161 
and it also provides extensive guidance on criminal and evidence law matters, receiving 
interest on monies and contract formation issues as in commercial law, and family law 
concerns such as marriage, divorce, and succession.162 In contrast, the Sunna, which is an 
Arabic word for “practice of the Prophet”,163 records the words, stories and activities of the 
Prophet and his companions and confidantes.164 Each individual story, that includes the 
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sayings of the Prophet, is known as a “Hadith”.165 These were recorded by the Prophet’s 
companions and passed down through generations.166 
 
The sanctity of life doctrine is a deep-rooted concept in Islam.167 Muslims believe that 
Allah has created and owns all life.168 Allah has fixed the time of birth and death of every 
follower.169 Chapter 22, Verse 66 of the Quran explains, “It is He, who gave you life, and 
then will cause you to die”. Thus, life is sacred and only Allah can end life through 
death.170 No human must intervene in this process. Muslims believe that Allah decides the 
length and quality of a person’s life, and only He can grant or end it. This credo forms the 
notion of sanctity of life under Islamic tenets and is reiterated throughout the Quran.171 
 
Committing suicide is explicitly forbidden in various Hadiths and throughout the Quran. 
Sahih-Al-Bukhari records that, “The Prophet said, ‘… And whoever commits suicide with 
piece of iron will be punished with the same piece of iron in the Hell Fire’”.172 It is taught 
that life is the greatest gift from Allah to every follower and it should be cherished, 
celebrated and protected at all times.173 The Quran confirms, “And do not kill or destroy 
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yourselves. Surely, Allah is Most Merciful to you”.174 Furthermore, Prophet Mohammed 
declared that, “He who commits suicide by throttling shall keep on throttling himself in the 
Hell Fire forever, and he who commits suicide by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing 
himself in the Hell Fire”.175 The Prophet is reported to have further explained that: 
 
Whoever purposely throws himself from a mountain and kills himself, will be in the 
Hell Fire falling down into it and abiding therein perpetually forever; and whoever 
drinks poison and kills himself with it, he will be carrying his poison in his hand and 
drinking it in the Hell Fire wherein he will abide eternally forever; and whoever kills 
himself with an iron weapon, will be carrying that weapon in his hand and stabbing 
his abdomen with it in the Hell Fire wherein he will abide eternally forever.176 
 
This suggests that Shari’ah law explicitly forbids committing suicide;177 and disobeying 
this tenet will result in punishment.178 Furthermore, Allah has endowed each follower with 
the power to endure pain.179 For followers of Islam, pain and suffering are part of being 
human.180 Even if a follower is in unbearable pain and suffering, they are forbidden to end 
their life. The Hadith confirms that, “There was amongst those before you a man who had a 
wound. He was in such anguish that he took a knife and made with it a cut in his hand, and 
the blood did not cease to flow till he died. Allah the Almighty said: ‘My servant has 
himself forestalled Me: I have forbidden him Paradise’”.181 																																																								
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The punishment for breaching the doctrine of sanctity of life is not confined to those who 
end their own lives, but also those who end the lives of others. Islam forbids murder.182 The 
Quran states that, “Whosoever has spared the life of a soul, it is as though he has spared the 
life of all people. Whosoever has killed a soul, it is as though he has murdered all of 
mankind”.183 Assistance in another’s suicide is considered murder in Islam. It is forbidden 
even if assistance is provided in order to relieve the pain and suffering of a patient. Prophet 
Mohammed stated that, “Allah did not reveal any disease, without also revealing its 
cure”.184 This indicates that Islam teaches its followers to be patient and stoical.185 Even if 
severe suffering and hardship befalls a Muslim, it is unacceptable to end their own life or 
that of another. Life is the most precious gift Allah has granted every follower and severe 
punishment ensues if a follower ends their own life or that of another.186 Similar to the 
position of the Christian faith, both suicide and assisted suicide are strictly forbidden in 
Islam; thus, there is no conflict between the two religions on these end-of-life issues. 
 
2.4 A Secular Approach to Suicide and Assisted Suicide 
One of the rudiments of modern British society is the concept of secularism.187 Secularism 
is not monolithic and has diversity within it such as non-theism or anti-religion. For the 
purposes of this thesis, secularism is taken to mean non-theism and consists of a temporal 
approach.188 It is necessary to critically review the secular values on assisted suicide 
because, as the next chapter establishes, the dominant culture of modern Britain has its 
roots in Christianity but is predominantly secular and pluralistic. 																																																								
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2.4.1 The role of secularism in English society 
The concept of secularism was first defined in 1846 by George Holyoake, who coined the 
term “secularism”, as meaning the “policy of life to those who do not accept theology”.189 
It was introduced into English society around the period of Enlightenment.190 
Juergensmeyer explains that: 
 
Prior to the… Enlightenment the words “religion” and “secularism” scarcely 
existed… The Enlightenment ushered in a new way of thinking about religion – a 
narrower definition of the term that encompassed institutions and beliefs that were 
regarded as problematic, and conceptually separated them from the rest of social 
life, which was identified by a new term, “secular”… After Enlightenment, the 
whole church and all of its customs… and beliefs were conceptually encompassed 
by the term “religion”. Everything else – including the moral basis for public order, 
social values, and the idea of moral communities – was secular.191 
 
The Enlightenment saw a demarcation of religious and non-religious values and activities. 
With the introduction of Darwinism and the theory of evolution, in the 19th century, the 
idea of divine creation and the guiding authority of God were challenged along with an 
academic and scientific disapproval of the New Testament.192 This led to the excoriation of 
Christian doctrines and secularism became a societal and political issue.193 This eventually 
changed the public and governmental landscape, which resulted in the weakening or ending 																																																								
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of religious ties with citizens, organisations and societies.194 In this context, secularism is 
defined as a “… process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
dominion of religious institutions and symbols”.195 It is a phenomenon towards a society in 
which religion is not given as much importance in public debates and policy-making.196 
 
Secularism has been defined as the separation of the Church from the State,197 absence of 
religion, the equal treatment of various religions, and even the replacement of religious 
beliefs by the social values common to a secular way of life.198 It is used to demarcate the 
ideas, practices, beliefs, values, traditions and institutions that are related to particular 
faiths;199 from the public sphere of the State and confine them to the private lives of 
citizens.200 It calls for the separation of all religious influences from government 
institutions in order to preserve the rights of everyone involved in a multicultural society.201 
It is submitted here that a multicultural society consists of individuals from different 
cultures and religious backgrounds. In order to guarantee that the rights of everyone are 
respected, the government cannot favour one religious group over the other and secularity 
has become the status quo.202 It is further submitted here that even though a preference for 
secular principles can be seen in governmental activities, especially policy making on most 
issues – and including the debate on assisted suicide to a significant degree – the notion of 
secularism ought not to deliberately seek to exclude the religious views of various 
communities within a society. Society, law and policy-making should not be inimical or 
unconcerned with religion. Under the notion of “new secularism”, a more contemporary 
approach is required to create equality between religious and non-religious viewpoints and 
to create a more harmonious and integrated society. This approach, of being more open and 																																																								
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inclusive of religious (instead of excluding or disregarding religious viewpoints)203 should 
especially be adopted by the government, particularly policy-makers. Policy makers, for 
example, can use morally neutral vocabulary that society as a whole can share, instead of a 
morality that is based on a specific religion.204 This preference for morally neutral 
vocabulary is based on the notion of secularism.205 Using neutral vocabulary does not 
necessarily mean that the views of different religions would be excluded from public 
debates or policy making. It is recommended here that both religious and non-religious 
views of individuals and communities should be included in the public debate – for 
example, through public calls for evidence – on assisted suicide and any subsequent policy 
making to ensure inclusion, equality and fairness to all members of society; and the final 
policy and laws should be expressed in a neutral vocabulary in order to avoid giving 
preference to any one religion and to be able to relate to every citizen, whether they identify 
with a religion or not.206 
 
Furthermore, the need to include the views of all the groups in a society is rooted in the 
notion of liberal democracy, the government ought not to use religion as a “constitutive 
device” to control and influence societal debates and issues.207 In a liberal democracy, there 
is inclusion of religious and non-religious views in order to guarantee fairness and equality. 
However, religious values, arguments and doctrines ought not to be exclusively used for 
governmental activities and action.208 Both religious and non-religious communities ought 
to be allowed to have an autonomous, free and independent existence in order to ensure that 																																																								
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no one religion can impose its beliefs on other individuals or communities, especially since, 
in a multicultural society, not everyone shares the same faith or identifies with the same 
values.209 It “is thought to offer a mode of democracy which allows individuals and groups 
to promote and defend their interests”.210 It is a representative democracy, operating under 
the theory of liberalism, which is “… a set of value commitments, for example to the 
individual’s freedom, autonomy, self-realization [and] rights protection” through codifying 
these values in the law.211 These liberal values and rights are enshrined in the law via the 
human rights movement, which is discussed in Chapter Five.212 John Stuart Mill argues that 
the values, interests and the conduct and actions in pursuit of fulfilling these values and 
interests are justified if they are useful and beneficial for the majority; otherwise they ought 
to be limited, as they then fall within a State’s jurisdiction, in order to ensure that an 
individual’s actions do not pose harm to others.213 Thus, inclusion of both religious and 
non-religious views allows for a wide range of values, which can be picked and mixed to 
benefit all of society and limit the more restrictive and disadvantageous principles that curb 
and infringe the rights and freedoms of others. Mill asserts – “the principle of liberty” – 
that: 
 
…the sole end for which mankind are warranted… in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear 
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.214 
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Mill adds to the understanding of this principle by explaining that the notion of duty or 
moral obligation underlies the principle of liberty. Mills explains that any conduct or 
actions that pose “a definite, damage or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or 
to the public, the case is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of morality 
or law”.215 Such conduct is of direct interest to society and any actions that pose a risk of 
damage fall within the State’s jurisdiction and can, thus, be limited in the interest of other 
citizens in society.216 Tribe exemplifies this theory by arguing that refusing to wear a seat-
belt, individuals endanger innocent third-parties and that by imposing a law that requires 
individuals to “buckle up… is a legitimate exercise of society’s power to protect the 
innocent not the entering wedge of tyranny”.217 Dershowitz builds on this argument by 
explaining that: 
 
Most car drivers who would not wear seat belts if the law were silent are not 
conscientiously opposed either to seat belts or to the legal requirement that they be 
worn; they are simply lazy, forgetful, or unconcerned; they will do whatever the law 
nudges them to do.218 
 
Wearing a seat belt not only protects the individual that is required to wear it but also other 
drivers and people of the general public. An individual should not have an objection to any 
law that protects other individuals’ and community’s rights, freedoms and even their health 
and well-being (even though that individual’s liberty may seem to be curtailed). Similarly, 
the ban on allowing euthanasia, for example, is to ensure that vulnerable individuals are not 
given unwanted deaths against their will, thus protecting their life and all the rights and 
freedoms that they enjoy along with it. However, as this thesis demonstrates, allowing 
assisted suicide (instead of euthanasia) only affects the individual who seeks the assistance 
and not any other individual or community at large. Thus, it is a justifiable option and 
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allowing it would not encroach on the rights, liberties and freedoms of others.219 
 
It is submitted that in a liberal democracy, the State ought to be “neutral in considering 
various conceptions of the good life”.220 Its role is to provide an unbiased and just 
framework in which fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals must be protected. As 
long as these rights and freedoms do not encroach on the rights and freedoms of others, 
every individual ought to have the freedom to choose how they live and die. The State 
ought not to favour one religious belief over another religious or even non-religious 
viewpoint. This thesis contends a “negative seat belt argument” here. If assisted suicide 
were to be decriminalised, the law would not require every single citizen to seek an assisted 
suicide. However, it should be open to providing the opportunity to seek an assisted 
suicide, on a case by case basis, where an individual is under unbearable pain and suffering, 
that cannot be cured or relieved via palliative care, and the appropriate set of safeguards 
have been met to ensure that the individual is not under any pressure, coercion or going 
through any mental health problems, the individual ought to be allowed to assert their 
autonomy and choose the time and manner of their death. 
 
2.5 The secular values that fuel the debate on assisted suicide 
2.5.1 Value of Life 
The religious doctrine of sanctity of life, which opposes the idea of allowing individuals the 
freedom to choose the time and manner of their death, is enshrined into societal values due 
to the historical ties of the Christian faith with Britain. This doctrine has evolved and 
transformed even when it was detached from religious beliefs and tenets. Over time, and 
influenced by pluralism and multiculturalism, it has evolved into a basic moral principle.221 
The sanctity of life doctrine is now part of secular morality.222 The modern, secular version 
of the notion of sanctity of life does not put emphasis on the traditional religious rationale 
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behind sanctity of life.223 It does not consider life as a gift from God or view sanctity of 
life, or ending life, as a sin.224 The non-religious sanctity of life principle ascribes an 
intrinsic value to every human life.225 To this end, Keown argues that: 
 
Human life is the supreme good and one should do everything possible to preserve 
it… Regardless of the pain, suffering, or expense that life-prolonging treatment 
entails, it must be administered: human life is to be preserved at all costs… Human 
life is a basic, intrinsic good. All human beings possess, in virtue of their common 
humanity, an inherent, inalienable, and ineliminable dignity. The dignity of human 
beings inheres because of the radical capacities, such as for understanding, rational 
choice, and free will, inherent in human nature.226 
 
However, it is submitted that Keown’s argument does not take into consideration that the 
ability to make autonomous choices, on which the dignity of human beings rests upon, also 
allows individuals the freedom to choose the time and manner of their death. The intrinsic 
value is not ascribed to individuals on the basis that human life is sacred, but rather to 
individuals’ right to self-determination, voluntariness, free choice, autonomy, and because 
of their dignity.227  
 
2.5.2 Human Dignity 
It is argued that the notion of human dignity emanated from religious tenets. Kilner et al 
note that: 
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For Christians, human dignity resides in the fact that a person is a creature of God 
who has value simply because one is a person, and not because others attribute 
dignity to him or her. Human dignity, therefore, can never be lost, even when one is 
shunned because of one’s appearance, incontinence, or pain. A human person is a 
creature for whom God chose to die. How can such a creature lose his or her God-
given dignity? Human dignity, therefore, is not lost by the retarded, the demented, 
those in permanents vegetative states… To deny dignity to those whose sensorial 
states are impaired is to deny the respect owed them as persons… On the Christian 
view, a dignified death is one in which the suffering person takes advantage of all 
the measures available to relieve pain and ameliorate the things that cause a loss of 
imputed dignity but also recognizes that his or her innate dignity remains.228 
 
It is submitted that the theological, particularly Christian, view on dignity seems to be that 
individuals have an inherent state or quality of being worthy of honour and respect by 
virtue of being human. This inherent dignity cannot be devalued or lost because of disease 
or disability. Neither is this inherent dignity a subjective commodity, which is dependent on 
the individual’s own estimation of their quality or life nor how others perceive it. As the 
next chapter demonstrates, with the rise of various phenomena namely secularism and 
multiculturalism, the religious connotations have been detached from this understanding 
and opponents of assisted suicide use this aforementioned definition of dignity to reject the 
idea of reform.  
 
However, with no religious underpinnings, the idea of dignity has turned into a secular 
value that proponents also use in favour of reform. Human dignity provides individuals 
with the moral right to decide the value and worth of their life by allowing them to make 
their own choices.229 To this end, Malpas and Lickiss argue that “…human dignity is 
respected and upheld only when the autonomy of human decision-making is itself respected 
and upheld”.230 Their argument is accurate in the sense that autonomy is the capacity to 
make decisions relating to life, how to live it and even when to end it. It provides 																																																								
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individuals the right to make self-governing and free choices. Individuals who are not 
allowed this right to self-determination or have decisions made on their behalf lack dignity 
and those who have this right epitomise true human dignity.231 Simply put, the relationship 
between the two notions is that dignity consists of the possession of a right to self-
determination. 
 
It is submitted that with medical advancements providing healthcare professionals and 
individuals with the ability to preserve life through disease, illness, disorders and 
disabilities; some individuals may now feel that they are being forced to continue 
preserving their life and endure, what they perceive to be, an undignified existence. To this 
end, Biggs explains that “…the ability to preserve life despite trauma and terminal disease, 
has resulted in more people demanding the right to die with dignity rather than endure the 
perceived indignity of a dependent existence”.232 
 
It is further submitted that individuals who view their existence as being of poor quality, 
having no value, degrading and undignified ought to be given the lawful option to end their 
life in a time and manner of their of own choosing. Thus, human dignity is a notion that can 
be predicated of a person: as it is reliant on the idea of self-governance and autonomy. 
“Death with dignity” has become an indirect expression that is substituted when referring to 
assisted suicide. Support for a change in the law on assisted suicide is driven by the notion 
of human dignity, which seeks to end the mental or physical pain and suffering of an 
individual, avoid humiliation and indignity and upholds an individual’s right to self-
determination, self-worth and dignity.233 
 
Orfali accurately encapsulates the argument in favour of allowing “death with dignity” 
because it: 
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…lets you decide how much function and dignity you want left when you die. You 
can wait until everything shuts down, or you can go sooner. You get to determine 
when enough is enough… At the end, you gradually start to lose control over every 
function. You feel totally helpless. You’re at the mercy of the disease, your 
caregivers, and the system. The assisted dying option puts you back in control.234 
 
However, various academics argue that choosing an assisted death is an attack on human 
dignity because such a choice is based on the pretense that the individual’s life has no value 
or meaning due to their disease or disability.235 For example, Sulmasy, a Catholic medical 
doctor and American ethicist, argues that: 
 
This premise is necessary in order to justify killing oneself, or to justify asking to be 
killed. Some may respond that [assisted dying] is justified whenever one determines 
that one’s life no longer has enough dignity, but to do so, such persons would need 
to measure dignity in terms of either pleasure, or freedom, or control, or social 
worth or claim that dignity is purely subjective… euthanasia and assisted suicide are 
freely chosen, willful assaults upon human dignity, based upon the premise that a 
human life has no meaning or value.236 
 
Sulmasy’s view is subjective and based primarily on a theological perspective – as he is a 
former Franciscan friar and his research interests are within spirituality, religion and their 
role in medicine – who argues that an illness is merely an assault on human dignity and 
does not completely destroy it.237 Various studies have established that patients subjectively 																																																								
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cite the “loss of dignity” as the main motivation for requesting an assisted death.238 The 
medical symptoms and the pain and suffering of terminal diseases, often lead to 
dependency on others, which may be perceived by some patients as a loss of dignity.239 It is 
submitted that this suffering and dependency can be viewed as a kind of indignity. Some 
patients cannot be cured or have their pain eased through palliative care and have no option 
but to end life. Thus, disease and disability diminish human dignity. Every individual’s 
dignity and freedoms should always be propagated and protected.240 Dignity can be 
restored either by curing that disease or by respecting an individual’s autonomous choice to 
end the disease-ridden life.241 As Chapter Five will argue, this ability to make autonomous 
choices – which emanates from the notion of human dignity that is protected by Article 3, 
which is further explored in Section 5.5 – is the main value on which a reform of the law 
could be based. The next subsection examines the theoretical background of these concepts: 
particular importance is given to the notion of autonomy, which is the most significant 
value that informs the debate on assisted suicide. 
 
2.5.3 Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy is central to the notion of secular morality. The idea of individual 
autonomy has its origins in the Greek language; “auto” meaning “self” and “nomos” 
meaning “law”, to create the concept of self-law or self-government. The principle of 
autonomy recognises the value of being able to make choices in life and that no man or 
State can interfere with this ability to choose. This ability to choose is what gives an 																																																																																																																																																																									
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individual sovereign control over their life. Roberts accurately argues that: 
 
Choice… is prerequisite to leading a successful, fulfilling and authentic existence 
according to one’s own moral lights. To have an autonomous life, a person must be 
free to deliberate about and choose the projects he or she will take up in life from an 
adequate range of options accommodating diversity of human aptitudes, abilities, 
interests and tastes… Autonomy makes a person the sovereign authority over his 
own life.242 
 
Individual autonomy is taking active steps to live in accordance with one’s own opinions, 
choices, preferences, values, ethics, and identity within the limitations of what one regards 
as morally acceptable.243 This right to autonomy applies to choices, of how to live, and also 
being able to choose the time and manner of death.244 Committing suicide can be a 
manifestation of this right to autonomy.245 However, manifesting this right is restricted 
when an individual is physically disabled and unable to end their life without assistance. 
Zucca cogently argues that: 
 
The question is whether we should allow [individuals to end life] by assisting them 
in their last informed decision to quit their lives. Religious institutions… want to 
resist this suggestion… Non-religious people disagree with the idea that God is the 
ultimate adjudicator… they generally rely on the value of individual autonomy… 
Life is theirs and they certainly cherish it. But if for some reason they have become 
detached from their life and only think limiting the pain life protracts, then they 
should be given a chance to end their life.246 																																																								
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The autonomous desire to end life is, as discussed earlier in this chapter, against the beliefs 
of many Muslims and Christians who believe that God can control when and where an 
individual’s life ends and not a matter that the individual controls. However, exercising the 
right to self-determination is what contributes to the social, physical and mental well-being 
of an individual and preserves the inherent dignity that every individual possesses.247 
Whilst autonomy is an innate right that every human being possesses,248 restrictions need to 
be placed on this right in order for individuals to engage in social contact and relationships 
with other members of society, who are equally autonomous beings, in order to preserve 
their autonomy.249 To this end, Hoffman and Okany argue: 
 
Limitations must be placed on human rights when necessary for ensuring that 
individuals do not exercise their freedoms in a way that infringes on the freedoms of 
others. [For example] One rationale recognised in human rights law for imposing 
limitations on the right to free speech is the protection of others against hostility or 
even violent attacks resulting from what is generally referred to as ‘hate speech’…  
In line with the aforementioned purpose of limitations placed on human rights, its 
prohibition or prevention would constitute striking a balance between the right of an 
individual to freedom of expression and the human rights of persons forming the 
target of such incitement, such as their right to life and their right not to be 
subjected to violent attacks.250 
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This argument indicates that autonomous desires must be limited; keeping in mind the 
relationship and effect their autonomous actions have on the rest of society and its 
members.251 Autonomy can never be viewed as absolute and exercised without restrictions 
because society and the State place rules, laws, regulations and restraints on citizens 
through legislation and cultural norms.252 There must be certain limitations on the ability to 
exercise and perform actions in order to fulfill the choices an individual makes, so that the 
rights and autonomy of others are protected and preserved. These limitations are placed, in 
accordance with the objective criteria set out by international human rights standards, in 
order to protect the rights of other individuals and communities in a pluralistic society.253 
 
The need to strike a balance between the rights of all individuals and communities is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five. The ability to end their life, whenever an individual 
chooses, is the ultimate act of autonomy. It is possible to exercise this right by committing 
suicide. However, in a few exceptional cases, for example when a patient is physically 
disabled and unable to commit suicide alone, they seek help from another individual to 
assist their suicide. This is when there is a need to draw the line: when a patient decides to 
seek an assisted suicide, based on their right to self-determination; but due to the 
criminality attached to assisted suicide cannot seek to do so without encroaching on the 
rights of the person who provides the assistance.254 
 
However, the idea of personal autonomy allows every individual the freedom to determine 
their course in life, the freedom to choose goals and accomplish them, to be free from 
coercion and, in the absence of any unreasonable restrictions, to carry out their desires and 
choices, and even provides every individual with the freedom to act. Raz argues that: 
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The ideal of personal autonomy… holds the free choice of goals and relations as an 
essential ingredient of individual well-being. The ruling idea behind the ideal of 
personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous 
person is a (part) author of his life. The ideal of personal  autonomy is the vision of 
people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through 
successive decisions throughout their lives… Autonomy is opposed to a life of 
coerced choices. It contrasts with a life of no choices, or of drifting through life 
without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.255 
 
It is submitted that what makes individuals truly autonomous is not the content or substance 
of their goals but rather their conduct and actions that fulfill these goals.256 Even though the 
State has withdrawn from certain areas by giving individuals complete autonomy over how 
they choose to conduct their lives; various rights are still limited.257 Thus, the autonomous 
person is “part author” of their life. The other part author is the State, who, in accordance 
with international human rights standards, can limit the actions or conduct that result from a 
choice made by the individual.258 
 
However, the notion of individual autonomy remains the most important value used in 
favour of the current assisted suicide movement.259  Judge Stephen Reignhardt argues that: 
 
…the decision how and when to die is one of the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, a choice central to personal dignity and 
autonomy. A competent, terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure of 
his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death rather 
than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of helplessness – 
diapered, sedated and incompetent.260 
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Autonomy allows individuals to make the self-determining decision to choose the time and 
manner of their death. It also allows these individuals to seek assistance in performing that 
decision. Even though this right to receive assistance cannot be absolute, as restrictions 
must be placed to protect vulnerable individuals and even protect the religious freedoms of 
individuals who may have religious or non-religious objections to assisted suicide;261 and 
even persons who do not wish to provide assistance. It is submitted that terminally ill 
patients should have their suffering relieved by all means necessary including a lawful 
option of assisted suicide.262 The ultimate expression of autonomy is an individual choosing 
the manner and time of their death. Autonomy also gives an individual the freedom to ask 
for assistance in performing that autonomous act of ending life. Allowing assisted suicide 
(instead of euthanasia) safeguards individuals from being ‘killed off’ against their will as 
the final action that ends life must be taken by the individual who seeks the assistance, thus, 
it is a justifiable course of action. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the foundation and development of the doctrine of sanctity of 
life, which dictates that suicide and assisted suicide are impermissible, in both the Christian 
and Islamic faiths. It also traced the evolution of this doctrine from a religious notion into a 
secular, non-religious principle along with the idea of individual autonomy, which is the 
most significant value in movement to reform the law on this area. 
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The teachings of the Christian faith have influenced the law of England for centuries. This 
chapter has traced the origins of the admonition of the Christian faith on the issues of 
suicide and assisted suicide, which emanate from the doctrine of sanctity of life. Whilst this 
doctrine is not explicitly set out in the Bible, followers of the Christian faith have 
interpreted it to mean that life is sacred; as God has created humans in His image and only 
He can give or take life. Thus, it is inadmissible to end your own life through suicide or that 
of another by assisting their suicide. Belief in this doctrine is shared by the Islamic faith, 
which dictates that Allah owns all human life and decides its length and quality, is 
reiterated throughout Shari’ah law. No human being must interfere in this process by 
ending their life or that of another. Even though this doctrine is not absolute: it only forms 
the rudiments of the generally held belief against suicide and assisted suicide in both faiths. 
 
Over the years – with the influence of secularism, which was traced in this chapter, and 
multiculturalism, which is analysed in the next chapter – this doctrine has transformed into 
a secular, non-religious principle. It is now detached from its religious underpinnings and 
does not have a sacredness attached to it. Instead, life is viewed as having an inherent 
value, which includes the individual’s right to self-determination and free choice. This right 
to autonomy is the most significant value in the debate to legalise assisted suicide, as it 
allows individuals to decide how they live and even choose the time and manner of their 
death. 
 
A central theme of this thesis is tracing the shift in language to better understand the 
influence and relationship of religion with the law on assisted suicide. Even though the 
terminology is largely the same, the understanding of the doctrine of sanctity of life has 
significantly changed. The different understandings of this doctrine are reflected in societal 
activities. For example, in 1948, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher, used 
religious terminology and references to explain that the “Christian belief” is that life is “a 
sacred thing”. This position is compared with Archbishop Welby’s statement in 2015, 
which contains no ecclesiastical references, where he suggests, “respect for the lives of 
others… ought not to be abandoned”. This shift in language can be attributed to the 
demarcation of religion from societal activities, which clearly demonstrates the disparate 
approach to the doctrine of sanctity of life. 
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The modern statements made by the Church of England further illustrate this shift in 
approach and language. They exclude Biblical references, ecclesiastical terminology and 
fervent religious language. Neutral, non-religious language is used in order to relay the 
stance of the Church against allowing assisted suicide. The Church recognises the notion of 
autonomy as being the most important value that informs the debate and on which a change 
in the law is possible. However, it argues that individual autonomy is superseded by the 
need to respect human life. 
 
Opponents of reform, including religious groups such as the Church of England, argue that 
retaining the criminal embargo on assisted suicide protects this intrinsic value. However, 
the contemporary understanding of the doctrine of sanctity life dictates that it is a subjective 
notion and takes on quality of life considerations. This doctrine is now based on an 
individual’s own view of their life, which is influenced by their conscience and beliefs. If 
they deem their quality of life to be so poor and their dignity to be in a deplorable state, 
there is a case for allowing assisted suicide; under definite circumstances, where the 
individual has a clear, informed and consistent wish to end life and their humiliation and 
indignity can be separated from mental illness and coercion or pressure. 
 
Even though the debate on assisted suicide is now predominantly fuelled by secular values, 
society, the law, and governmental activities, particularly policy-making, should not 
exclude religious beliefs in order to ensure equality, fairness and concord in society. 
Furthermore, under the “new secularism” approach, discussed in this chapter, both religious 
beliefs and non-religious principles ought to be continually included in the debate on 
assisted suicide in liberal democratic English society to ensure that there is objectivity, 
inclusion and fairness in society and the final policy or laws ought to be in a non-religious 
language in order to ensure that no one religion is given preference over the other and to be 
able to relate to every citizen in society, regardless of their religious or non-religious 
affiliation. 
 
In an attempt to provide a more definitive answer to the role of religion and secularism in 
multicultural English society, the remainder of this thesis explores their influence, as set out 
in this chapter, on the momentum for reforming the law on assisted suicide in England. 
	 61	
Chapter 3. The influence of multiculturalism on assisted suicide policy-
making in England 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the background analysis that partly informs the remainder of this 
thesis. It examines the meaning of multiculturalism, which consists of a dominant culture 
and minority subcultures, to establish the role that religion and secularism plays within 
modern, pluralistic, multicultural English society. In doing so it examines the historical 
development of how English society became multicultural, namely through waves of 
immigration from former colonies, especially the Indian subcontinent that brought a 
significant amount of individuals who identify with the Islamic faith into the country.263 It 
also discusses the negative perception of Muslims, the reasons behind the intolerance and 
prejudice towards them, whether the demands made by the Islamic community are 
unreasonable and conflicting with the dominant culture of English society, which is 
increasingly secular but has deep-rooted ties with the Christian faith. This includes the 
accommodations made by government in order to integrate minority subcultures into 
contemporary English society. It establishes that the current societal landscape of English 
society, has an increasing separation of religion from public institutions and governmental 
activities yet the inclusion of religion has not been completely abandoned and religion 
continues to receive representation in public bodies, such as the House of Lords, and even 
governmental activities, particularly the law-making process. The role of religion in 
governmental activities and public bodies is studied to establish whether it influences the 
debate on assisted suicide, especially the process of reforming the law in this area, in a 
liberal democratic country such as England. Finally, this chapter establishes that religion is 
a significant part of the culture of English society. However, even with the deep-seated ties 
English culture has with the Christian faith, which continue to receive inclusion in public 
bodies and governmental activities, the pluralism and fluidity that is present in multicultural 
English society have decreased its influence. This means that English society is no longer 																																																								
263 Note: Immigrations patterns have radically changed in the 21st century with the “free 
movement of workers/persons” from the EU, which are mentioned in ch 3. However, the 
current debates around the EU Referendum have been excluded from this thesis due to their 
elaborate, complex and labyrinthian nature, which cannot be accommodated due to the 
word limitation. 
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deeply tied to the tenets and historical traditions of the Christian faith and societal and 
governmental activities have become predominantly secular. 
 
3.2 What is multiculturalism? 
The concept of culture has to be understood first to better comprehend the meaning of 
multiculturalism.264 Culture has been defined as the intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic 
development of an individual, group or society.265 It is a phenomenon, which encapsulates 
the entire way of life, activities, beliefs, values and customs of a people, group, or society; 
and is generally understood as an intricate, constantly evolving concept.266 Figueroa 
broadens the definition by cogently arguing that: 
 
Culture does not refer only to folklore, dress, diet or popular music. It embraces all 
that a group of people have together realised and passed on as part of their heritage. 
It refers especially to shared symbolic and cognitive systems, to language, beliefs, 
values, religion, way of life, and social institutions or patterns.267 
 
Over time, these values and practices “become a way of life of a group of people… [and] 
handed down from one generation to the next”.268 However, defining multiculturalism is 
much more intricate. Understanding the definition and mechanism of multiculturalism 
helps with analysing how the phenomenon develops notions relating to assisted suicide. 
Multiculturalism is a complex term. It refers to the openness and presence of more than one 
culture in society.269 For example, the United Nations270 – which is an organisation 																																																								
264 Fernando Falcony Tella, Challenges for Human Rights (MNP 2007) 3-16 (This article 
discusses multiculturalism as a contemporary phenomenon, the concept of tolerance, 
individual and collective rights and respect for minority subcultures) 
265 Phil Smith and Alexander Riley, Cultural Theory: An Introduction (2nd edn, Blackwell 
2009) 1 
266 Nancy Adler, ‘Do Cultures Vary?’ in Theodore Weinshall (ed), Societal Culture and 
Management (Walter de Gruyter & Co 1993) 29 
267 Peter Figueroa, ‘Equality Multiculturalism, Antiracism and Physician Education in the 
National Curriculum’ in John Evans (ed), Equality, Education and Physical Education 
(Burgess Science Press 1993) 91 
268 Adler (n 266) 29 
269 Figueroa (n 267) 91 
270 For a detailed discussion on the aims and objectives of the UN: United Nations, ‘What 
We Do’ <https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=WWD> accessed 21 May 2017 
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composed primarily of sovereign States to promote international co-operation, which was 
established after the Second World War in order to ensure that such a conflict never 
happened again – has defined multiculturalism as “the existence of ethnically or racially 
diverse segments in the population of a society or State”.271 A multicultural society is by 
nature heterogeneous and culturally diverse.272 It is characterised by a plurality of cultures; 
their beliefs, traditions and practices, which collectively constitute that society’s content 
and identity.273 This plurality consists of various cultures and identities and tends to consist 
of a dominant culture and various minority groups that form the subcultures. 
 
Pluralistic societies are linked with the existence of individuals and groups of different 
religious, ethnic and racial backgrounds, such as national minorities and immigrants.274 
Multiculturalism seeks to maintain this heterogeneity of cultures. Multiculturalism is 
multifaceted:275 it consists of several cultural and ethnic groups, various lifestyles, different 
religions and languages, and groups with various socio-economic and political backgrounds 
within the society.276 This creates pluralism, diversity and heterogeneity in a society, which 
should be encouraged, to flourish and maintain the different identities of various groups 
within that society. It is submitted here that multiculturalism is a beneficial phenomenon: it 
celebrates the difference between cultures, seeks to protect cultural variety,277 and even 
recognises, accepts and promotes these differences.278 																																																								
271 Christine Inglis, ‘Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity’ (UNESCO 
MOST Policy Paper No 4, 1996) 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/105582e.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
272 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Dialogue between cultures’ in Ramon Maiz and Ferran Requejo (eds), 
Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism (T&F 2004) 
273 ibid 
274 Jan Niessen, Diversity and Cohesion: New challenges for the integration of immigrants 
and minorities (COEP 2000) 37 
275 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Multiculture (R&L 2007) 89 
276 Niessen (n 274) 37; and Will Kymlicka, ‘The rise and fall of multiculturalism? New 
debates on inclusion and accommodation in diverse societies’ (2010) 61(199) International 
Social Science Journal 97, 102. 
277 Michel Wieviorka, ‘Is Multiculturalism the solution?’ (1998) 21(5) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 881-910; and Giuliana Prato, ‘Introduction – Beyond Multiculturalism: 
Anthropology at the Intersections Between the Local, the National and the Global’ in 
Giuliana Prato (ed), Beyond Multiculturalism: Views from Anthropology (Ashgate 2009) 7 
278 Margaret Adsett, ‘The Notion of Multiculturalism in Canada and France: A Question of 
Different Understandings of Liberty, Equality and Community’ in Reza Hasmath (ed), 
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3.2.1 The relationship between multiculturalism and globalisation 
Multiculturalism is the corollary of globalisation, which can be divided into three, 
interlinked dimensions: economic, political and social.279 Van Krieken et al argue that: 
 
We have become used to thinking of economic activity as global… many families 
are also spread around the world, political action takes place as much in world 
forums as it does in national parliaments or congress, and [even] cultural 
innovations spread around the world [very quickly]… Thinking globally is not in 
itself especially new.280 
 
The main thrust of Van Kreiken’s argument is that globalisation is not a new phenomenon. 
Furthermore, its strength and magnitude has increased over the years and there is an 
intertwinement of modern societies and countries through the increased movement of 
goods, services, information and people and interdependence on technological, scientific 
and cultural advancements.281 It is submitted here that globalisation and multiculturalism 
are mutually interdependent.282 Both these phenomena can be predominantly attributed to 
waves of immigration, which is discussed in the next section, that have changed the ethnic 
and social landscape of cities and even entire countries. Immigration in England and Wales 
has unprecedentedly increased in recent decades. The 2011 Census reveals that the foreign-
born population of England and Wales has increased from 4.6 million in 2001 to 7.5 																																																																																																																																																																									
Managing Ethnic Diversity: Meanings and Practices from an International Perspective 
(Ashgate 2011) 48 who argues that diversity ought to be allowed to be expressed in private 
life and public spheres of society. Note: There are antithetical arguments presented by other 
academics: Paola Catenaccio, ‘Between multiculturalism and globalisation’ (2003) 
<http://www.ledonline.it/mpw/allegati/mpw0303catenaccio.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017; 
and Robert Van Krieken, Daphne Habibis, Philip Smith, Brett Hutchins, Greg Martin and 
Karl Maton, Sociology (5th edn, Pearson 2014) 243). For an opposite opinion on 
multiculturalism, as being a disadvantageous phenomenon and minority groups, 
particularly the Islamic community, using it as a tool to remain segregated: Doug Saunders, 
The Myth of the Muslim Tide: Do Immigrants Threaten the West? (Vintage Books 2013) 
279 Van Krieken et al (n 278) 29-30 
280 ibid 27 
281 Leon Tikly, ‘The New Partnership for African Development: Implications for Skills 
Development’ in Joseph Zajda (ed), International Handbook on Globalisation, Education 
and Policy Research: Global Pedagogies and Policies (Springer 2005) 294 
282 Catenaccio (n 278). Also see: Peter Stalker, Workers Without Frontiers – The Impact of 
Globalization on International Migration (Lynne Riener Publishers 2000) 
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million in 2011.283 It is further submitted here that this shift in demographics has 
transformed monocultural English society into a pluralistic, multicultural one – and Britain 
into the globalised country – it is today.284 Shifting economic patterns, for example through 
open and nonrestrictive labour and economic markets – coupled with personal reasons for 
immigrating to a foreign country – have allowed for globalisation to take effect.285 Cantle 
argues that: 
 
Globalisation will ensure that the world… will have become more multicultural… 
each country will find that its population is increasingly… “super-diverse”. The 
ease of travel, and the opening up of labour and financial markets means that this is 
inevitable. The ideal of a more integrated international community… is seldom 
advanced as a desirable political objective, despite the evident interdependency of 
economic and political decision-making. Similarly, whilst people are themselves 
increasingly crossing borders… and creating real and tangible personal relationships 
at all levels, they are often fearful about the impact of globalisation on their 
communities and collective identity. ‘Identity politics’, whether on a narrow 
national, ethnic, faith or regional basis, often holds back the transition, rather than 
supporting and inspiring a new and interconnected world… Minorities are often the 
visible expression of the change brought by globalisation and whilst their movement 
and growth is often seen as the cause of changing economic and social patterns, it is 
simply the consequence of those changes. This makes them highly vulnerable.286 																																																								
283 ONS, ‘2011 Census Analysis: Social and Economic Characteristics by Length of 
Residence of Migrant Populations in England and Wales’ (4 November 2014) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_381447.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
284 David Lundy, ‘Multiculturalism and pluralization: kissing cousins of globalization’ in 
Richard Tiplady (ed), One World Or Many? The Impact of Globalisation on Mission 
(William Carey Library 2003) 72 
285 For a discussion on the link between neoliberalism (which is a modified form of 
liberalism that tends to favor free-market capitalism) and autonomy: Mark Olssen, 
Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Social Democracy: Thin Communitarian Perspectives on 
Political Philosophy and Education (Routledge 2010) 151-176; and Michael Freeden, 
Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies 
(OUP 2013) 147. 
286 Ted Cantle, ‘Interculturalism as a new narrative for the era of globalisation and super-
diversity’ in Martyn Barrett (ed), Interculturalism and multiculturalism: similarities and 
differences (COEP 2013) 69-71 
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Cantle’s argument indicates that globalisation creates diversity within countries and 
societies. However, minority groups are highly vulnerable and entirely dependent on 
societal and governmental decisions to preserve their identity and culture in a globalised, 
pluralistic State287 through political accommodation.288 Thus, when accommodation is 
made for them, it leads to political, economic and social change within society. British 
society, which continues to develop and grow, has become multicultural – and subsequently 
globalised – predominantly through the immigration of non-white individuals from outside 
Europe.289 The next section analyses how immigration shifts have shaped modern English 
society. 
 
3.3 Immigration in 20th Century Britain 
The historical context of immigration into Britain must be examined to explain how 
modern society has become pluralistic and determine when different cultures began 
influencing policy making. McKay explains that: 
 
The UK has been a country of immigration for more than a century. The expansion 
of British colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the 
annexation of countries in the Caribbean, South East Asia and Africa as a product of 
imperial expansion, inevitably created the conditions for future chains of migration. 
Originally these were from the UK to the ‘colonies’, but in the 20th century – and 
particularly the end of the Second World War – they increasingly ran from former 
colonies to the UK. Immigration also had a ‘pre-colonial’ phase, with movements of 
people from Italy, Poland and Russia… from the final years of the nineteenth 
century and the early years of the twentieth.290 
 																																																								
287 Joke Swiebel, ‘The European Union’s Policies to Safeguard and Promote Diversity’ in 
Elisabeth Prugl and Markus Thiel (eds), Diversity in the European Union (Palgrave-
Macmillan 2009) 25 
288 Multiculturalism in Britain has occurred through the amassing of minority groups 
through immigration from outside western countries, who need political accommodation: 
Tariq Madood, Multiculturalism (2nd edn, Polity Press 2013) 5 
289 ibid 2 
290 Sonia McKay, ‘The Dimensions and Effects of EU Labour Migration in the UK’ in Bela 
Galgoczi et al (eds), EU Labour Migration since Enlargement: Trends, Impacts and 
Policies (Ashgate 2009) 29 
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However, immigration patterns have drastically changed since the twenty-first century 
especially when examining these patterns within the EU context. The number of individuals 
coming into Britain from EU countries (particularly after the expansion of the EU in May 
2004 with the low income ‘A8’ countries – namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – joining the EU);291 has averaged around 
200,000 per year.292 During the General Election in 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron 
stated that the new Conservative government would aim to reduce net migration (the 
difference between the numbers entering and leaving the country).293 However, the net 
migration figures released by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in November 2015 
establish that it remained the highest on record (compared to the previous results in the year 
ending June 2014).294 Net migration of EU citizens significantly increased to 180,000 (up 
by 42,000) and non-EU net migration also increased to 201,000 (up by 36,000).295 It is 
submitted here that the British government cannot directly control the number of 
individuals entering Britain from the EU and that Mr Cameron’s ambition of reducing net 
migration to the “tens of thousands” can only be achieved by cutting down the immigration 
numbers of international, non-EU foreign nationals.296 It is further submitted here that 
controlling the influx of foreign nationals (due to the inability to control persons moving 																																																								
291 BBC News, ‘Who are the A8 countries?’ (24 April 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/4479759.stm> accessed 21 May 2017 
292 McKay (n 290) 31 
293 Laurence Dodds, ‘David Cameron Will Never Hit His Immigration Target: Here’s Why’ 
The Telegraph (21 May 2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-
2015/politics-blog/11602078/Immigration-how-will-the-Conservatives-tackle-it.html> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
294 ONS, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report’ (26 November 2015) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/migration1/migration-statistics-quarterly-report/november-
2015/stb-msqr-november-2015.html> accessed 21 May 2017 
295 ibid 
296 Dodds (n 293). In recent years, there has been significant, visible opposition to EU 
migration, which was particularly notable during the EU referendum and Brexit. For 
example, various news articles stated that EU immigration was a decisive factor for the 
vote to leave the EU: Steven Swinford, ‘Theresa May vows Brexit deal will limit migration 
whatever the impact on EU trade’ <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/31/theresa-may-
vows-to-make-controls-on-eu-migrants-a-red-line-duri/> accessed 21 May 2017; Gonzalo 
Vina, ‘Four ways to curb migration post-Brexit’ <https://www.ft.com/content/e03bde3a-
4f39-11e6-88c5-db83e98a590a> accessed 21 October 2016; and Simon Tilford, ‘Britain, 
Immigration and Brexit’ 
<https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/bulletin_105_st_article1.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
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into the country from within the EU) is a predominant factor in generating hostility towards 
foreign nationals and subsequently their cultural and religious beliefs, which are seen to run 
counter to those of the dominant culture of the country, which is discussed in the next 
section.297 Since it is non-EU immigration that is a cause for concern, particularly during 
election season and has been seen in recent party manifestos, this thesis focuses on foreign 
immigration from the Indian subcontinent. As the historical context of immigration 
influences the inclusion of the views of minority religious groups in Parliamentary debates 
on assisted suicide – which, as Chapter Six will establish, began in 1936 – the starting point 
of the detailed examination of the immigration patterns is the 1900s. 
 
Britain underwent waves of immigration for consecutive decades after 1900. Britain had a 
“free immigration” policy until 1905, when the Aliens Act was passed to allow the home 
secretary to prevent undesirable individuals from entering the country.298 From 1900 to 
1909 around 2,287,000 individuals immigrated to the United Kingdom.299 A significant 
amount of minority religious communities started to gather in Britain during this time. This 
is evidenced by the first Sikh Temple opening, in 1911, in a house in London and Sikh 
followers travelling hundreds of miles, from within Britain, to attend religious services and 
festivals.300 
 
 
 																																																								
297 Mehdi Hasan, ‘Five questions for anyone who says ‘it’s not racist to talk about 
immigration’’ NewStatesman (13 November 2014) 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/11/five-questions-anyone-who-says-its-not-
racist-talk-about-immigration> accessed 21 May 2017 
298 Rita Simon and James Lynch, Immigration the World Over: Statutes, Policies, and 
Practices (R&L 2003) 123 
299 Mark Clapson, The Routledge Companion to Britain in the 20th Century (Routledge 
2009) 337 
300 Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History of Britain: Multicultural Racism Since 1800 
(Routledge 2014) 158. The history is arguably very different to the current position under 
the neoliberal frame. For a detailed discussion on neoliberalism: David Harvey, A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2005); Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, 
Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (Pluto Press 2005); and Monica Prasad, The Politics of 
Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany and 
the United States (University of Chicago Press 2006). 
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The wave of immigration carried through subsequent decades, with 2,494,000 people 
moving to Britain in 1920.301 The amassing of minority religious groups carried on too, 
which is evidenced by the formation of the Central Hindu Association and the Hindu 
Association of Europe in the 1930s.302 Panayi explains that “The most visible of the new 
migrant religious identities in post-war Britain and those which count the largest number of 
adherents originate in South Asia in the form of Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam”.303 These 
minority groups were establishing a permanent presence within British society.304 
 
The end of the Second World War – in 1945 – brought various cultures, ethnicities, 
languages and religions via immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and the Caribbean 
islands into Britain.305 Thus, the end of the war became a significant period, which shifted 
and shaped the terms of contemporary debates about immigration. This large-scale 
immigration continued throughout the 1950s306 and the 1960s when another 2,000,000 
immigrants arrived in Britain.307 
 
3.4 Segregation of minority subcultures and its impact on the Islamic Community 
In response to this influx of immigrants from former British colonies, Roy Jenkins, the 
British Home Secretary, issued a statement in 1966 explaining the need to include, 
welcome and integrate the new immigrants into British culture.308 Jenkins stated that: 
 																																																								
301 Clapson (n 299) 337 
302 Panayi (n 300) 158 
303 Panayi (n 300) 157 
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immigration legislation and consolidate the laws into one Act in order to control and 
administer the stay of foreign and Commonwealth nationals (Simon and Lynch (n 298) 
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Integration is perhaps rather a loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by 
immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we 
need in this country a ‘melting-pot’, which would turn everybody out in… carbon 
copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman… I define 
integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. 
That is the goal.309 
 
It is submitted here that this statement suggests that immigrants would not be required to 
change their lifestyle or abandon their beliefs, customs and practices. They would be 
tolerated within society and their viewpoints would even be included in policy-making in 
order to accommodate and assimilate them into the country. The extent to which minority 
views have been accommodated in policy-making on assisted suicide is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Six. 
 
Even though this influx of immigrants, and their respective cultures, was generally 
welcomed, various politicians did not view this inflow favourably, particularly in the post-
imperialism era. For example, John Enoch Powell, a Conservative politician, opined that 
Britain should close its borders to immigrants, particularly Commonwealth citizens. He 
opined that this influx could create racial and ethnic divisions, which would increase to the 
extent that they would threaten the country’s democratic system.310 In an attempt to protect 
democracy and the British national identity, he opined that a pre-Imperial role should be 
adopted via reverting power and prestige to the Monarchy, the Parliament and the Church 
of England.311 It is submitted here that Powell did not want to accept the post-Imperial 
status of Britain and Commonwealth nations in an attempt to avoid cultural and ethnic 
dissonance. However, with the liberal Labour party in power at the time, different cultures 																																																								
309 Roy Jenkins, ‘Racial Equality in Britain’ in Roy Jenkins, Essays and Speeches (Collins 
1967). Also see: Anthony Lester, ‘Multiculturalism and Free Speech’ (2010) 81(1) The 
Political Quarterly 15 
310 Enoch Powell, ‘Memorandum on Indian Policy’ cited in Simon Heffer (ed), Like the 
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and racial minorities were welcomed into Britain and were assured that they would be 
allowed to maintain and preserve their own distinctive customs and identities. It is further 
submitted that these negative views around immigration, especially individuals who 
identify with the Islamic faith, are still held and are blatantly expressed by politicians. For 
example, during campaigning for the General Election 2015, the UK Independence Party’s 
(UKIP) immigration spokesman, Gerard Batten, stated that there ought to be a ban on 
building new mosques in the country, and across Europe, and that the Islamic faith and its 
texts, namely the Quran, needed updating because “there’s something wrong… [Muslims] 
need to revise their thinking”.312 He also stated in an interview in 2010 that the Islamic 
community would never be able to integrate into British culture because of the threat of 
having “two incompatible systems living in the same place at the same time”.313 Also, in 
the run up to the General Election 2015, UKIP member Ken Chapman, commented that, 
“Islam is a cancer that needs eradicating, multiculturalism does not work in this country, 
clear them all off to the desert with their camels that’s their way of life”.314 
 
Muslims continue to be reported in a negative light by the media, political commentators 
and suchlike who equate the religion with intolerance, backwardness, negativity and 
hostility.315 Cesari argues that a misrepresented and intolerant view of Islam and its 
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followers is steered by intellectuals and the media.316 This is clearly demonstrated by their 
role in the hijab controversies and the Rushdie affair.317 These misrepresentations of the 
Islamic religion and exaggerations of Muslim’s demands and reactions to societal issues 
have led to a significant proportion of society developing a prejudiced and distorted view of 
Islam. Some citizens now harbour an unnatural fear of Muslims, their faith and practices.318 
In 2006, one-in-four individuals in Britain had an unfavourable view of the presence of 
Muslims in society.319 Just 14% of the British public expressed a negative view of Muslims 
in 2005, compared with 23% in 2008.320 In recent years, hate crimes against Muslims, 
particularly women, have significantly risen. For example, the Metropolitan Police 
Service’s Statistics for the 12 months up to July 2015, recorded that hate crime was up by 
70% with 816 Islamophobic crimes (compared with 478 for the previous 12-month 
period).321 The negative representations also create hostility, prejudice, discrimination, 
inequality and intolerance within society,322 which seem to have grown in Britain, and 
worldwide, after the Rushdie Affair, the first Gulf War323 and the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States.324 There is also a recent increase in anti-Islamist sentiment and uncertainty about 
multiculturalism in Britain based on the 7/7 and 21/7 London bombings in 2005.325 																																																								
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September 11 Terrorist Attack on Pakistani-American Parental Involvement in US Schools 
(R&L 2016) 26-40 
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Furthermore, this fear of Islam and its followers subsequently endangers the balance and 
equality of a multicultural society by drawing attention to the differences between beliefs 
and values of minority groups and the dominant culture. This fear, and the subsequent 
unbalance stems from the view that Islamic beliefs are strict, severe and run counter to the 
modern Western values of the dominant culture of Britain.326 Poulter states to this effect 
that Islam is an unalterable and fixed path that every Muslim must follow regardless of 
where they live and that followers must comply with traditional norms of behaviour or they 
are at risk of losing their standing and prestige in the society: both in Britain and overseas 
especially their home countries.327 This conception has led to a public perception that 
Islamic values run counter to liberal values and are incompatible with the Christian 
ideology that is deep-rooted in the culture and law in England, which is why the 
aforementioned religions are being chosen for detailed analysis in this thesis.328 
 
Many academics and experts – such as Lewis,329 Huntingdon,330 and Kaplan331 – argue that 
various minority groups, particularly minority religious groups such as the Muslim 
community, are also seen as an obstacle to globalisation: they have no role in global 
governance or a globalised, modern society due to the history, traditions, values, viewpoints 
and reactions against competing values.332 Furthermore, in recent years, opposition to 																																																								
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multiculturalism has arisen due to social, economic and political factors; and is seen as 
undermining “…the cohesion and shared identity that any society needs”.333 Trevor Philips 
– a writer, broadcaster, former Labour party politician, and former Head of the Commission 
for Racial Equality in 2003 – opined that allowing individuals from different subcultures 
practice and adhere to different religions may have allowed them to maintain a separate and 
distinct religious or cultural identity;334 but has also bred separatism and Britain is 
“…sleep-walking into segregation”.335 Philips further argues that the excessive cultural 
difference between the Islamic community and the dominant culture has led to the Islamic 
community living parallel lives within society and has subsequently created a loss of 
societal coherence and homogeneity.336 
 
It is submitted that the religious affiliation and ethnic and cultural traditions influence 
individuals’ decisions of whether or not to seek an assisted suicide. Furthermore, this role 
of the State in endorsing, regulating or providing assistance in an individual’s suicide 
becomes more complex and difficult when there is a significant lack of uniformity on the 
issue, due to the presence of parallel opinions and behaviours of minority subcultures that 
disagree with the viewpoint of the dominant culture. Finding mutual ground on certain 
societal issues, particularly assisted suicide, is fundamental in order for the State to allow 
and regulate the law on the issue.337 However, as established in the previous chapter, the 
views of the Christian and Islamic faiths are in congruity on this issue but they tend to 
significantly differ from those of the secular school of thought on assisted suicide. 																																																								
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It is further submitted that the non-religious views and religious beliefs of all the different 
communities should be included in public debates that have a direct effect on the lives of 
every individual within that community. Minority subcultures form a significant majority 
of the population of England and Wales:338 14% of the population – a mixture of temporary 
residents and permanent citizens – belongs to a non-white ethnic group,339 and 13% of the 
residents (around 7.5 million people in England and Wales) were born outside the United 
Kingdom.340 Thus, their views need to be included in public debates, particularly under the 
current movement towards allowing assisted suicide.341 In order to establish the views of a 
minority subculture – in particular, the Islamic community – the definition of subculture 
needs to be set out, the role it plays and the manner in which it interacts with the dominant 
culture must be analysed. 
 
A subculture is the culture of a minority group whose values and norms of behaviour are 
seemingly very different from the dominant culture.342 Stolley argues that: 
 
A subculture is a smaller culture within a dominant culture that has a way of life 
distinguished in some important way from that dominant culture. Subcultures form 
around any number of distinguishing factors… for example… racial and ethnic 
backgrounds.343 																																																								
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Subcultures have to live within the confines of the dominant culture.344 Individuals 
belonging to a particular subculture tend to associate and interact with one another from the 
same minority group.345 They bond through a common history.346 They speak the same 
language.347 They may even behave similarly and have a shared worldview.348 They are 
distinguished and identified by their clothing and adornments, language and dialect, and 
other distinctive cultural markers.349 To this end, Haenfler argues that a subculture is: “A 
relatively diffuse social network having a shared identity, distinctive meanings around 
certain ideas, practices, and objects, and a sense of marginalization from or resistance to a 
perceived ‘conventional’ society”.350 
 
The cultural values, norms and beliefs of minority subcultures are deeply embedded in 
individuals that belong to them and provide them with an identity.351 Cultural identity 
provides individuals with a sense of belonging and security.352 This identity is formed by 
the language, religion, values and beliefs, traditions and heritage, and opinions and 
behaviour of individuals.353 This identity is expressed and even preserved by interacting 
with other like-minded individuals who speak the same language, share the same religion 
and beliefs, come from the same heritage, partake in the same traditions and share the same 
cultural values and conventions.354 																																																								
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The definition of a minority subculture should not be confounded with the notion of a 
hybrid culture. The dominant culture and minority groups’ values, opinions and behaviour 
blend over time to create a hybrid culture.355 This is one of the side effects of 
multiculturalism. Laegran argues that: 
 
In the minority world, the formation of particular groups and subcultures are 
characteristic of youth… Youth cultures do not develop in isolation… but through 
negotiations between existing elements and new impulses transmitted from [the 
dominant culture].356 
 
The main thrust of Laegran’s argument is that the youth tries to fit in and prefers the 
practices of the dominant culture to their parental generation’s culture and heritage, which 
subsequently leads to a coalesced hybrid culture. This argument is supported by the fact 
that, for example, Mosque attendance among the younger generation is low and has become 
a matter of choice.357 Female Muslims are increasingly entering higher education and 
refusing arranged marriages.358 Some even get married with post hoc parental consent.359 
The younger generation is increasingly rejecting what they view as the Islamically 
uninformed and misguided customs and practices of their parental generation.360 Based on 
this analysis, it is submitted that a change in the law on assisted suicide would not meet 
with opposition from a significant majority of the younger generation of minority groups 
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because they have abandoned their parental customs and beliefs.361 
 
3.4.1 The Islamic community in Britain 
The Islamic community is the second largest religious group in England and Wales. As 
discussed earlier, immigration from the Indian subcontinent began after the end of the 
Second World War and Muslims subsequently achieved cultural and political prominence 
in the 1970s and 80s in Britain and across Europe.362 The number of mosques built in 
Britain increased dramatically in the 1970s.363 In 1990, there were about 400 mosques in 
Britain,364 which has risen to over 1800 mosques as recorded by the Islamic website 
‘Muslims in Britain’.365 The 2001 and 2011 Census show that the majority of Muslims in 
Britain are of South Asian Heritage.366 In 2011, Indian was the second largest ethnic group 
with 2.5% followed by 2% Pakistani; compared to 2001 with 2.0% Indian and 1.4% 
Pakistani.367 The ONS notes that “This is consistent with census findings on international 																																																								
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migration, which found that South Asian countries (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) 
continued to rank highly within the most common non-UK countries of birth”.368 Muslims 
in Britain mostly come from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir and the surrounding cities 
such as Attock, Jhelum and Rawalpindi and tend to retain the values of their home 
country.369 This includes retaining the cultural value of caring for vulnerable, ill and elderly 
individuals based on the Islamic tenet prohibiting assisted suicide, which was discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Two. 
 
In an attempt to retain their cultural traits, to raise their families in compliance with their 
values and to preserve their cultural identity; Muslims living in the United Kingdom started 
to make demands in relation to ritualistic slaughter, facilities for prayer at the workplace, 
exempt female children from certain sports and activities and even demanded that school 
uniforms be changed.370 The government eventually created provisions and policies to 
accommodate the needs of the Islamic community. The demands were initially resisted 
because of controversies such as those surrounding the publications of the Satanic Verses, 
for example protests and book burnings, and subsequent public anxiety encompassing the 
Islamic community.371 However, the growing Islamic community created a significant 
cultural presence within Britain and policy makers had to accommodate their demands. To 
this end, Wetherley et al argue that: 
 
…in the past 20 years or so in the UK… attention has focused on the religious 
identification of the majority of Asians as Muslims. This preoccupation with 
Muslims can be traced in the UK context to the controversy surrounding the 
publication of The Satanic Verses in 1989… Furthermore… the rising tide of 
criticism of multiculturalism reflects a specific concern with its alleged failure in 																																																																																																																																																																									
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relation to the presence of Muslim minorities within these societies.372 
 
Even with the seeming incompatibilities, conflicts and differences between cultures, 
multiculturalism is a favourable phenomenon. It appreciates that pluralism and cultural 
diversity is characteristic of modern British society and the needs of various cultures can be 
accommodated and tolerated without disturbing the cohesion, stability and congruity of 
society.373 The government, particularly policy makers, have made significant changes to 
accommodate the various demands of minority groups, and even the dominant culture, 
which are discussed in the next section. Societal attitudes have also changed towards 
certain issues, especially assisted suicide. A greater degree of tolerance on this issue seems 
to be demonstrated by minority groups, which is reflected in the lack of public outrage 
amongst the Muslim community, as was the case during the Rushdie Affair. Society, and 
even faith and its representatives, seem to be demonstrating a great degree of tolerance for 
religious and moral diversity with the recent developments on assisted suicide policy and 
recent Bills in Parliament, which are evaluated in greater detail in Chapters Four and Six 
respectively. 
 
3.4.2 Governmental actions accommodating the needs of minority subcultures 
The government often accommodates the demands of minority subcultures in an attempt to 
promote equality and to bring them on an equal footing with individuals of the dominant 
culture in Britain. One such attempt is the Equality Act 2010, which amalgamates a series 
of legislation such as the Race Relations Act 1965 and 1976, the Equal Pay Act 1970, the 
Sex Discrimination Acts 1975 and 1986, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007.374 
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The 2010 Act seeks to harmonise and consolidate these laws on equality and 
discrimination. Robinson argues that “The Act seeks to… strengthen the legal provisions to 
support the progress of equality... achieve greater equality… for marginalized groups and to 
recognise diversity”.375 Section 4 of the Act identifies characteristics that are protected 
under the law: age, disability, race, sexual orientation, religion and belief to name a few. 
Furthermore, “there is clear scope for the influence of human rights arguments on the 
development of these laws through statutory interpretation under section 3 of the [Human 
Rights Act]”.376 The 2010 Act protects religious and non-religious groups against direct or 
indirect discrimination, ensures that they are not harassed or victimised due to their 
beliefs,377 and that equal opportunities are offered to them in the workplace and in wider 
society.378 
 
Furthermore, Britain promotes the idea of equality in its multicultural society by extracting 
the issues of cultural difference from the public sphere and including both minority and 
majority views on public issues.379 Minority groups, particularly, are also provided with 
equal opportunities and rights exclusive to that minority group.380 These opportunities and 
rights not only allow minorities to preserve their cultural identity but also give them some 
degree of control over how they live their private lives and act in public spheres of 
society.381 For example, Sikhs are exempt from wearing safety hard hats on construction 
sites under section 11 of the Employment Act of 1989 and motorcycle helmets under 
section 16 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.382 They are also allowed to carry a “kirpan” – 																																																								
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which is a short sword or knife – in public places under section 139 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. Jewish shopkeepers are exempt from Sunday trading legislation,383 and specific 
exemptions have been made to accommodate ritualistic slaughter of animals for various 
minority religions.384 Even in recent years, courts have sought to protect the religious 
beliefs of minority groups, for example, in Ghai v Newcastle City Council,385 where the 
Court of Appeal accommodated a Hindu claimant to have an open-air cremation under the 
Cremation Act 1902 and the Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008. It can be 
concluded here that these exemptions are legal privileges that provide minority groups with 
a certain degree of autonomy that entitles them to control and influence the way they live 
and preserve their cultural identity.386 
 
3.5 The dominant culture of English society 
In contrast to a minority subculture, the dominant culture is the culture of the most 
powerful group in a society.387 It not only consists of a certain life-style, values and 
opinions, religion and language but also receives “the most support from major institutions 
and constitutes the major belief system”.388 Andersen and Taylor further explain that: 
 
Although the dominant culture is not the only culture in a society, it is commonly 
believed to be “the” culture of a society, despite other cultures present… Often, the 
dominant culture is the standard by which other cultures in the society are judged… 
A dominant culture need not be the culture of the majority of people; it is simply the 
culture of the group in society that has enough power to define the cultural 
framework.389 																																																																																																																																																																									
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Asari, Halikiopoulou and Mock argue that every nation needs a distinctive, defining and 
unifying principle that is exclusive to that nation.390 For example, a common language or 
religion, a shared history and common heritage, or even a “golden age” or common 
historical memories.391 Hence, the dominant culture is often viewed as a notion that stems 
from the national identity of the country.392 The national identity involves the preservation 
and continuation of beliefs, values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose 
the distinctive heritage of a nation and the identification of citizens with that heritage.393 
The national identity, and subsequently the traits of the dominant culture, has been formed 
by the religious traditions, historical events, social customs and even fashion, music and 
sport. For example, Morra notes that “… sport – particularly football” is a modern, 
contemporary marker of the British national identity.394 These characteristics are treated as 
the norm for society as a whole, including minority groups.395 
 
In 1940, Sugarman described the dominant culture of Britain as follows: 
 
In Britain some of the more obvious features of this dominant culture are: the history 
of Britain and the former overseas empire, learned not only in history lessons but also 
through the celebration of anniversaries such as Guy Fawkes and Remembrance Day; 
the monarchy; the rituals and formulae of the established Church, learned through 
daily religious assemblies, services for special ecclesiastical holidays and through 
formal religious education lessons; Shakespeare and “good” literature; “classical” 
music and the works of Gilbert and Sullivan, which though far from “classical” have 
been long in favor with the British middle class; ideals of fair play; the ethic of 
queuing.396 																																																								
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Even though the meaning of the dominant culture is multifarious, complex and varied; the 
dominant culture has changed very significantly since 1940 and British society is now 
multicultural, pluralistic, and fluid. Even though it still exists within the dominant culture, 
society is no longer controlled by the historical heritage and traditions, especially the tenets 
and rituals of the Church of England, and is becoming increasingly secular.397 
 
3.5.1 The increasingly secular dominant culture of England 
Recently, former Prime Minister David Cameron declared that Britain is a Christian 
country: “We should be more confident about our status as a Christian country, more 
ambitious about expanding the role of faith-based organisations, and, frankly, more 
evangelical about a faith that compels us to get out there and make a difference to people’s 
lives”.398 However, it is submitted here that Mr Cameron’s statement does not take into 
consideration that even though 59.3% of the English and Welsh population identify with 
Christianity, a very small percentage consistently practice it, for example, by attending 
Sunday worship services regularly.399 It is further submitted that even though the religion 
an individual identifies with has a significant influence of their decision to seek an assisted 
suicide; identifying with a religion and supporting assisted suicide are not necessarily 																																																																																																																																																																									
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mutually exclusive. Even though individuals identify with the religion, they do not actively 
practice it and do not necessarily prescribe to its tenets. For example, an individual who 
identifies with the Christian faith, who does not regularly attend church, may not have a 
religious opposition to a change in the law on assisted suicide. Similarly, an individual who 
identifies with the Christian faith and regularly attends Church service may also have no 
objection to a change in the law. 
 
Furthermore, around quarter of the population identify with no religion and there is an 
indubitable presence of minority religious groups in Britain.400 It is submitted that the 
dominant culture is a phenomenon (as are subcultures) that constantly evolves and 
integrates and amalgamates with the values and traditions of various minority religious and 
non-religious groups. Ferrante argues that “the idea of the old secular State, which 
embraces the idea of religious neutrality of public institutions, has been overcome by the 
idea of a new secularism that should take into greater account different cultural and 
religious groups’ needs to have a defined public role”. 401 It is further submitted here that 
the dominant culture of Britain is now largely secular but, due to its historical ties, 
underpinned with the values of the Christian faith. To this end, Bharma cogently argues 
that: 
 
…English law and British public policy are influenced by Britain’s religious roots… 
Although Britain is secular in the contemporary sense that the idea of values and 
ways of life beyond Anglican Christianity are permissible, its history does not permit 
the idea that the British public sphere is detached from Anglican Christianity. As a 
liberal democracy it should not be apologetic about its rich religious history. 
However, pursuit of the myth that Britain’s institutions and structures are detached 																																																								
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from these religious roots perpetuates a damaging and false picture of the neutral 
nature of the British public sphere.402 
 
The United Kingdom is the only Western democracy that reserves seats for a religion, 
namely the Church of England, in its law-making body. 403 The deep-rooted link between 
the State and the Church can be seen in the Monarch swearing an oath on coronation as the 
‘Supreme Governor of the Church of England’.404 There is also a significant amount of 
representation of the Christian religion in the local government. The Church of England and 
the Roman Catholic Church are entitled to representation on local authority committees, as 
they are providers of education through schools they have set up and can influence issues in 
relation to education in the area where they maintain schools.405 Furthermore, the Church of 
England plays a significant role in formulating and approving syllabuses taught at 
schools.406 The relationship between Britain and the Christian religion is also deep rooted 
in the law making process.407 For example, twenty-four bishops and two Archbishops of the 
Church of England are members of the House of Lords and present the views of the 
Christian faith in the Parliamentary debates.408 Steven explains: 
 
Sitting in the chamber in their robes of state, they also provide a very vivid symbol of 
the power of Christianity in the British political system… the Church of England can 
have a direct effect on public policy… The Church of England – as the state Church – 
does not just restrict itself to parliamentary politics inside the Westminster village. It 
also involves itself directly in party politics outside the Palace of Westminster… Its 
General Synod (the national decision-making body of the Church)… makes 
statements about public issues, many of which are essentially party political. While 																																																								
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the Church is always keen to make clear that it is not making a party political point, it 
nevertheless enters party political issues on a regular basis, posing huge challenges 
for party politicians in the process… the Church of England has managed to hold on 
to its influence over British society.409 
 
The main thrust of Steven’s argument is valid as historically; the Christian religion has had 
deep-seated historical ties with English law. This argument is supported by the fact that the 
Church of England and Wales still receives representation in the House of Lords. Although 
this representation makes up less than 4% of the House of Lords, the views of the Church 
of England receive direct consideration in every debate and policy-making. Even though 
the control of the Christian religion has reduced over time, it still has a substantial influence 
over judicial and governmental activities that have always sought to protect its principles, 
particularly the doctrine of sanctity of life. The Church of England remains opposed to a 
change in the law on assisted suicide. The previous chapter demonstrated that this 
opposition is grounded in Christian tenets. It is submitted that the majority of the members 
of the dominant culture still identify with the Christian religion as their faith, even if they 
do not practice it and due to its deep-rooted tied with the country it continues to exert 
influence on societal issues. This is evident in historic and current debates such as suicide 
and assisted suicide, which are discussed in Chapters Four and Six respectively. 
 
Over two-thirds of the British public, who took part in a YouGov Poll, agree that the law on 
assisted suicide needs reforming in order to provide patients with the option of an assisted 
suicide.410 This tolerance, and the subsequent demand for a need to reform the law is 
reflected in a statement by Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who compared the same-sex marriage 
Bill to Lord Joffe’s assisted dying Bill: 
 
As this [same-sex] debate has very eloquently shown, the Bill arouses strong 
feelings on all sides of this House, as did the assisted dying Bill. I believe that there 
is a majority in this country in favour of this Bill, though a much smaller majority 																																																								
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than was in favour of the assisted dying Bill. I believe that on assisted dying, the 
majority is now greater than it then was”.411 
 
The religious and non-religious views of different communities should be included in all 
debates that have a direct impact on the lives of every citizen. The debate and the law on 
assisted suicide directly impact all vulnerable and elderly individuals. Thus, their religious 
and non-religious views and beliefs on the issue need to be included in the debate. As 
mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, in the liberal democracy setting of this country, 
there is a newer approach to governmental activities, such as policy making, that is more 
open and inclusive of religious views (which are not disregarded in favour of non-religious, 
secular views).412 However, even though religious views receive inclusion on certain 
debates – such as euthanasia – they are, as this thesis argues, increasingly absent from other 
debates, particularly assisted suicide. The reasons behind this absence, along with a detailed 
analysis of the Parliamentary debates surrounding recent assisted suicide Bills, which forms 
the original contribution to this thesis, can be found in Chapter Six. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the multifaceted, beneficial phenomenon of multiculturalism and 
established the role that religion and secularism play within contemporary, pluralistic 
English society. This chapter has established that English society is now heterogeneous and 
pluralistic with a diverse range of cultures, beliefs, customs and practices, which now make 
up its multicultural identity. Religion is one of the most important ingredients of a 
multicultural society. Depending on the degree of religiosity of an individual, religion may 
greatly impact their important life decisions such as seeking an assisted suicide. Thus, their 
views and beliefs of the issue need to be included in societal and governmental activity. 
This chapter has explained that English society is pluralistic, as it consists of a dominant 
culture and various minority subcultures, and has become this way due to waves of 
immigration in order to determine when different cultures and their beliefs began 																																																								
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influencing the policy-making process, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
The government made promises to these immigrants to ensure that they would not have to 
abandon their beliefs and cultures, which subsequently led to their beliefs being 
accommodated via policy-making in order to integrate them into society. However, there is 
significant historic and contemporary opposition to immigration, particularly minority 
groups such as the Islamic community, who have been reported negatively, particularly by 
political representatives and commentators who associate the Islam with backwardness, 
hostility and conflicting with the increasingly secular dominant culture of English society, 
which has deep-rooted ties with the Christian faith. 
 
Even though the stance of the Christian and Islamic faiths is harmonious in their opposition 
to allowing assisted suicide, these negative representations have led to the popular belief, 
which is reflected in opinion polls and surveys that the two faiths are in conflict and that the 
Islamic faith contradicts the secular values of the dominant culture. When there is a lack of 
homogeneity on an issue, due to the presence of parallel beliefs and opinions and negative 
representation of Islam, the role of policy-makers to regulate the law on assisted suicide is 
even further complicated. As the previous chapter argued, both the non-religious views and 
religious beliefs of all the different communities should be included in public debates that 
have a direct effect on the lives of every individual within that community. Thus, finding 
mutual ground on societal issues, particularly assisted suicide, is essential in order for 
policy-makers to regulate the law in this area. 
 
Even though the Christian faith remains opposed to a change in the law on assisted suicide 
and continues to have an influence within governmental activities especially the policy-
making process; as the next chapter demonstrates, this control and influence has reduced 
over time as religious doctrine is being superseded by secular values such as the notion of 
autonomy along with medical and technological advancements that are reflected in 
contemporary policies and the governmental and judicial approach to assisted suicide cases. 
Even the societal approach and attitudes to assisted suicide have significantly changed over 
time, as traced in the previous chapter. Society is demonstrating a much higher degree of 
tolerance, for religious and moral diversity, and for allowing, or at least not acting against, 
assisted suicide, which is demonstrated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. The Influence of Religion on the Historical and Current 
Momentum for Reforming the Law of Suicide and Assisted Suicide in 
England 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the influence of religion, particularly the Christian faith on the law on 
suicide and assisted suicide in England. In developing this discussion, the Parliamentary 
debates on the Suicide Bill 1961 are analysed, which establish that there is a significant 
amount of inclusion of religious views, particularly of the Christian faith, but no inclusion 
of minority views, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, can be attributed to the non-
prominent presence of minority groups in England during this time. It argues that with the 
changing societal and cultural landscape, which was discussed in the previous chapter, 
suicide was decriminalised to reflect societal changes and medical advancements that 
acknowledged its causes. However, the decriminalisation of suicide did not mean that 
society, law or Parliament accepted and promoted suicide nor did they sanction a breach of 
the doctrine of sanctity of life. This chapter also establishes the reasons behind Parliament 
retaining the ban on assisted suicide, under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act of 1961, namely 
the need to protect the doctrine of sanctity of life and societal interest in prosecuting 
individuals who have malicious motives behind assisting another person to end their life. 
 
This chapter continues by exploring the update, under section 59 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, to the criminal embargo on assisted suicide found in the 1961 Act, by 
evaluating the Parliamentary debates around the Coroners and Justice Bill to establish the 
reasons behind this update, namely the need to protect vulnerable people, increase public 
understanding of assisted suicide and to make individuals aware that this provision applies 
as much to the Internet as to offline activities. It also examines whether religious views 
were included in this debate and concludes that as a result of this update, the inviolability of 
life continues to be preserved by retaining the prohibition on assisted suicide. It establishes 
that a significant majority of individuals with both religious and non-religious viewpoints 
support a change in the law on assisted suicide; however, religious tenets did not receive 
any explicit consideration during the Parliamentary debates on the 2009 Bill. It argues that 
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this lack of consideration given to religious beliefs demonstrates that Parliament’s approach 
to assisted suicide is increasingly secular. Furthermore, this chapter argues that there is a 
clear shift in societal and Parliamentary attitude and approach towards this debate, which is 
now much more temporal and does not include religious language and references. The 
reasons behind this shift in attitudes and language, which is one of the main aims of this 
thesis, is critically reviewed. For example, this shift is reflected in the Parliamentary 
debates along with the reaction of religious groups, particularly the Church of England, 
whose entire response was written using non-religious language. 
 
Finally, this chapter examines the paradoxical position of the current law on assisted 
suicide. In developing this discussion, it argues that even though the ban on assisted suicide 
was retained by Parliament in 2009, the DPP Policy, which was published, in 2010, in 
accordance with the House of Lords’ decision in Purdy, allows ‘back-door’ assisted 
suicide. Purdy, which is a very significant assisted suicide case, is studied throughout this 
thesis and is set out in this chapter along with the DPP’s policy that contains the factors 
used to prosecute an individual under the criminal provision on assisted suicide. 
 
4.2 Pre-19th Century Law in England 
In the 5th century, St Augustine declared suicide to be a cardinal sin.413 He stated that it 
violates the 6th Commandment, “Thou shalt not kill” and that human suffering is a diktat 
from God and humans must bear that burden.414 Canon law, which denied suicides burial 
rites, was adopted in England in the 7th century.415 Around the 10th century, suicide became 
a crime under common law in England.416 There was no change in the law and suicide 
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remained a cardinal sin and a heinous crime throughout the 16th and 17th century.417 It was a 
crime against God and King. To this end, McLynn explains that: 
 
Before the eighteenth century religion overwhelmingly determined people’s attitude 
to suicide… the suicide was a criminal on two counts. In the first place, he offended 
against the king, whose interests dictated the preservation of his own subjects. In the 
second, he blasphemed against the law of God”.418 
 
Individuals who successfully ended their lives were refused a Christian burial and buried at 
a crossroad with a wooden stake through their body and their property was confiscated.419 
The confiscated property was distrained to the King.420 Thus, it was in the interest of the 
King to be aware of suicides.421 Blackstone422 summarised the approach as follows: 
 
The law of England wisely and religiously considers that no man hath a power to 
destroy life, but by commission from God, the author of it: and as the suicide is 
guilty of a double offence; one spiritual, in evading the prerogative of the Almighty, 
and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against 
the King, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects; the law has 
therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of 
felony, a felony committed on oneself.423 
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There was predominantly a negative attitude towards suicide throughout the Middle Ages 
that continued until about the 19th century.424 Coroners’ juries adjudicated on whether a 
suicide was ‘felo de se’ (a felony of himself) or ‘non compos mentis’ (not of sound 
mind).425 If an individual who attempted or committed suicide was deemed mentally ill or 
insane they were not convicted. A verdict of ‘non compos mentis’ was increasingly being 
handed down instead of ‘felo de se’.426 If the suicide was declared a ‘felo de se’, the 
deceased’s property was confiscated and reverted back to the Crown.427 
 
The punishment of confiscation of property was abolished in 1870.428 In the latter half of 
the 19th century, the legal and social landscape started to change when the medical, 
particularly psychological, reasons behind suicide attempts were being analysed.429 Due to 
this shifting social landscape, the role of the law in relation to suicide also began to change. 
For example, around the First World War, there were increasingly fewer prosecutions of 
attempted suicides.430 Juries consisted of local people who felt compassion and sympathy 
towards the individual who attempted or committed suicide and their families.431  Jury 
members would avoid handing down the severe punishment by declaring that the deceased 
had acted in a moment of insanity.432 
 
However, it is submitted here that there was clearly an unfavourable and antipathetic 
attitude towards suicide and, by extension, assisted suicide in policy-making. This negative 
attitude towards suicide and assisted suicide was grounded in religious reasoning, 
particularly the established religion of the country, the Church of England, which is 
discussed in significant detail in Chapter Two. Therefore, it was not until 1961 that the law 																																																								
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on suicide changed in order to reflect a change in public opinion, which was based on 
compassion and sympathy for those who committed or attempted suicide, along with the 
rise of secularism and autonomy, better understanding of the medical causes of suicides and 
a poor track of enforcing the law.433 
 
4.3 The 1961 Reforms: The Decriminalisation of Suicide in England 
As explained in the previous section, and in Chapter Two, suicide was strongly condemned 
for centuries by Christianity:434 it being a crime was rooted in religious belief.435 Changes 
in opinion happened gradually by disposing off the religious taboo attached to suicide.436 In 
a progressively modern society such changes have been influenced by scientific research, 
which tend to reign over religious beliefs in regulating social processes and even policy-
making.437 The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, introduced the Suicide Bill in the 
House of Lords on 14 February 1961.438  There were a number of reasons, each of which 
will be examined in turn, that could be attributed to the decrease in prosecution and the 
eventual decriminalisation of suicide. 
 
Lord Rea, in the House of Lords, who was in favour of a change in the law, stated that: 
 
If a man commits suicide and is successful… the law comes down in its majesty and 
penalises him in a way, which reflects only upon his family, his relatives and his 
reputation; whereas if there is an attempt to commit suicide, which does not 
succeed, the man himself is the sufferer under the law.439 																																																								
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Lord Rea’s statement indicates that if the suicide was successful, the individual who 
committed the crime could obviously not be prosecuted or punished440 because the 
perpetrator and the victim of the crime were the same person.441 Since, the actual 
perpetrator of the religious sin and the criminal offence of suicide could not be punished, 
the Church and the State targeted the things that they left behind.442 However, confiscating 
property was increasingly seen as distasteful and abhorrent443 because forfeiture to the 
Crown was punishment on the deceased’s family rather than on the person who committed 
suicide.444 Furthermore, a considerable amount of public and societal interest to reform the 
law existed in 1961, which could be seen in newspaper articles at the time. For example, 
the Guardian newspaper frequently published articles around the Parliamentary debates 
backing the Suicide Bill, with titles such as, “Removing Criminal Taint in Suicide”,445 “Bill 
that suicide, or the attempt, should be no crime: Sympathy with mental stress”,446 and, 
“Law on suicide has been unchanged for 1000 years”.447 This demonstrates the shifting 
societal landscape of the country in favour of reforming the law on suicide. 
 
4.3.1 Medical Causes of Suicides 
The most important factor that fuelled the reform was the increased awareness of the 
medical causes of suicide. The Lord Chancellor explained during the Parliamentary debates 
that: 
There is the question of mental stress… These people could be saved if, somehow, 
we could provide a more sympathetic contact, and better opportunities for people to 
talk over their troubles, or at least somebody to listen to them. This Bill is a step in 
the right direction.448 																																																								
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There was clearly more sympathy towards individuals who attempted suicide due to mental 
stress or illness. Furthermore, Leo Abse, in the House of Commons, pointed out that, “… 
more than two-thirds of those who, on release [from mental hospitals], subsequently 
committed suicide did so within a year of being released – most of them within six 
months”.449 David Weitzman asked: “It is important to consider the reasons why a person is 
driven to attempt to commit suicide. What are the reasons? It may be because of unbearable 
pain. It may be a case of mental stress, worry and illness of some kind”.450 Indeed, the 
majority of suicides were perpetuated because of the pain and suffering caused by 
psychiatric and physical illnesses. The debates on psychiatric illnesses, particularly 
depression, had started changing many years before the 1961. For example, by 1948, the 
Ministry of Health had already established that depressed patients were at an immediate 
risk of suicide.451 The advice was that they needed to be medically attended to on the day of 
admission to a hospital or as soon as they were diagnosed with depression and not treated 
as criminals.452 
 
In considering the Suicide Bill, the Lord Chancellor explained that medical research 
suggested that: 
 
Many cases of suicide are the outcome of intolerable mental stress amounting to 
mental illness. It is even truer that most cases of attempted suicide flow from some 
form of mental stress or unbalance. Recent research suggests… that those who 
attempt suicide are often making an appeal for help.453 
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As a result of medical findings, Members of Parliament argued that the law should have a 
more sympathetic approach to this area of the law: individuals who attempted or committed 
suicide were increasingly seen as patients with a mental disorder.454 Both Houses of 
Parliament opined that these individuals needed medical treatment and not punishment;455 
and the criminal prohibition on suicide may have seemed to serve as an obstacle to seeking 
treatment.456 As a result of the Bill being adopted, the criminal offences of suicide and 
attempted suicide were decriminalised to protect and safeguard the grieving family of the 
deceased from further distress and to ensure that the individual who attempts suicide is not 
hindered from seeking the medical help due to a fear of prosecution.457 Herring summarises 
that one of the reasons behind decriminalising suicide “…is that those who have attempted 
suicide do not need the ministrations of the criminal law, but rather the care of medical and 
other professionals”.458 
 
4.3.2 Religious and Ethical Doctrine on Suicide 
As well as examining the societal and medical reasons behind the need to decriminalise 
suicide, Parliament extensively discussed the religious views, particularly of the Christian 
faith and the need to preserve the doctrine of sanctity of life. The Parliamentary debates are 
being analysed in significant detail in order to establish the amount of inclusion of religious 
views on the issue – which are then contrasted with the amount of inclusion in the 2015 
debate set out in Chapter Six, in order to evaluate the discursive shift in language in the 
varying societal, political and cultural contexts over this extensive period of time – which 
forms one of the elements of the original research presented in this thesis. 
 
No consideration was given to the views of minority religious groups, particularly Islam, in 
1961 debate. This lack of consideration can be attributed to the fact that even though 
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minority groups were present in the country, their presence was not well-established.459 In 
contrast, almost all the Members of Parliament, especially in the House of Lords, spoke 
about the beliefs of the Church of England in relation to debate on suicide and assisted 
suicide.460 The significant amount of consideration given to Church of England tenets, 
during the 1961 Parliamentary debates, demonstrates the historic connection between 
English law and the Church and even reflected the view of the majority of society. For 
example, the Baroness Wootton of Abinger, in support of reform, in the House of Lords, 
stated that: 
 
…the origin of the concept that suicide should be a crime is rooted in religious 
belief… It is still possible to hold that the taking of life, whether one’s own life or 
that of another, is a grievous sin, and, at the same time, that it is unnecessary, 
unwise, and inhumane to make it a crime.461 
 
It is submitted that the main thrust of Baroness Wootton’s argument is that, historically, 
religion has had a significant impact on the law against suicide. Even though they may 
continue to have an influence, especially in the attitudes of individuals and communities 
who view ending life as a sin; religious principles were beginning to become detached from 
the law. This can be attributed to reshaping cultural landscape of England and changing 
societal attitudes, which no longer attached sinfulness to the idea of suicide.  Thus, a 
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Controversies, Policies and Practices (The Policy Press 2009) 43; and Humayun Ansari, 
The Infidel Within: Muslims in Britain Since 1800 (C Hurst and Co Publishers 2004) 40. 
For greater discussion on how and when the Islamic community established in Britain: ch 3. 
460 For example, four of the six Lords spoke about the views of the Church in relation to 
assisted suicide during the second reading. There was no explicit reference to the views of 
the Catholic Church. The terms “Christianity” and “the Church” were used by various 
members in the House of Lords HL Deb 02 March 1961 vol 229: (Lord Silkin) col 254; 
(Lord Denning) col 262-263; (Baroness Wootton of Abinger) cols 266-267; and (The Lord 
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change in the law on suicide and including and respecting religious ideologies was no 
longer mutually exclusive. 
 
Similarly, Lord Silkin, who too was in support of the Bill, stated that “We are taking the 
view that it is no longer the business of the community to preserve the life of a person who 
wants to end his life. Whether or not suicide is a sin is a matter which is not for this House, 
but in the future it will certainly not be an offence”.462 Members of Parliament also viewed 
suicide to be an issue of individual, personal despair, which only concerned the individual 
who ended their life.463 Whether they believe that it is a sin or not is the conscientious 
decision of that individual: if they chose to end life, they would not be commissioning a 
crime. 
 
In light of the Bill being debated Parliament, the Church of England altered its stance on 
suicide. The Church stated that suicide was an act of despair and that “The punishment of 
the offender is not likely to deter others from attempting to commit suicide” and agreed that 
it should no longer be criminal.464 Instead, steps should be taken to prevent suicides by 
helping individuals to seek counseling and psychotherapy.465 After taking into 
consideration the change in public opinion, altered stance of the Church, the medical 
reasons behind suicides, and the changed societal landscape, which did not consider suicide 
as a taboo issue; suicide was decriminalised. Decriminalising suicide did not imply that 																																																								
462 ibid col 254 
463 Note: Suicide was generally seen to be a solely individual despair and issue. However, 
Durkheim opined that suicide had a social dimension and that individuals from different 
social and religious background have varying suicide rates: Emile Durkheim, On Suicide 
(first published 1897, Penguin 2006); and Luigi Tomasi, ‘Emile Durkheim’s Contribution 
to the Sociological Explanation of Suicide’ in WSF Pickering and Geoffrey Walford (ed), 
Durkheim’s Suicide: A Century of Research and Debate (Routledge 2000) 11-21. 
464 Church of England Information Office, Ought Suicide to Be A Crime? A Discussion of 
Suicide, Attempted Suicide and the Law (Church Information Office 1959) p10. Note: The 
Church used religious language and explained that a true Christian “accepts death as that 
signal occasion when he is finally to prove the love and power of God in Christ. He sees 
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465 ibid. Note: The aformentioned pamphlet issues by the Church of England was 
formulated by a Committee made up of various religious leaders and medical experts. An 
important member of this Committee was a psychiatrist and magistrate, who later became a 
president of The Samaritans, Dr Doris Odlum. 
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society had accepted suicide. However, the decriminalisation of suicide meant that the 
stigma surrounding suicide was greatly reduced and the family of the deceased was no 
longer treated unjustly.466 To this end, the Lord Chancellor stated that “The effect of… the 
Bill would be to take away from attempted suicide the stigma of criminal conduct and 
replace it by a presumption of mental illness to which, in the eyes of some people, some 
stigma still attaches”.467 The Suicide Bill received Royal Assent on the 3rd of August 1961 
and was immediately in force.468 Committing or attempting to commit suicide ceased to be 
crimes.469 Section 1 provides that “The rule of law whereby it is a crime for a person to 
commit suicide is hereby abrogated”. 
 
It is concluded that both Houses of Parliament prioritised societal and medical reasons over 
religious doctrine in 1961. However, the beliefs of the Church, particularly in the doctrine 
of sanctity of life, were included in the debate and were preserved, to some degree, through 
the retention of the ban on assisted suicide. The next section discusses the reasons behind 
Parliament retaining this ban in 1961. 
 
4.4 Assisted Suicide and Section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961 
Even though suicide was decriminalised, it remains criminal to be complicit in another’s 
suicide under section 2(1) of the 1961 Act, which states that “A person who aids, abets, 
counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, 
shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment”.470 When this clause was 
being debated in Parliament, a number of religious issues such as the impact that changing 
the law on assisted suicide would have on the Christian faith, particularly the doctrine of 
sanctity of life, were discussed and are analysed in this section. 																																																								
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4.4.1 Parliamentary Debate on Clause 2(1) of the Suicide Bill 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one the reasons suicide was decriminalised was to 
allow individuals to freely use their religious and conscientious views to dictate their choice 
of ending or preserving life without commissioning a crime. However, the doctrine of 
sanctity of life was still viewed, by various Members of Parliament, to be of paramount 
importance and retaining the criminal embargo on assisted suicide preserved this doctrine 
to some degree.471 To this end, Eric Fletcher, a Labour party MP, categorically stated: 
 
…that it would be a travesty were it thought that by passing this Bill… we were in 
any sense attempting to lessen the sanctity of human life. Suicide will still remain a 
mortal sin. This Measure should not in any sense be interpreted as an 
encouragement to people who wish to commit suicide and, of course, by the 
provisions of Clause 2 it still remains a criminal offence to advise or counsel 
anybody to commit suicide.472 
 
The House of Lords also discussed that Christianity views suicide as a sin but also that the 
criminal embargo on assisted suicide should be retained in order to preserve the religious 
doctrine of sanctity of life.473 To this end, the Lord Bishop of Carlisle argued that: 
 
Clause 2 makes it a crime to encourage or assist or tempt anyone to take his own 
life. It is concerned with the protection of life in society. Now while Clause 2 helps 
to protect society, I am not satisfied that it is sufficiently strong to uphold the 
sanctity of life… the preservation of that sanctity is basic for the wellbeing of any 
society... it needs to be preserved at all costs... I want to do everything possible 
through the law and at the same time to guard that view of life, which regards life as 
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a mystery, a wonderful and sacred thing which has been given to man by other than 
himself.474 
 
The Lord Bishop of Carlisle’s statement suggests that the ban on assisted suicide attempted 
to protect the doctrine of sanctity of life and reflect the importance placed on this doctrine, 
by making it a crime to encourage anyone to take their own life or assist in another’s 
suicide.475 This importance is endangered when an individual demonstrates a willingness to 
engage in activity that ends the life of another person.476 Prado further explains that, “the 
policy behind the proscription against assisted suicide is an abhorrence of the act of suicide 
even though it is no longer a crime”.477 
 
Guinn et al argue that the criminal embargo on assisted suicide appears to have been 
retained because holding those liable who assist another person to die raises a significant 
degree of public and societal interest.478 The main thrust of Guinn’s argument is valid in 
that suicide is, generally, a course of action that ends the life of one individual and does not 
involve another person. However, assisted suicide concerns the person who assists another 
individual with the act of ending their life; and without any regulations and monitoring, 
there is no way to distinguish a compassionate assistor from an individual who has 
malicious intentions. Thus, assisted suicide raises a significant amount of societal interest. 
However, as Chapter Six will establish, the nature of assisted suicide is such that the 
individual who seeks the assistance always takes the final action that ends life. Therefore, 
the risk of unwanted deaths is significantly reduced. Furthermore, under definite 
circumstances and with the proper safeguards – to ensure that an individual has an 																																																								
474 (The Lord Bishop of Carlisle) HL Deb 02 March 1961, vol 229, col 258-262 
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informed, consistent and autonomous wish to end their life and is not mentally ill or under 
any pressure – assisted suicide is a justifiable choice and ought to be a lawful option. 
 
It is concluded from this analysis that during the Parliamentary debate, both Houses of 
Parliament unanimously agreed that assisted suicide ought to be regarded as criminal 
conduct.479 The inviolability of human life is reflected by the maximum punishment of 14 
years’ imprisonment;480 for “Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring suicide or an 
attempt to commit suicide” under section 2(1) Suicide Act 1961.481 This prohibition, 
contained in section 2(1), remained the same until movement to reform it began in the mid-
2000s;482 and it was reformed in 2009. The next section critically evaluates the reasons for 
this change,483 along with the terminology used during the Parliamentary debates, in order 
to establish whether the shifting cultural and societal landscape of England has affected the 
importance placed on the doctrine of sanctity of life, the values that inform the modern 
debate on assisted suicide and contrasts them with the historic movement to reform the law 
in this area. 
 
4.5 Section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
The offence of “aiding and abetting” the suicide or attempted suicide of another person was 
a criminal offence under section 2(1) of the 1961 Act, which has now been amended to one 
of “encouraging or assisting” by section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.484 The 
effect of this amendment is to hold individuals accountable, who assist another person 																																																								
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whose conduct and actions encourage the person to attempt or commit suicide.485 This 
individual, who provides the assistance, may be an unknown individual such as a person 
over the Internet or a familiar individual to the person who attempts or commits suicide.486 
 
The main factor behind this change is the need to protect vulnerable individuals from being 
influenced by modern technology, particularly the Internet, into committing suicide. Biggs 
and Jones explain that “a spat of suicides by young people thought to have been influenced 
by Internet websites promoting and glamorizing suicide provided the impetus to revise the 
law”.487 The new formulation of the offence, under section 59, takes into consideration the 
constantly expanding threat of the Internet. It also includes the view of the Law 
Commission in 2006, which reported that there has been a growth of “suicide websites” 
over the past few years and that these websites have proven to play a role in a number of 
reported suicide pacts.488 For example, they unite individuals who are contemplating 
suicide and even provide them with various suicide methods they could use to end their 
lives.489 Furthermore, Tanya Byron’s report in 2008 – Safer Children in a Digital World – 
also evaluates the risks such websites pose to children who use the Internet.490 The report 
explains that pro-suicide sites might encourage harmful behaviour in young people.491 
Vulnerable young people meet online and share pacts to commit suicide.492 Individuals who 
have access to websites that provide information about suicide techniques have an 
increased chance of their suicide attempt being successful.493 It is submitted here that the 
societal landscape was changing due to technological advancements, particularly the 																																																								
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widespread accessibility and usage of the Internet, thus, the understanding of both suicide 
and assisted suicide was also beginning to transform. This shift in understanding can also 
be attributed to medical advancements, particularly the increasingly unstigmatised debate 
around mental health problems in Britain, which has led to a better understanding of mental 
health and psychiatric illness.494 This technological and societal evolution is reflected in the 
legislative changes made by section 59. 
 
4.5.1 Parliamentary Debates on the Coroners and Justice Bill 
In the 2009 debate, Lord David Alton, who identifies with Roman Catholicism,495 and was 
against a change in the law, argued that the section 59 amendment introduces a new offence 
of encouraging or assisting suicide by outlawing predatory websites that encourage or 
promote suicide.496 However, it is submitted that section 59 does not create a new law: it 
merely simplifies and updates the language: the scope of the law remains the same.497 The 
question arises: almost 50 years later, why did Parliament change the wording without 
fundamentally altering the scope of the offence? Wells and Quick explain that section 59 
“merges the substantive and attempt offences of assisted suicide into a single offence of 
‘encouraging or assisting’ suicide or attempted suicide”.498 As the evidence found in the 
Parliamentary debates suggests, the rising popularity of the Internet seems to be a pivotal 
reason for this change, and criminal liability for encouraging another individuals’ suicide 
arises in online activities and offline circumstances.499 
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McGowan argues “the scope of the law remains the same so these changes [under section 
59 of the 2009 Act] do not make anyone liable to prosecution who was not liable 
before”.500 It is submitted here that this argument fails to take into account the growing 
concern about whether the law was adequate to protect vulnerable individuals and to deal 
with encouragement or information about suicide over the Internet.501 Section 59 addresses 
the issue of encouragement provided over the Internet and offline activities.502 The 
amendment clarifies that an individual who provides any services or information on how to 
commit suicide is potentially committing an offence even if it is read by anyone not known 
to the author of that information.503 
 
During the Parliamentary debates on the Coroners and Justice Bill, Members of Parliament 
appreciated the law was being updated to make the public aware how the law operates and 
that the law on assisted suicide applies to both online and offline activities.504 Various 
Members of both Houses of Parliament opined that updating the language was necessary to 
protect vulnerable individuals – especially young people – from ending their lives after 
reading or discussing information on websites that provide information on suicide by 
prohibiting inimical online activity which would have the effect of encouraging or assisting 
suicide.505 To this end, in the House of Commons, Mr James Gray commented: 
 
I googled “How to kill yourself”, and the sort of stuff that came tumbling out was 
simply appalling... Some of these sites not only describe how to do it but encourage 
people to do it… In a civilised society such as ours we cannot allow that to 
continue… it should not be all that difficult to analyse the dozen or 20 really 																																																								
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wicked, vicious, nasty sites and… having them taken down.506 
 
In the House of Lords, a paramount concern was to protect vulnerable people, who are 
exposed to malicious and unscrupulous activity on the Internet. To this end, Lord Hylton 
explained that “…many people, especially the feeble-minded, the frail, the elderly, the 
confused or the chronically ill, are particularly vulnerable. They deserve our protection 
against coercion or persuasion to take their own lives”.507 In the House of Commons, Brian 
Iddon, the MP for Bolton (South-East), stated that, “…some people who have no suicidal 
tendencies in their mind when they stumble on to those sites, which is not difficult to do, 
may begin to think about suicide, particularly if they are already distressed”.508 
The Coroners and Justice Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 14 January 
2009. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Jack Straw, explained that the 
amendment: 
 
…does not substantively change the law, but it does simplify and modernise the 
language of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 to increase public understanding and 
to reassure people that the provision applies as much to actions on the internet as to 
actions offline.509 
 
An individual who encourages or assists a suicide, either online or offline, is 
commissioning a crime. It should be noted here that during the Parliamentary debate on the 
Coroners and Justice Bill, Lord Patel argued that the section 59 amendment “…fails to 
distinguish between those who maliciously encourage suicide and those who 
compassionately assist the death of a terminally ill adult who is suffering but mentally 
competent”.510 Individuals may have benevolent and altruistic motives behind assisting, 
encouraging or comforting those with suicidal intentions. However, there are others in 																																																								
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cyberspace, who encourage, provoke and even pressurise individuals to commit suicide. 
The Internet and individuals in cyberspace teach vulnerable persons how to end their life. 
There is a perceived risk of the Internet as “…the modern version of the howling crowd 
yelling, Jump! Jump! at the suicidal person standing on the skyscraper window ledge”.511 
This risk of the Internet can be illustrated by the recent incidents of “Internet suicides”. 
Various news reports stated that all these individuals, who ended up committing suicide, 
frequented suicide websites, forums and chat rooms.512 They often had conversations in 
chat rooms with users about how to commit suicide. One news report states that chat room 
users encouraged a father to take the life of his son and then end his own life by hanging 
himself.513 
 
In an attempt to protect these vulnerable individuals from being manipulated or coerced 
into a premature death, via online activity, the language of the law was updated.514 The 
Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham encapsulates the position of the House of Lords, 
on the section 59 amendment, as follows: 
 
Since the Suicide Act 1961, developments in communication mean that powerful 
influences can be brought to bear on emotionally vulnerable people, not least young 
people, by so-called suicide websites. This is a very sensitive area where people 																																																								
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frequently act under tragic and burdensome pressures. We must avoid criminalising 
people who are merely discussing their feelings… However, it is vital that the law 
should continue to prohibit irresponsible or unscrupulous actions, which would have 
the effect of encouraging or assisting suicide.515 
 
It is concluded that as a result of these debates, the inviolability of life is preserved through 
the updated prohibition on assisted suicide in section 59 of the 2009 Act.516 Keown 
encapsulates the amendment as follows: 
 
Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 provides a maximum penalty of 14 years’ 
imprisonment for aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring suicide or an attempt to 
commit suicide. The prohibition has been updated by section 59(2) of the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 which, replacing section 2(1), provides that a person commits 
an offence if he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or 
attempt to commit suicide.517 
 
The amendment not only updates the technical terminology of section 2(1) of the 1961 Act 
but also protects vulnerable individuals from encouragement or assistance from known or 
unknown users over the Internet.518 
 
 																																																								
515 HL 18 May 2009, vol 710, col 1219-1220; and (The Lord Bishop of Southwell and 
Nottingham) HL 18 May 2009, vol 710, col 1220. 
516 Keown, Law and Ethics of Medicine (n 226) 8 
517 ibid. Also see: Duncan Atkinson, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2012 (OUP 2010) 13; 
and DPP, ‘Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ 
(February 2010, updated October 2014) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html> accessed 
21 May 2017 
518 Note: Mr Justice Hawkins differentiated between the terms “aiding and abetting” and 
“encouragement” in R v Coney and Others (1882) 8 QBD 534. Even though the case 
concerned public bare-knuckle contests, Hawkins J noted that encouragement does not 
always amount to aiding and abetting a crime. Aiding and abetting a crime takes place 
when an individual actively provides assistance and facilitation to commit a crime. 
However, encouragement can be knowingly or unknowingly given. Words or actions can 
be misinterpreted and be taken as encouragement. 
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4.5.2 Religious and Secular Attitudes in the 2009 Debate 
During the second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords, Lord Taverne appreciated that 
a significant majority of individuals with non-religious viewpoints support a change in the 
law on assisted suicide; and there was also an increase in individuals from the Christian 
religion, about 80% of both Catholics and Protestants, who now supported assisted suicide. 
He opined that this change “… has been consistent over a long period and is based on the 
personal experience of miserable deaths of relatives and friends”.519 However, religious 
tenets and viewpoints, especially those of minority groups, did not receive any explicit 
consideration during the Parliamentary debates. This negligible amount of consideration 
given to religion demonstrates that Parliament’s approach to assisted suicide is increasingly 
secular. 
 
Various members of Parliament opined that the amendment sought “to prohibit 
irresponsible or unscrupulous actions which would have the effect of encouraging or 
assisting suicide” and protect vulnerable individuals especially young people from “suicide 
websites”.520 The idea that fuelled this debate was the need to protect vulnerable individuals 
from coercion, pressure and undue influence from any third party. The significance of 
religion is decreasing in society and in the debate on assisted suicide; which is why the 
approach to the debate is not derived from the views of a particular religion and now has a 
secular undertone.521 
 
The evidence found in the Parliamentary debates suggests that Members of Parliament did 
not view ‘religion’ as a factor on which the change in the law was based. It can be 
concluded that there is a clear switch from religious terminology in 1961, to secular 																																																								
519 HL Deb 18 May 2009, vol 710, col 1273 
520 For example, HL Deb 18 May 2009, vol 710: (Lord Goodhart) col 1266 stated that 
“…assisting the suicide of a person who has a few weeks or months to live, and will suffer 
great pain and distress during that period, is not and should not be a crime”. Also see: (The 
Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham) col 1220; (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) col 
1228; (Baroness Jay of Paddington) col 1233; (Lord Patel) col 1237; (Lord Alderdice) col 
1258; (Lord Neill of Bladen) col 1267; and (Baroness Warnock) col 1276; (Lord Hylton) 
col 1279; (David Howarth) HC Deb 26 Jan 2009, vol, 487 column 68; and (Mrs Madeleine 
Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)) HC Deb 26 Jan 2009, vol, 487 cols 78-79. 
521 For greater discussion on secularism and morality, refer to ch 2. This shift has led to a 
change in the approach to the debate around the legalisation of assisted suicide, see: ch 6. 
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language in the 2009 Act.522 For example, the values that fuel the debate on assisted 
suicide, were described by Lord Kingsland, as “…entirely a matter of conscience”.523 
Secular values seem to be receiving priority over religious doctrine. As can be seen from 
Parliamentary debates, policy makers are advocating and promoting secular values.524 Non-
religious values seem to be favoured in the modern debate on assisted suicide.525 The 
Islamic community did not react to the section 59 amendment.526 However, the Church of 
England reacted to this Bill by reiterating that: 
 
Encouraging or assisting suicide remains a criminal offence... In amending the 
Suicide Act by Section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Parliament 
confirmed that it should remain an offence to intentionally encourage or assist 
suicide or an attempted suicide.527 
 
Even the reaction of the Church of England to the section 59 amendment was written using 
non-religious language. There is a clear secular attitude towards this debate, which is now 
much more temporal and non-religious.528 Religious groups have abandoned ecclesiastical 
references and religious language in Parliamentary debates, which may be an attempt to 
relate to every citizen in society and not just an individual faith group or community. This 																																																								
522 For greater discussion on the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969, refer to ch 6. 
523 HL Deb 18 May 2009, vol 710, col 1212 
524 Tthe Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham HL Deb 18 May 2009, vol 710, col 
1220 stated that the amendment not only sought to protect vulnerable and young people but 
also “…to ensure that the operation of the law is compassionate towards people who find 
themselves in a difficult position because their relatives wish to end their own lives”. 
525 Members of Parliament pointed out that there is a significant degree of moral culpability 
of assisting the suicide of another (The Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmour)) HL Deb 02 
March 1961, vol 229, col 250. The aim of the Suicide Bill is to administer compassion yet 
protect society and uphold the sanctity of life (The Lord Bishop of Carlisle) HL Deb 02 March 
1961, vol 229, col 258. Hence, complicity in another’s suicide did not cease to be an offence as 
per (The Lord Chancellor (Viscount Kilmour)) HL Deb 02 March 1961, vol 229, col 250. 
526 However, they had strong, opposing views on Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill, 
discussed in ch 6. 
527 Church of England, ‘Assisted Suicide Debate – Bishop of Bristol Warns Against 
Change in the Law’ (The Church of England in Parliament, 5 March 2014) 
<http://churchinparliament.org/2014/03/05/assisted-suicide-debate-bishop-of-bristol-warns-
against-change-in-the-law/> accessed 21 May 2017 
528 George Jacob Holyoake, English Secularism: A Confession of Belief (The Open Court 
Publishing 1896) v 
	 112	
move away from religious references and undertones has shifted the manner in which 
certain values, particularly the doctrine of sanctity of life, are understood. This doctrine is 
now understood as having an intrinsic value, rather than a religious attachment. The basis 
of this doctrine is now the freedom and autonomy of an individual to make decisions in 
relation to their life and death, based on the quality and subjective worth of their life, which 
are significantly influenced by the religious and non-religious views that the individual 
identifies with. 
 
4.6 Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide 
Parliament did not change the law on assisted suicide during the 2009 debate, however, the 
DPP issued guidelines, which were published on 25 February 2010, clarifying the 
circumstances in which a suspect would be prosecuted for assisted suicide. This section 
focuses on this policy, which was published in response to the House of Lords’ decision in 
the Purdy case. It concerned a woman with progressive multiple sclerosis that sought 
clarity on the factors that the DPP takes into account when prosecuting individuals under 
section 2(1) of the 1961 Act. The House of Lords required the DPP to publish guidance on 
the prosecution policy in relation to individuals who assist or encourage another to commit 
suicide.529 The DPP then published interim guidance and launched a public consultation on 
23 September 2009.530 Consistently with section 2(4) of the 1961 Act, it applies to cases of 
assisting or encouraging another individual’s suicide. Section 2(4) must be read alongside 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors.531 The Code follows a two-stage test: the Evidential Stage 
and the Public Interest Stage.532 
 
																																																								
529 Purdy (n 56) [41], [52]-[53]. Also see: Dave Powell, ‘Assisting suicide and the 
discretion to prosecute revisited’ (2009) 73(6) J Crim L 475, 477; James Chamlers, 
‘Assisted suicide: jurisdiction and discretion’ (2010) Edin L R 295, 297-298; and Jonathan 
Dickens, Social Work, Law and Ethics (Routledge 2013) 80 
530 Keown, Law and Ethics of Medicine (n 226) 303 
531 For greater discussion on the two-stage test under The Code, refer to: David Calvert-
Smith and Stephen O’Doherty, ‘Legislative technique and human rights: a response’ (2003) 
Crim L R 384, 385 
532 David Ormerod, Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2012 (OUP 2011) 1268; and Penney 
Lewis, ‘The Limits of Autonomy: Law at the End of Life in England and Wales’ in Negri 
(n 24) 241 
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In order to satisfy the Evidential Stage, it must be proved that “the victim committed or 
attempted to commit suicide and the suspect aided, abetted, counselled or procured the 
suicide or the attempt”.533 It is clear within the policy that the victim must be the one who 
takes their own life.534 The suspect must not, under any circumstance, physically assist the 
victim in committing suicide. Cohen summarises the position as follows: 
 
The policy clarifies that the victim must be the sole actor in taking his own life. If 
the assister causes the victim’s death by administering the lethal procedure, the 
assister will have committed murder or manslaughter, regardless of the victim’s 
genuine desire to die.535 
 
Once the DPP establishes that there is significant evidence, which satisfies the Evidential 
Stage, the case is then evaluated under the Public Interest Stage using the factors set out in 
the policy. The policy sets out 16 factors specifying when it is in the public interest to 
prosecute a suspect who encouraged or assisted another individual to commit suicide; such 
as the age, voluntariness, mental capacity of the victim, and whether the suspect was paid 
by the victim, whether they had a history of violence, or gave assistance or encouragement 
to more than one victim to name a few.536 The policy sets out a further 6 factors explaining 
when prosecution is not in the public interest; such as the suspect being wholly motivated 
by compassion and reluctance to assist the victim, whether the suspect sought to dissuade 
the victim and subsequently reported the victim’s suicide to the police and fully cooperated 
with them in their enquiries.537 
 
It is worth noting here that following the consultation exercise on the interim policy, the 
DPP received around 5000 responses.538 A very small minority of all the respondents to the 
public consultation on the interim policy included the view of religion on assisted suicide. 
For example, 9% of the relevant respondents stated that, “All life is sacred and we must 																																																								
533 DPP Policy (n 517) 
534 ibid 
535 Cohen (n 471) 713 
536 DPP Policy (n 517) 
537 ibid 
538 CPS, ‘Assisted Suicide Consultation: Annex A – Summary of Respondents’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses_annex_a.html> accessed 21 May 2017 
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preserve the sanctity of life”.539 One of these respondents was the Mission and Public 
Affairs Division (MPAD) of the Church of England who reiterated that the Church remains 
opposed to any change in the law on assisted suicide.540 The MPAD stated that the DPP 
policy does not change the law and merely brings “clarity in the application of the law 
prohibiting assisted suicide”.541 The other respondents, around 447 of the 5000 
respondents, opined that the sanctity of life was a significant issue in the debate on assisted 
suicide and needed to be identified and included when deciding in favour of or against 
prosecution.542 In contrast, 7% of the total number of respondents, viewed autonomy as a 
significant issue within the assisted suicide debate.543 These 339 respondents agreed to the 
following statements: “Every person should have the right to make decisions about their 
own life. A change in the law is required; no cases involving assisted suicide should be 
prosecuted”.544 
 
Furthermore, the MPAD made a statement after the publication of the final policy: 
 
Assisted suicide, as well as being a crime, is always also a tragedy… the most 
compassionate course is to provide love, support and the best possible medical and 
nursing care, not to acquiesce in requests for assisted suicide… Protecting the 
vulnerable, ensuring that every life is appreciated as being valuable… outweighs 
arguments in favour of individual choice… We believe that [the publication of the 
DPP policy] ought to bring to an end to calls for a change in the law. Any further 																																																								
539 CPS, ‘Assisted Suicide Consultation: Public Consultation Exercise on the Interim Policy 
for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Assisted Suicide: Summary of Responses’ (February 
2010) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
540 MPAD of the Church of England, ‘Response to the Director of Public Prosecutions’ 
Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ (25 
February 2010) <http://www.churchofengland.org/media-
centre/news/2010/02/pr2710.aspx> accessed 21 May 2017. The Church of England seems 
to be the only respondent. The Islamic community, especially organisations such as the 
MCB did not respond to the interim or final DPP policy. 
541 CPS, ‘Response to the DPP Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or 
Assisting Suicide’ (25 February 2010) <http://www.churchofengland.org/media-
centre/news/2010/02/pr2710.aspx> accessed 21 May 2017 
542 CPS, ‘Assisted Suicide consultation Summary of Responses » Question 9: issues identified’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/as_responses_question_9.html> accessed 21 May 2017 
543 ibid 
544 ibid 
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calls for change would be ideologically driven and, if heeded, would change 
fundamentally and irrevocably the moral status of our society and would make this 
a less compassionate and caring land in which to live and die.545 
 
Firstly, the Church of England is not using religious vocabulary. There is no mention of the 
sanctity of life doctrine, being a religious value or mention of religious text.546 This may be 
an attempt to relate to individuals who practice the Christian faith, non-Church going 
parishioners (individuals who identify with the Christian faith but do not practice it) and 
even individuals who hold other religious or non-religious beliefs. Secondly, even though 
autonomy is the most important value that influences the debate on assisted suicide, the 
Church does not view it as a significant value as it is outweighed by the need to protect 
vulnerable individuals who may be given a premature death. Lastly, the Church opined that 
any momentum to change the law, subsequent to the DPP policy, would be “ideologically 
driven” based on a system of ideas concerning economic, political and social theory rather 
than being driven by religious principles.547 Thus, demonstrating a preference for non-
religious principles and the secular system of thought. For example, even the term ‘moral’, 
in relation to the societal landscape, is used with a secular undertone in the Church of 
England’s statement. 
 
After the final policy was published, the Catholic Archbishop of Cardiff also commented: 
 
In issuing these Guidelines it is clear that the DPP has listened very carefully to, and 
taken account of, the many representations made to him during the consultation… 
the new Guidelines, which now give greater protection to some of the most 
vulnerable people in our society. There is also a greater stress on the fact that the 
law has not changed, that all cases will be investigated and that no one is being 
given immunity from prosecution under these Guidelines.548 																																																								
545 MPAD (n 540) 
546 For a detailed discussion on the Church of England’s view on assisted suicide and the 
role of the sanctity of life doctrine refer to ch 2. 
547 MPADs (n 540) 
548 The Most Reverend Peter Smith Archbishop of Cardiff Chair of the Bishops’ 
Conference of England and Wales Department of Responsibility and Citizenship, 
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The comments were made in general, non-religious terms. Although it may have been 
implied, there was no religious terminology used nor was there a mention of the doctrine of 
sanctity of life. The Church of England and Wales were concerned with the need to protect 
vulnerable, ill and disabled individuals. The Church of England even felt that the need to 
protect vulnerable individuals overrode the right to autonomy, on which individuals seek an 
assisted suicide. Both the Church of England and Catholic Churches also reiterated that the 
DPP guidelines merely clarified the law and did not change it. It is concluded here that 
there is a clear shift in attitudes to this debate, which is reflected by the shift in language of 
religious and Parliamentary members from a religious to a secular approach. 
 
The current position of the law on assisted suicide in England can be encapsulated as 
follows. The DPP policy does not change or repeal the Suicide Act of 1961.549 It does not 
guarantee a suspect immunity from prosecution for assisting the victim to commit suicide. 
The policy does, however, attempt to clarify whether or not prosecuting a suspect would be 
in the public interest. To this end, the policy sets out 16 factors that influence the decision 
of the DPP to favour prosecuting the suspect and a further list of 6 factors telling against 
prosecution. Regardless of whether the suicide occurs, the policy applies to assistance or 
encouragement provided by a suspect – wholly or partly – in England and Wales. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Suicide was a crime in England for centuries; however, the social and legal landscape 
began changing when the medical reasons behind suicide attempts were established, and 
society developed a more compassionate attitude towards individuals, and their families, 
who tried to or ended their lives. Even though the law was changed to reflect this 
compassionate attitude, there was a significant attachment of religion with this area of the 																																																																																																																																																																									
‘Publication of the DPP Assisted Suicide Guidelines: Comment from the Archbishop of 
Cardiff’ (25 February 2010) <www.catholic-ew.org.uk/Home/News/2010/Publication-of-
the-DPP-Assisted-Suicide-Guidelines-Comment-from-the-Archbishop-of-
Cardiff/(language)/eng-GB> accessed 21 May 2017 
549 In common law systems, like England, any new amendments are adjunct to the previous 
law and tend to supplement it or codify pre-existing case law (rather than superseding, 
replacing or abolishing it as in a civil law system): John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law 
Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2nd 
edn, Stanford University Press 1985) 7, 27, 32 
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law. Thus, it was not until 1961 that suicide was decriminalised. This relationship of 
religion with the law on assisted suicide was reflected in the extensive inclusion of religion, 
namely the Church of England, in the Parliamentary debates during that time. Furthermore, 
the lack of inclusion of minority groups, particularly the Islamic faith, can be attributed to 
the fact that, as established in the previous chapter, even though minority subcultures were 
present in the country at the time, their presence was not well-established. 
 
By decriminalising suicide, Parliament or society was not accepting or encouraging suicide 
neither was it devaluing the doctrine of sanctity of life. In an attempt to protect the 
inviolability of this doctrine, which is rooted in Christianity, the criminal embargo on 
assisted suicide was retained. The historic connection of the Christian faith with the law 
was reflected in the Parliamentary debates, which continued to view the taking of life 
against its religious tenets. 
 
Over the years, there was an increasing detachment of religion from societal activities; and 
medical and technological advancements led to a shift in social and governmental approach 
that led to an interest in reforming the law on this area. However, this interest to review the 
law did not take place until 48 years later, in 2009, due to secular values beginning to fuel 
the debate on assisted suicide, particularly the notion of autonomy gaining ground. To this 
end, section 2(1) of the Suicide Act of 1961, which codified the offence of “assisting, 
aiding or abetting” suicide, was amended to one of “encouraging or assisting” by section 59 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
 
Even though the criminal embargo on assisted suicide continued to protect the doctrine of 
sanctity or value of life, the main reason behind the retention of this ban, in 2009, is that 
there is a significant amount of public interest in prosecuting an individual who is willing to 
maliciously assist or encourage another person to take their life. Furthermore, the main 
reason behind this amendment was the need to protect vulnerable people from being 
influenced by modern technology, namely the Internet, into committing suicide. This 
amendment updates and simplifies the language and makes the public aware that the law 
applies to both online and offline activities. 
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The shift in approach towards the issue of assisted suicide was established in this chapter. 
For example, the Parliamentary debates revolved around the need to protect vulnerable 
individuals from malicious intent, coercion and pressure instead of the need to include the 
views of various religions on this issue. There is clearly a decrease in inclusion of religious 
views in the debate on assisted suicide, which is increasingly secular and not derived from 
any religion. This shift in approach is evident in the language, during the Parliamentary 
debates, which viewed ending life as a “mortal sin” in 1961 compared to it being “entirely a 
matter of conscience” in 2009. This shift in language and approach to this issue will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six. Clearly, the approach to this area of the law is largely non-
religious and temporal. 
 
This shift is even reflected in the reaction of religious groups, namely the Church of 
England, to the section 59 amendment. The Church’s statement was drafted in non-
religious language without any ecclesiastical references. A clear secular approach was 
taken in order to relate its stance to every citizen in society and not just individuals who 
identify with the Christian faith. Even the understanding of the doctrine of sanctity of life 
has shifted from having a religious piety attached to it to having an inviolable and intrinsic 
value. However, as argued in Chapter Two, the contemporary understanding of this 
doctrine is that it has a subjective value, takes on quality of life considerations and allows 
individuals the freedom to make decisions in relation to their life and death. This freedom 
to choose the time and manner of death is guaranteed under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. The impact of human rights law on reforming assisted suicide 
law in multicultural English society 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the influence human rights law has on furthering the reform of the 
law on assisted suicide in England. It also extracts the values that influence domestic and 
Strasbourg human rights jurisprudence on this area of the law. The aim of human rights law 
is to protect, safeguard and develop the dignity and freedoms of every citizen. It should be 
noted here that only certain provisions under human rights law, which have been invoked in 
assisted suicide cases and are directly linked to the religious and secular values that inform 
the human rights debate on assisted suicide, are being analysed in this chapter. 
 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 2, which 
protects the right to life that is based on the doctrine of sanctity of life and is one of the 
central principles that inform the jurisprudence and debate on the law on assisted suicide. It 
establishes that since the main aim of Article 2 is to protect life, it cannot be extended to 
include an antithetical right to die. However, Strasbourg jurisprudence creates an opening, 
under Article 8, which has become a very powerful Convention right, to allow individuals 
to choose the time and manner of the death. To develop this discussion, this chapter 
examines the domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 8 in order to understand 
how the right to self-determination emanates from this Convention right; and evaluates 
whether the DPP’s refusal to provide immunity from prosecution or the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide, contained in section 2 of the Suicide Act of 1961, breach an individual’s 
Article 8 rights. The Pretty case is examined in significant detail as it was the first of its 
kind to reach the Strasbourg court and was applied to various subsequent Strasbourg and 
domestic cases, such as Koch and Purdy and Nicklinson respectively. 
 
The previous chapters have extracted the values and principles that guide the law on the 
issue of assisted suicide namely the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is historically a 
religious principle, on which the opposition to reform is based; and the notion of autonomy, 
which is primarily a non-religious value and grounded in human rights law, on which a 
reform of the law on assisted suicide can be based. This chapter also examines the notion of 
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dignity and whether the loss of dignity that disabled or terminally ill patients feel – which 
causes pain and suffering and the dependency on others – amounts to an infringement of 
Article 3. This extraction and analysis of these competing values, in the human rights 
context, forms the original contribution of this thesis. Lastly, this chapter inquires, and 
forms part of the original contribution, whether these competing values are protected under 
Article 9; and if a lack of lawful option of assisted suicide breaches an individual’s freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion, if they believe in the notion of assisted suicide for 
themselves. Pretty was the only case that invoked Article 9 in this context and is given 
particular importance throughout this chapter. 
 
5.2 The intrinsic link between Article 2 and the doctrine of sanctity of life 
This section examines the scope of Article 2 in order to determine whether it was 
formulated to preserve life, whether Strasbourg jurisprudence gives consideration to 
religious tenets such as the doctrine of sanctity of life and if it can be extended to provide 
individuals with a right to die with dignity. Article 2 provides as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to 
effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in 
action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
Article 2 is one of the most significant foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society; and 
must be stringently and meticulously interpreted. The Strasbourg Court has confirmed, in 
Solomou v Turkey, that Article 2 “... ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
Convention”.550 It imposes both a negative and positive obligation on Member States.551 																																																								
550 Solomou and Others v Turkey [2008] App no 36832/97, para 63 
551 Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (OUP 2011) 184 
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The negative obligation imposes a duty on Member States not to intentionally or even 
negligently take life.552 The positive obligation imposes a duty to safeguard life.553 Even 
though the Strasbourg Court continues to maintain, as in Osman v UK,554 that Member 
States must take reasonable steps to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they 
have (or ought to have) knowledge;555 the obligation to not take life is not unlimited or 
absolute.556 Article 2(2) lists a number of exceptions to the right to life.557 
 
English courts have maintained that the purpose of Article 2 is to protect the sanctity of life 
(which, as established in Chapter Two, can have either a religious or non-religious 
underpinning) and should not be extended to allow assisted suicide. Furthermore, as 
Chapter Two established, the sanctity of life is a doctrine that emanates from the Christian 
religion, which has deep-seated historical ties with England. Thus, discussion around this 
doctrine can extensively be found in English courts and rarely in Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
For example, Lord Bingham in Pretty v DPP – which concerned a woman with motor 
neuron disease who claimed that section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible 
with the Convention and that the DPP’s refusal to grant immunity to her husband if he 
assisted her to travel to Dignitas in Switzerland to end her life was an infringement of her 
Convention rights558 – opined that: 
 
 
 
																																																								
552 ibid 220 
553 ibid 184; and Brid Moriarty and Eva Massa (eds), Human Rights Law (4th edn, OUP 
2012) 220 
554 This case concerned the police unable to avoid an obsessed male teacher killing a male 
pupil. 
555 Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245 
556 Susan Breau, ‘The Right to Life of Detainees in Armed Conflict’ in Jon Yorke (ed),  The 
Right to Life and the Value of Life :  Orientations in Law, Politics and Ethics (Ashgate 2010) 
155; and Wicks, ‘Terminating Life and Human Rights’ (n 226) 199 
557 Bev Clucas and Scott Davidson, ‘Taking Human Rights Seriously: UK and New 
Zealand Perspectives on Judicial Interpretation and Ideologies’ in Roger Brownsword (ed), 
Global Governance and the Quest for Justice: Volume 4 (Hart 2004) 158; Breau (n 556) 
155; and Fiona Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (OUP 2006) 179 
558 Pretty v UK (n 57) para 14(11)(5) 
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Whatever the benefits which, in the view of many, attach to voluntary euthanasia, 
suicide, physician-assisted suicide and suicide assisted without the intervention of a 
physician, these are not benefits which derive protection from an article framed to 
protect the sanctity of life.559 
 
The main thrust of Lord Bingham’s view is valid in the sense that Article 2 is framed to 
protect the doctrine of sanctity of life and any actions that contravene this doctrine cannot 
emanate from this Convention right. Thus, a “right to die” would be antithetical to its 
purpose. However, this view does not take into consideration that the doctrine of sanctity of 
life is not absolute;560 “and has changed over time, for example, as in Britain, attempted 
suicide is no longer a criminal offence”561 along with the right to refuse treatment, which 
are all exceptions to this doctrine and allowing assisted suicide would only add to this list 
of exceptions. In contrast, however, Wicks argues that: 
 
Article 2 does not say that everyone’s right to life must be protected by law until the 
continuation of that life is no longer in the person’s own interests, and indeed such a 
restriction on the right to life would imply the rejection of the sanctity of life 
principle by its assumption that death is sometimes preferable to life… The 
prohibition on the intentional deprivation of life (in Article 2 ECHR) has been 
stretched to breaking point with the judicial acceptance of the withdrawal of 
[artificial nutrition and hydration] from patients in [persistent vegetative state] when 
the clear intention is to cause death.562 
 
																																																								
559 Pretty (n 57) [6] 
560 Mandy Shircore and Malcolm Barrett, ‘Uncomfortable Bedfellows: Queensland 
Criminal Law and Patients’ Rights to Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment’ (2009) James 
Cook University Law Review (2009) 16(1) 90, 103 (“The House of Lords recognised, 
however, that the doctrine of sanctity of life is not absolute; it yields in certain 
circumstances to the right to self determination or autonomy”). 
561 Karen Dyer, ‘Raising our heads above the parapet? Societal attitudes to assisted suicide 
and consideration of the need for law reform in England and Wales’ (2009) 21 The 
Denning law Journal 27, 39 
562 Elizabeth Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare (Hart 2007) 247-251. Also see: Pretty 
(n 57) [109]-[111] (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough). 
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The main thrust of Wicks’ argument is that domestic courts hold that Article 2 emanates 
from the doctrine of sanctity of life and, thus, seek to preserve it regardless of the 
justifications provided by individuals want to end it. Furthermore, Wicks criticises that 
allowing individuals to assisted the suicide of another will have an implication on the duty 
of the State to take steps to safeguard life. Even though Wicks criticises the court for 
allowing withdrawal of artificial food and hydration, Wicks does not take into 
consideration that judicial acceptance of patients being allowed to withdraw artificial food 
and hydration is not the only exception into the doctrine of sanctity of life in English law. 
Decriminalising suicide in 1961,563 which is discussed in the previous chapter, was another 
exception into English law that has always sought to protect the doctrine of sanctity of life. 
Furthermore, the judicial acceptance based on distinctions between withholding or 
removing food and hydration as being an omission and act, respectively (and not 
euthanasia, which was discussed in Section 1.3) also amounts to an exception to the aim of 
preserving the doctrine of sanctity of life under English law.564 Thus, allowing assisted 
suicide would only add to the list of exceptions in English law that are based on the 
doctrine of sanctity of life.565 
 
In Pretty, the House of Lords, rejected her application on the basis that assisting the suicide 
of another is criminal under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961.566 The House also noted 
that the right to life under Article 2 was formulated to protect against the intentional taking 
of life and preserve the doctrine of sanctity of life. To this end, Lord Steyn opined that: 																																																								
563 For a detailed discussion on the decriminalisation of suicide in 1961, refer to ch 4. 
564 Rebecca Louise Blackburn, ‘Ending One’s Own Life: Unjustifiable Injustice’ (PhD 
thesis, Durham University 2011) 70 
565 ibid 78 
566 For the media response to the Pretty case: Staff and Agencies, ‘Diane Pretty loses right 
to die case’ The Guardian (29 April 2002) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2002/apr/29/health.medicineandhealth> accessed 21 
May 2017. The Guardian uses language that clearly supports the notion of assisted suicide 
and largely quotes supporters of the movement to reform the law. Also see: BBC News, 
‘Diane Pretty: The Fight Continues’ (29 November 2001) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1682321.stm> accessed 21 May 2017. The BBC 
supports the movement to reform the law, and uses emotive language in its report. For 
example, when describing Mrs Pretty’s condition, the report states, “The disease robs the 
patient of the ability to move muscles – including, eventually, those controlling speech and 
breathing”. 
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The purpose of Article 2(1) is clear. It enunciates the principle of the sanctity of life 
and provides a guarantee that no individual “shall be deprived of life” by means of 
intentional human intervention… Nothing in the article or the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights can assist Mrs Pretty’s case on this article… So 
radical a step [of assisted suicide], infringing the sanctity of life principle, would 
have required far more explicit wording.567 
 
It should be noted here that Lord Steyn further stated that the notion that the doctrine of 
sanctity of life should always be preserved by retaining the criminal embargo on assisted 
suicide, is shared by different religions within a pluralistic society: 
 
There is a conviction that human life is sacred and that the corollary is that 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are always wrong. This view is supported by the 
Roman Catholic Church, Islam and other religions. There is also a secular view, 
shared sometimes by atheists and agnostics, that human life is sacred.568 
 
The main thrust of Lord Steyn’s argument is that the doctrine of sanctity of life ought to be 
protected as there are many religious communities and even non-religious groups and 
individuals who oppose a change in the law based on their religious beliefs or non-religious 
viewpoints. However, this argument does not take into consideration that there is a 
significant majority of individuals, from non-religious groups and even religious 
communities, who support a change in the law on assisted suicide. For example, a British 
Social Attitudes Survey, which was published in 2010, calculated that “71% of religious 
and 92% non-religious people believe that a doctor should be allowed to end the life of a 
patient with an incurable disease”.569 Similar polls have been conducted in recent years, 																																																								
567 Pretty (n 57) [59]-[60] 
568 Pretty (n 57) [54]. Lord Steyn further stated, “On the other side, there are many millions 
who do not hold these beliefs. For many the personal autonomy of individuals is 
predominant. They would argue that it is the moral right of individuals to have a say over 
the time and manner of their death”. For a detailed discussion on autonomy see ch 2 and 5; 
and for a discussion of the relationship between autonomy and human rights, refer to ch 5. 
569 British Humanist Association, ‘Religion and belief: some surveys and statistics’ 
<https://humanism.org.uk/campaigns/religion-and-belief-some-surveys-and-statistics/> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
	 125	
such as a YouGov poll in 2013, which calculated that 62% of individuals who identify with 
a religion support the notion of assisted suicide. In May 2014, a YouGov poll of 4500 
individuals calculated that 73% of respondents supported Lord Falconer’s proposals, which 
are discussed in Chapter Six, to legalise assisted suicide for terminally ill individuals and 
only 13% were against a change in the law.570 Similarly, in a 2015 Populus poll of 5000 
people, where 82% of the respondents in favour of Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill, 
which is discussed in Chapter Six.571 These polls demonstrate a favourable shift in attitude 
towards the notion of assisted suicide and have demonstrated that this support to change the 
law has been consistent and unwavering. Even though the values largely remain the same, 
such as the doctrine of sanctity of life, the meaning attached to these values and terms has 
significantly changed. With the constant and unswerving public support for reform and the 
considerable public, media and judicial attention given to the issue of assisted suicide, it is 
the ideal time to change the outdated law on assisted suicide.572 
 
Williams argues that “It is true that the predominant spirit borne by the Convention at its 
inception, when the ‘right to life’ was asserted, no doubt focused upon the notion of 
preservation of life… Yet a more global, or inclusive, notion of the right to life might very 
well include some idea of a right to die”.573 Even though the inceptive aim of Article 2 was 
to preserve life, in a multicultural society, with a number of varying opinions and beliefs, 
which all need to be included and protected, and in light of these numerous polls, which 
demonstrate an overwhelming amount of public support to change the law on assisted 
																																																								
570 YouGov, ‘YouGov/Dignity in Dying Survey Results’ (May 2014) 
<d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/63mety3ekh/DignityinDying
_Results_140521_AssistedDying.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
571 Populus, ‘Dignity in Dying Poll’ (2015) <www.populus.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/DIGNITY-IN-DYING-Populus-poll-March-2015-data-tables-
with-full-party-crossbreaks.compressed.pdf> accessed 21 May 2017 
572 For greater discussion on the historic and modern attempts to reform the law, see: ch 6. 
573 Williams (n 149) 185. The idea of the the Convention as a ‘living instrument’, which 
emerged from Strasbourg’s decision in Tyrer v UK App no 5856/72 (ECHR, 25 April 
1978), allows the freedoms and rights contained within the Convention to be interpreted 
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greater discussion on the living instrument principle: Philip Plowden and Kevin Kerrigan, 
Advocacy and Human Rights Act (Cavendish, 2002) 26-27; and Clotilde Pegorier, Ethnic 
Cleansing: A Legal Qualification (Routledge 2013) 29. 
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suicide, Article 2 ought to be viewed as a Convention right that could be extended to 
include a right to end an undignified life. 
 
5.2.1 Does Article 2 provide a right to die? 
After having exhausted all domestic remedies, Mrs Pretty took her claim to the Strasbourg 
Court who handed down a decision on the 29th of April 2002.574 This was the first case 
where the Strasbourg Court adjudicated on the relationship between the right to life under 
Article 2 and ending life through an assisted death, which is examined in this section.575 
Mrs Pretty submitted that Article 2 protected the right to choose whether or not to carry on 
living and included a right to die in order to “… avoid inevitable suffering and indignity as 
the corollary of the right to life”.576 She also argued that allowing assisted suicide “would 
not be in conflict with Article 2… otherwise those countries in which assisted suicide was 
not unlawful would be in breach of this provision”.577 
 
The Strasbourg Court held that it was not persuaded that “the right to life” guaranteed in 
Article 2 could be interpreted as involving a negative aspect on the basis that: 
 
Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring… a 
right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring 
on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life.578 
 
The Strasbourg Court explicitly held that “… no right to die, whether at the hands of a third 
person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from Article 2”.579 Since 
such a right does not exist, the United Kingdom was not in breach of its Article 2 
																																																								
574 Pretty v UK (n 57) 
575 It has subsequently adjudicated on this matter in various cases such as Haas v 
Switzerland (2011) App no 31322/07 (ECtHR, 20 January 2011); Koch v Germany (2012) 
App no 497/09 (ECtHR, 19 July 2012); Gross v Switzerland (2014) App no 67810/10 
(ECtHR, 14 May 2013); and Lambert and Others v France (2015) App no 46043/14 
(ECtHR, 24 June 2014). 
576 Pretty v UK (n 57) para 35 
577 ibid para 35 
578 ibid para 39 
579 ibid para 40 
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obligations by failing to decriminalise assisted suicide.580 Mrs Pretty’s argument was 
completely antithetical to the purpose of Article 2. The decision of the Court and the 
formulation of Article 2 sought to preserve life,581 except in very limited circumstances as 
listed in Article 2(2), and to uphold the sanctity and value of life.582 
 
It is submitted here that the judgment of the Strasbourg Court indicates that since the right 
to die is “diametrically opposite”583 to the right to life, it simply does not exist.584 Neither 
could Article 2 be extended to grant a right to die.585 To this end, Ovey et al note that 
Article 2 cannot be extended to allow a right to die or assisted suicide and that “There is 
little doubt that other provisions of the Convention are better suited to arguments about 
legalized assisted dying [such as Article 8] ”;586 since the inceptive aim of Article 2 is to 
protect life and, by extension, the doctrine of sanctity of life. Even though the Strasbourg 
Court rarely mentions the doctrine of sanctity of life, the main aim of Article 2 is to 
preserve this doctrine,587 which is formulated in a way to prevent the unsanctioned, 
unwanted or premature ending of life,588 and contains within it the notion that human life 
has irreducible, equal and infinite value.589 To this end, the Strasbourg Court explained that: 
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The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human 
freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected 
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of 
the quality of life take on significance… many people are concerned that they 
should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or 
mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal 
identity... [The Court acknowledged] the principle of personal autonomy in the 
sense of the right to make choices about one’s own body applied to deciding on 
ending one’s life based on our own assessment of our quality of life.590 
 
It is submitted that there seems to be flexibility on allowing assisted suicide. On one hand, 
the Strasbourg Court holds the notion of sanctity of life to be so significant that assisted 
suicide cannot be allowed under Article 2. However, on the other hand, it seems to accept 
that if human dignity is so eroded and degraded, there may be an opening of the possibility, 
under Article 8 of the Convention, which is discussed in the next section, depending on the 
individual circumstances of the case, for assisted suicide to be allowed. It is further 
submitted that assisted suicide may be acceptable, under definite circumstances – with a 
number of safeguards to ensure there is no coercion, pressure or vulnerability such as a 
temporary mental health illness that is leading the individual to make such a request – 
where the dignity of that individual is weak, deteriorated and irreparable, and, thus, the 
quality of their life is so poor that an individual consistently and conscientiously views it to 
have no value. 
 
It is reiterated here that the sanctity, or value, of life is a very subjective issue: it depends on 
the quality of life of every individual, especially for those who have severe disabilities and 
terminal illnesses that causes them physical and mental pain and suffering.591 Where the 
utter humiliation, pain and suffering are very severe, the loss of dignity is irreversible and 
not repairable and, under a number of safeguards, can be separated from mental illness, it 
can be ensured that there is no pressure or coercion and other options have been fully 																																																								
590 Pretty v UK (n 57) paras 65-66 
591 Katri Lohmus, Caring Autonomy (CUP 2015) 40. Lohmus argues that, “autonomy… is 
based on a subjective (quality of life) valuation of life, rather than on some objective set of 
ideals (sanctity of life)”. 
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explored, such as palliative care, individuals ought to have the right to receive an assisted 
suicide. As the Strasbourg Court has decided, such a right cannot emanate from Article 2. 
However, it seemed to have opened up the possibility of accepting assisted suicide under 
Article 8. In recent years, the Strasbourg Court has further clarified the relationship 
between Articles 2 and 8, in relation to end-of-life decisions: 
 
[Article 2] obliges the national authorities to prevent an individual from taking his 
or her own life if the decision has not been taken freely and with full understanding 
of what is involved”.592 
 
The Strasbourg Court opined that there is a need for end-of-life decisions to be free, 
informed and autonomous. This notion of autonomy emanates from Article 8, which has 
now become a very powerful Convention right. The next section of this chapter analyses 
the scope and working of Article 8 in order to determine how the principle of autonomy 
emanates from it and whether it provides individuals with the freedom to choose the time 
and manner of their death. It also examines whether a refusal to provide immunity for 
assistance or the blanket ban on assisted suicide are an infringement of an individual’s 
Article 8 rights. 
 
5.3 How the right to self-determination emanates from Article 8 
Article 8 is set out in two paragraphs and provides as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 																																																								
592 Haas (n 575) para 54 
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Article 8 places both a negative obligation “to protect the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities”593 and a positive obligation to adopt “…measures 
designed to secure respect for private life even in sphere of the relations of individuals 
between themselves”.594 Article 8 primarily provides a right to respect of private life. The 
Strasbourg Court has previously held that there is no exhaustive definition of the idea of 
private life, but it generally encompasses the right to “establish and develop relationships 
with other human beings”.595 The Strasbourg Court did not want to overly restrict the 
notion of an individual’s private life to an “inner circle” in which people live their personal 
life.596 Article 8 not only protects conduct in an individual’s private life but also any 
relationships and conduct in the public sphere.597 Article 8 has been successfully raised in 
order to receive protection against interference by the State and its public authorities in a 
wide variety of circumstances.598 For example, a right to identity and personal 
development, sexual life, sexual orientation and gender identification,599 the right to 
establish and flourish relationships with other individuals, every individual’s physical and 
mental integrity and social identity are all protected activity within the scope of Article 8.600 
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This protected activity can be carried out in private and even public spheres as long as it 
does not encroach on the rights of others.601 
 
The Strasbourg Court has extended Article 8 to provide for a right to self-determination in 
assisted suicide cases. In order to illustrate this argument, the Pretty v UK case must be 
examined in greater detail. In the context of Article 8, Mrs Pretty argued that section 2(1) of 
the 1961 Act interferes with her right of self-determination by prohibiting a lawful option 
of assisted suicide, which subsequently restricts the autonomous decisions of individuals 
who seek to receive an assisted suicide and infringes their right to choose the time and 
death – in order to avoid pain, suffering and indignity – under Article 8.602 
 
Even though the text of Article 8 does not explicitly provide for such a right, the Strasbourg 
Court has recognised that the notion of individual autonomy is based on the freedom to 
choose, which is fundamental to the working of Article 8. 603 To this end, the Strasbourg 
Court held in this respect that: 
 
Although no previous case has established as such any right to self-determination as 
being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, the Court considers that the notion 
of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its 
guarantees.604 
 
The Strasbourg Court recognised that Mrs Pretty was suffering due to her disease, which 
would cause her to further deteriorate and increase her physical pain and mental suffering, 
and she wanted to “…mitigate that suffering by exercising a choice to end her life with the 
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assistance of her husband”.605 The Court further stated that the manner in which Mrs Pretty 
chooses to pass the last moments of her life is part of the act of living, and that she has the 
right to ask for that choice to be respected.606 Section 2(1) of the 1961 Act prevented Mrs 
Pretty from exercising her choice to avoid an undignified death.607 The Strasbourg Court 
noted that this constituted an interference with her Article 8(1) rights.608 
 
It is submitted here that the Strasbourg Court’s judgment indicates that there is clearly a 
right to self-determination, guaranteed by Article 8(1), which allows individuals to choose 
the time and manner of their death. Personal autonomy is an important principle underlying 
the interpretation of Article 8’s guarantees.609 The notion of autonomy surrounds the 
decision of individuals seeking assistance to end their undignified and distressing lives.610 
However, the Court went on to decide that even though Mrs Pretty’s Article 8(1) rights 
were engaged;611 the government’s interference may be justified, under Article 8(2), as 
“necessary in a democratic society” for the protection of the rights of others in society.612 
Furthermore, under the notion of margin of appreciation, Member States are under no 
obligation to lift criminal embargo on assisted suicide, grant immunity to individuals who 
assist others in ending their lives or to create measures in order to accommodate those who 
need assistance in ending their lives. 
 
The Strasbourg Court concluded in Pretty that the right to choose how to end life is within 
the scope of Article 8(1). However, the criminalisation of assisted suicide is within the 
State’s margin of appreciation (and not a disproportionate measure under Article 8(2)). 
Thus, the concept of margin of appreciation should be noted here. In relation to all the 																																																								
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Articles found in the European Convention on Human Rights, with exception of Article 
3,613 the margin of appreciation is leeway provided to Member States to decide how they 
fulfill their obligations under the Convention, which subsequently affects the extent of 
protection provided by the Convention Rights.614 This leeway is given to Member States to 
ensure that the Convention Rights are accessible and workable in individual States, which 
all have very different histories, traditions and pluralistic and diverse modern societal 
landscapes.615 Allowing this leeway has the effect that the application of Convention rights 
is not uniform or homogenous across all the Member States.616 Furthermore, it is this 
leeway that allows Member States such as the United Kingdom to retain the criminal 
embargo on assisted suicide in line with its deep-rooted Christian traditions and culture, yet 
allow Switzerland to decriminalise assisted suicide and even set up organisations, such as 
Dignitas, that provide patients with extensive assistance to end their life by taking lethal 
medication through a feeding tube, orally or intravenously.617 
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It should be noted here that the refusal of the Strasbourg Court to extend Article 8 to 
include a “right to assisted suicide” along with allowing a wide margin of appreciation in 
such cases, is an ill-founded approach. For example, Lord Lester argues that: 
 
The danger of continuing to use the standardless doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation is that, especially in the enlarged Council of Europe, it will become the 
source of a pernicious ‘variable’ geometry of human rights, eroding the acquis of 
existing jurisprudence and giving undue deference to local conditions, traditions, 
and practices.618 
 
It is submitted that whilst allowing Member States to exercise their margin of appreciation 
is done in order to tolerate and respect the choices made under the varying legal systems in 
accordance with the idea, beliefs and principles that are valued in their respective, unique 
societies; allowing for such a wide margin of appreciation in assisted suicide cases and not 
creating a substantive right generates a significantly varying and dissimilar landscape of 
human rights. Nonetheless, allowing a wide margin of appreciation in relation to assisted 
suicide cases and not creating a right to assisted suicide could be attributed to the 
Strasbourg Court not wanting to act as a judicially elite institution by imposing such a right 
on Member States. The decision to change the law should be done by the representatives of 
the individual democratic Member States in accordance with their societal and cultural 
landscape, rather than a judicially elite institution. Thus, as discussed in the previous 
section, in the Pretty case, the Strasbourg Court left an opening under Article 8 of the 
possibility of allowing assisted suicide, in certain circumstances with a number of 
safeguards to regulate such an option, for domestic courts and institutions to interpret in a 
manner that conforms with the societal and judicial landscape of the individual Member 
State. As discussed previously, surveys and polls conducted over a number of years 
demonstrate a change in societal attitudes, which are now favourable towards a reform in 
																																																								
618 Anthony Lester, ‘Universality versus subsidiarity: a reply’ (1998) 1 European Human 
Rights Law Review 73, 74, For further criticism on the working of the margin of 
appreciation: Z v Finland EHRR 371 (dissenting opinion of De Meyer J); and Paul 
Mahoney, ‘Speculating on the future of the reformed European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1999) 20 Human Rights Law Journal 1, 3. 
	 135	
the law and add further impetus to the momentum to reform the law.619 This reform can 
only be based on the notion of autonomy guaranteed under Article 8. The string of domestic 
and Strasbourg cases, in which Pretty was subsequently applied, demonstrate the 
continuing expansion of the scope of Article 8 and the significance of this powerful 
Convention right, under which a reform of the law is possible. 
 
5.3.1 The effect of Pretty and Article 8 as the trump card in domestic and Strasbourg 
cases 
Mahendra argues that the Pretty case has very little, if any effect at all on English law in 
relation to assisted suicide because it did not lead to a change in the law.620 Even though 
Strasbourg’s decision in Pretty did not lead to a change in the law on assisted suicide in 
England, the House of Lords applied it to the Purdy case in 2009. This case concerned a 
woman, Debbie Purdy, who was suffering from multiple sclerosis, a progressive disease, 
which increased her pain and suffering everyday and rendered her unable to perform 
everyday tasks.621 Due to her deteriorated physical condition, she was unable to commit 
suicide and needed her husband to assist her to go to the Dignitas Clinic in Switzerland, 
where assisted suicide is lawful.622 Mrs Purdy argued that the prohibition in section 2(1) of 
the 1961 Act constituted a violation of her Article 8(1) rights; and this violation is not “in 
accordance with the law”, under Article 8(2), in view of the DPP’s failure to provide clear 
guidance on when a prosecution for assisted suicide is brought.623 
 
The House of Lords unanimously agreed that Mrs Purdy’s decision to seek assisted suicide 
was within the scope of Article 8(1).624 Any interference with her Article 8(1) rights needed 
to be justified by under Article 8(2).625 The failure of the DPP to provide clear guidance on 
when a prosecution for assisted suicide is brought did not fall within the qualifications 
																																																								
619 The next chapter discusses the historic and modern Bills in Parliament that have 
attempted to reform the law in this area. 
620 Bala Mahendra, ‘Still No Right to Die’ (2002) 152 (7031) New Law Journal 693 
621 Purdy (n 56) [17] 
622 ibid [17] 
623 ibid [28] 
624 ibid [60]-[106] 
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under Article 8(2).626 Hence, Mrs Purdy’s Article 8(1) rights had been breached and this 
interference was not justified under Article 8(2).627 To this end, Baroness Hale stated that 
“The need for more precise guidelines governing the prosecution of those who may help 
them stems from the right to respect for their private lives protected by Article 8”.628 
Finally, the House of Lords required the DPP to “promulgate an offence-specific policy 
identifying the facts and circumstances which he will take into account in deciding… 
whether or not to consent to a prosecution under section 2(1) of the 1961 Act”.629 It should 
be noted here that both Diane Pretty and Debbie Purdy sought to travel to Switzerland to 
receive an assisted death at the Dignitas clinic, with their husbands, and challenged section 
2(1) of the 1961 Act. Mrs Pretty sought immunity for her husband whereas Mrs Purdy 
brought a judicial review seeking clarification of the law if her husband assisted her to 
travel to Switzerland. 
 
The House of Lords required the DPP to publish a policy on the factors taken into account 
when deciding to prosecute an individual for assisting the suicide of another. The DPP, 
Keir Stramer QC, who published this policy in 2010, in accordance with the Purdy 
decision, stated that: “The policy does not change the law on assisted suicide. It does not 
open the door for euthanasia”.630 However, pressure groups, such as ‘Not Dead Yet’, 
rightly proffer that the policy was “…seeking to change the law by the back door by 
creating the impression that those who assist in a suicide will be immune from 
prosecution”.631 It is submitted here that the individuals who assisted their family members 
to travel to Switzerland, where assisted suicide is lawful, to end their lives were never 
prosecuted. The Purdy decision reinforces this position. This argument is supported by the 
fact that the second highest number of people who travel to Dignitas in Switzerland to end 																																																								
626 ibid [57]-[106] 
627 ibid [57]-[106] 
628 ibid [67] 
629 ibid [56] (Lord Hope). For a detailed discussion on the DPP guidelines, refer to ch 4. 
630 CPS, ‘Assisted Suicide’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide.html> accessed 21 May 
2017. For a detailed discussion on the DPP Policy on assisted suicide, refer to ch 4. 
631 Peter Saunders, ‘DPP guidance on prosecutions for assisted suicide comes in for serious 
criticism’ (Christian Medical Fellowship Blog, 19 December 2009) 
<http://www.cmfblog.org.uk/2009/12/19/dpp-guidance-on-prosecutions-for-assisted-
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their lives is from Great Britain. From 2002 to 2009, 134 Britons have received an assisted 
suicide at Dignitas.632 A further 176 individuals travelled to Switzerland, from 2010 to 
2015, to receive an assisted death at Dignitas.633 None of the individuals, generally family 
members, who assisted competent patients to travel to Dignitas, in Switzerland, have been 
prosecuted under section 2(1) of the 1961 Act.634 To this end, Rogers notes that, “Presently 
it is clear that nothing very bad awaits those who compassionately assist a competent 
person who wishes to die”.635 This suggests that individuals who assist another to end their 
life will not be prosecuted, unless they have a malicious motive.636 
 
Individuals value their right to self-determination in death as much as they do in life thus, 
they want an option to end life in order to avoid suffering and, in most cases, a painful 
death. Debbie Purdy’s case predominantly rested on the claim that the DPP code hindered 
with her right to self-determination as it was not specific and clearly defined to allow 
individuals to regulate their conduct and actions.637 To this end, Greaseley argues that: 
 
The value of personal autonomy has become something of a trump card... the 
underlying premise of... Purdy... was that the right to privacy and self-determination 
entails the right to end one’s own life so as to avoid intolerable or degrading forms 
of suffering.638 
 																																																								
632 Simon Rogers, ‘Assisted suicide statistics: the numbers Dignitas helps to die, by 
country’ The Guardian (25 February 2010) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/25/assisted-suicide-dignitas-
statistics> accessed 21 May 2017 
633 Dignitas Clinic, ‘Accompanied Suicides Per Year and residence’ 
<http://dignitas.ch/images/stories/pdf/statistik-ftb-jahr-wohnsitz-1998-2015.pdf> accessed 
21 May 2017 
634 Rogers (n 632); Michael Hirst, ‘Suicide in Switzerland: Complicity in England?’ [2009] 
Crim LR 335; and Sheila McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law (Routledge 2010) 122 
635 Jonathan Rogers, ‘Assisted suicide saga – the Nicklinson episode’ (2014) Arch Rev 7, 8 
636 It is rare for a guilty conviction to be handed down: one example is R v Kevin James 
Howe [2014] EWCA Crim 114. 
637 Heather Keating and Jo Bridgeman, ‘Intensive Caring Responsibilities and Crimes of 
Compassion?’ in Jo Bridgeman, Heather Keating and Craig Lind (eds), Regulating Family 
Responsibilities (Ashgate 2011) 260 
638 Kate Greaseley, ‘R (Purdy) v DPP and the Case for Wilful Blindness’ (2010) 30(2) 
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It is submitted that the application of the Strasbourg decision in Pretty by the House of 
Lords in Purdy clearly demonstrates that the scope of Article 8 is non-restrictive, very 
powerful and is interpreted by the courts to include a very wide variety of circumstances; 
such as the right to self-determination in order to make a judicial demand for the DPP to 
clarify and codify the policy they use in order to determine whether or not a defendant will 
be prosecuted for providing assistance to an individual to end their life. Unlike Article 2, 
which was formulated to protect life and has a very restricted scope; Article 8 is a very 
flexible Convention right. In definite circumstances and after a number of safeguards have 
been met, where human dignity is irreparably eroded, the quality of life is poor and the 
individual has an informed, autonomous and consistent wish to end their life, there is an 
opening under Article 8 to allow an individual to seek an assisted suicide. 
 
5.3.2 The continuing expansion of the scope of Article 8 
The Strasbourg Court is continually expanding the scope of Article 8, particularly under the 
notion of the right of self-determination, as was evident in Koch v Germany.639 It concerned 
an applicant, Mr Ulrich Koch, whose late quadriplegic wife needed him to assist her to end 
her undignified life.640 She requested lethal medication from the Federal Institute for Drugs 
and Medical Devices, Germany; who refused on the basis that domestic law did not allow 
the Federal Institute to provide drugs for the purpose of committing suicide as Article 8 did 
not encompass a right to assisted suicide.641 This decision was appealed: but during this 
time, the applicant and his wife travelled to Dignitas in Switzerland where Mrs Koch 
received an assisted death.642 The decision of the Federal Institute was upheld.643 Having 
exhausted all domestic remedies, the applicant lodged a claim with the Strasbourg Court on 
the basis that the refusal of the Federal Institute violated his wife’s Article 8 rights by 
refusing to examine the individual circumstances and the merits of the complaint.644 The 
Court ruled in Koch’s favour by holding that “the domestic authorities are under an 
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obligation to examine the merits of the applicant’s claim”645 and that “there has been a 
violation of the applicant’s right under Article 8 to see the merits of his motion examined 
by the courts”.646 
 
One of the consequences of the Koch decision is that the Strasbourg Court yet again refused 
to create a right to assisted suicide. This has been attributed to the Court attempting to not 
act as a judicially elite institution, choosing not to impose its decisions and allowing 
Member States to change the law in conformity with their distinct societal and cultural 
outlooks.647 To this end, Thielborger argues that the Koch case shows that the Strasbourg 
Court: 
 
…generally welcome inclination not to monopolize all decision-making, but to have 
trust in the judicial orders of the Member States, is concerningly being developed 
into a denial by the Court to give its opinion even on questions of general and 
principled importance.648 
 
However, this argument does not take into consideration that the Strasbourg Court provides 
extensive guidance on how Convention rights are understood and ought to be applied. It has 
further expanded the scope of Article 8 by shifting the obligation from the individual to the 
Member States. An individual is required to demonstrate that they are going through a 
significant amount of suffering and seek to avoid a painful death by having their 
autonomous decision respected by being allowed to receive assistance in their suicide. 
Member States must now prove that they are meeting their obligations under the 
Convention rights (or that their actions to the contrary are justified and within the margin of 
appreciation). To this end, McLean argues that the Koch case shifted the emphasis “…from 
the individual’s need to prove that the State should provide assisted dying, to the need for 
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647 As ch 3 argues, due to the cultural shift in English society, with polls demonstrating that 
society now has a favourable approach towards this issue, it is the ideal time to change the 
law. For greater discussion on contemporary Bills to allow assisted suicide refer to ch 6. 
648 Pierre Thielborger, ‘Judicial Passicism at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 
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the State to justify its failure to do so”.649 
 
It is further submitted that the Court widened the scope of Article 8 even further by 
requiring Member States to consider the merits and individual circumstances of every case. 
However, it chose not to create a substantive right to assisted suicide under Article 8. This 
reluctance to create a new right can also be based on the fact that “the vast majority of 
Member States seem to attach more weight to the protection of the individual’s life than to 
his or her right to terminate it”.650 This argument is substantiated by the fact that thirty-six 
Member States prohibit any form of assisted suicide and only four – namely Switzerland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – allow it (by permitting doctors to prescribe 
lethal medication to their patients to commit suicide).651 Member States clearly attach great 
significance to the value of human life and seek to preserve it. The Court chose not to 
create a new right to assisted suicide, however, it did provide a comprehensive direction on 
how the Convention rights, particularly Article 8, ought to be understood and applied to 
cases; and shifted the obligation from the individual who needed to prove that the State 
ought to provide them with a regulated option of assisted suicide, to the Member States 
who must now justify their failure to do so. York accurately encapsulates the position of the 
Strasbourg Court as follows: 
 
…everyone’s right to life must be protected by the law… only until the continuation 
of that life is no longer in the person’s own interests… [which suggests] that death 
may sometimes be preferable to life… primarily [to uphold] an individual’s right to 
self-determination within a democratic society.652 
 
 																																																								
649 Sheila McLean, ‘Decisions at the end of life: An attempt at rationalisation’ in Catherine 
Stanton et al (eds), Pioneering Healthcare Law: Essays in Honour of Margaret Brazier 
(Routledge 2015) 
650 Haas (n 575) para 55 
651 Koch (n 575) para 26. Note: There is further Strasbourg jurisprudence in Swiss cases 
namely Gross (n 575) and Haas (n 575). However, both these cases concerned non-
terminal, able-bodied applicants who sought to acquire lethal medication in order to 
commit suicide (and did not seek assistance in their death). 
652 Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Positive and Negative Obligations under the Right to Life in English 
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5.3.3 The recent application of Strasbourg decisions in English courts 
These two competing values – namely autonomy and sanctity of life – continue to be 
considered in domestic courts, which apply Strasbourg’s decisions in assisted suicide cases, 
as was the case in Nicklinson.653 In the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, President of the 
Supreme Court, explained that: 
 
The appeals arise out of claims brought by three men, Tony Nicklinson, Paul Lamb 
and someone known for the purpose of these proceedings as Martin, each of whom 
was suffering such a distressing and undignified life that he had long wished to end 
it, but could not do so himself because of his acute physical incapacity.654 
 
Nicklinson and Lamb argued that there ought to be a lawful option of assisted suicide in 
England and Martin sought further clarification on the DPP policy, particularly in relation 
to prosecuting an individual if they assist him in killing himself.655 
 
In the Supreme Court, Lord Wilson opined that the main objection to changing the law is 
the notion of “sanctity (or, for those for whom that word has no meaning, the supreme 
value) of life which, for obvious reasons, is hard-wired into the minds of every living 
person”.656 The English courts continue to view the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is 
deep-rooted in Christian ideology, as a paramount principle, that informs the debate on 
assisted suicide and on which the movement to reform the law should be abandoned. It is 
argued in this thesis that the law can no longer be based on Christian morality. There is a 
clear shift in social attitudes, as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, towards the notion 
of sanctity of life, which historically had religious underpinnings, to a non-religious 
conception of this notion which is defined in terms of its intrinsic value and quality. In a 
multicultural society, there are competing and varying values and beliefs, which all need to 
be included in the public debate on assisted suicide. Many religious and non-religious 																																																								
653 Nicklinson (n 58). Note: Mr Tony Nicklinson died during these proceedings and it was 
his wife, Jane Nicklinson, supported Mr Lamb in the Supreme Court proceedings. 
654 ibid [2] 
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656 ibid [199]. The doctrine of sanctity of life was discussed at [357-358] as per Lord Kerr; 
[215] as per Lord Sumption; and [311] as per Lady Hale (who mentioned that this doctrine 
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groups view human life as being sacred and attach an intrinsic value to it. However, other 
groups and individuals do not view life as a sacred commodity and its value is defined in 
terms of its quality. For example, a terminally ill patient who is in constant pain because of 
their disease may not view it as a life worth living but a healthy individual would view it as 
a valuable or sacred commodity. The value or sacredness of life is an entirely subjective 
matter. To this end, Draghici argues that: 
 
The legalisation of assisted suicide is value-neutral, in that it simply leaves the 
judgment on the quality of life that makes life worth living or the unwavering 
sanctity of life to the individual’s own determination. This is already the case for the 
overwhelming majority of individuals, as suicide does not constitute an offence. 
Decriminalising compassionate assistance to die would merely amount to permitting 
someone who has lost full possession of their physiological integrity to choose in 
the same way another individual with full command of their body would do; indeed 
the only time the state steps in to limit individual belief in this area is when the 
individual loses the natural ability to dispose of themselves. The ethical unease with 
a change in the law quite possibly stems from the conviction that it would represent 
an endorsement of a particular view on life and death, whereas in fact it is not a 
decision on what is right or wrong, but a deferral to private opinion.657 
 
The main thrust of Draghici’s argument is valid in that the quality of life, and the 
subsequent decision to seek an assisted suicide, is a subjective issue, which is influenced by 
an individual’s own beliefs and values. Furthermore, once a decision to end life has been 
made, individuals should be allowed to seek an assisted suicide without the fear that they 
are commissioning a crime and should be protected by extensive safeguards. Thus, there is 
a continued need to strike a balance between protecting the value of life and allowing 
individuals the autonomy to choose the time and manner of their death.658 Moreover, the 
assisted suicide debate has historically been influenced by the religious doctrine of sanctity 
of life and with the modern “new secularism” approach requiring both religious and non-																																																								
657 Carmen Draghici, ‘The blanket ban on assisted suicide: between moral paternalism and 
utilitarian justice’ (2015) 3 EHRLR 286, 296 
658 This debate is also surrounded by notions of compassion and human dignity in ch 6. 
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religious values to be continually included in this debate to ensure that there is openness, 
inclusion and equality; there is room for inclusion of religious beliefs in the debate. 
However, in order to ensure that one religion, such as the Christian faith due to its historic 
deep-rooted ties with England, is not given preference over another, particularly minority 
religions such as Islam, it is recommended that the final policies and laws on the issue are 
expressed in a non-religious, “value-neutral” undertone. 
 
However, in a contemporary societal landscape, this notion of sanctity of life can no longer 
be treated as an absolute principle as it takes on quality of life considerations and constantly 
conflicts with an individual’s right to self-determination. To this end, Lord Sumption 
explained: 
 
The problem in this case is that on the issue of suicide, our most fundamental moral 
instincts conflict. Our belief in the sanctity of life is not consistent with our belief in 
the dignity and autonomy of the individual in a case where the individual, being of 
sound mind and full capacity, has taken a rational decision to kill himself.659 
 
The two main values that continue to fuel the debate on assisted suicide are the sanctity of 
life, which can have either a religious or non-religious underpinning, and the notion of 
individual autonomy. In the Supreme Court, it was held that “autonomy is an important 
value”;660 in making decisions and choices about the time and manner of ending life and 
engages Article 8.661 It is submitted here that the majority of the Court’s approach was 
appropriate and the most significant Convention right that continues to fuel the debate on 
assisted suicide is Article 8. However, in order to be able to access this right, it was 
continuously reiterated – particularly by Lords Neuberger662, Mance,663 Wilson,664 and 
Kerr665 – that the decision to commit suicide, whether assisted or not, must be “voluntary, 
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clear, settled and informed”.666 It is further submitted that this notion was rightly given 
great importance in the Supreme Court because it creates a high threshold that needs to be 
met in order to request an assisted suicide (if it is permitted by Parliament) and safeguards 
weak and vulnerable individuals, particularly those who are temporarily feeling unhappy or 
depressed. The notion of autonomy, under Article 8, is the paramount value in the debate 
on assisted suicide in England and the main principle on which a reform of the law could be 
based. It allows individuals to choose how to live life and even to end an undignified life. 
As long as the decision to end life is an autonomous, voluntary and informed one, the right 
to self-determination ought to allow individuals to commit suicide or receive assistance in 
doing so. 
 
In the Supreme Court, the discussion predominantly revolved around Article 8, and 
applying Strasbourg jurisprudence to the appeals. For example, the Strasbourg Court has 
extended Article 8(1) to include “the right to decide how and when to die, and in particular 
the right to avoid a distressing and undignified end to life (provided that the decision is 
made freely)”;667 and that having a third party involved in enabling an individual to die 
does not prevent them from invoking Article 8(1).668 With this Strasbourg jurisprudence as 
the foundation of the appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to adjudicate on whether the 
DPP Policy was lawful or if it interfered with the rights guaranteed under Article 8; and 
whether the blanket ban, under section 2 of the 1961 Act, was within the margin of 
appreciation or incompatible with Article 8?669 
 
On the first issue, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that it should not “involve itself 
with the terms of the DPP’s policy on assisted suicide, albeit that [the Court] would expect 
the DPP to clarify her policy.”670 With regards to the second issue, that sought a declaration 
of incompatibility, the Court unanimously agreed that the “blanket ban” under section 2 of 
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the 1961 Act was within the margin of appreciation afforded on this issue to Member 
States.671 However, Lord Neuberger pointed out that: 
 
…if the primacy of human life does not prevent a person committing suicide, it is 
difficult to see why it should prevent that person seeking assistance in committing 
suicide… some people with a progressive degenerative disease feel themselves 
forced to end their lives before they would wish to do so, rather than waiting until 
they are incapable of committing suicide when they need assistance (which would 
be their preferred option). Section 2 therefore not merely impinges adversely on the 
personal autonomy of some people with degenerative diseases, but actually, albeit 
indirectly, may serve to cut short their lives.672 
 
Furthermore, in the Supreme Court, the majority of the judges held that it had the 
constitutional authority to make a declaration of incompatibility but it would be unsuitable 
for the Court to do so before letting Parliament the opportunity to debate the position in 
relation to this area of the law, especially in light of the Court’s judgment in Nicklinson.673 
Adentire explains that: 
 
…one should conclude that by issuing a declaration, the judiciary would instead be 
summoning Parliament, with its legitimacy and expertise, to draw its mind to the 
effects that the absolute prohibition has on individuals in Mr Nicklinson’s 
position.674 
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This explanation suggests that Parliament would be the more suitable setting to consider the 
proportionality of the criminal embargo on assisted suicide and decide whether or not the 
current prohibition on assisted suicide ought to be altered or repealed.675 Lord Sumption 
further discussed, in great detail, whether this issue was one for “Parliament or the Courts” 
to decide:676 
 
The question whether relaxing or qualifying the current absolute prohibition on 
assisted suicide would involve unacceptable risks to vulnerable people is in my 
view a classic example of the kind of issue which should be decided by 
Parliament… the issue involves a choice between two fundamental but mutually 
inconsistent moral values, upon which there is at present no consensus in our 
society. Such choices are inherently legislative in nature. The decision cannot fail to 
be strongly influenced by the decision-makers’ personal opinions about the moral 
case for assisted suicide. This is entirely appropriate if the decision-makers are 
those who represent the community at large. It is not appropriate for professional 
judges. The imposition of their personal opinions on matters of this kind would lack 
all constitutional legitimacy.677 
 
It is submitted here that the Supreme Court clearly believed that changing the law is 
Parliament’s prerogative and they ought to let Parliament, on the basis of constitutionality, 
especially the House of Commons, to debate and change the law, as they are a 
democratically elected body that ought to impartially represent the views of their 
constituencies. Lord Hughes further explained that: 																																																								
675 Rogers (n 635) 7 
676 Nicklinson (n 58) [230] to [235]. Also see: Lord Neuberger ([98], [104], [116] and 
[118]) accurately encapsulated the position of the majority of the court as follows: 
“…Parliament has not sought to resolve these questions through statutes, but has been 
content to leave them to be worked out by the courts… Parliamentary sovereignty and 
democratic accountability require that the legislature has the final say… it would be 
institutionally inappropriate at this juncture for a court to declare that section 2 is 
incompatible with article 8, as opposed to giving Parliament the opportunity to consider the 
position without a declaration… Parliament now has the opportunity to address the issue of 
whether section 2 should be relaxed or modified, and if so how, in the knowledge that, if it 
is not satisfactorily addressed, there is a real prospect that a further, and successful, 
application for a declaration of incompatibility may be made”. 
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A change, whether desirable or not, must be for Parliament to make. That is 
especially so since a change would be likely to call for an infrastructure of 
safeguards which a court decision could not create.678 
 
Lord Hughes believed that the courts could not create a policy or Act, in the same manner 
as Parliament, setting out a limited set of circumstances in which assisted suicide would be 
accessible and a number of safeguards to protect both the individuals who seek an assisted 
suicide and all individuals, especially health care professionals, who would be involved in 
the process. It is submitted that Lord Hughes’ approach was accurate since Parliament can 
debate the issue of reforming the law on assisted suicide in great detail and receive input 
from the democratically elected members in the House of Commons and experts with 
comprehensive and authoritative knowledge on various subjects in the House of Lords. 
Furthermore, they can pass laws with a number of safeguards and protections for patients, 
their friends and family, healthcare professionals and all the individuals who would be 
involved in the assisted dying process. Lastly, the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
dictates that Parliament is the supreme legal authority in this county that creates and repeals 
laws. Thus, as a matter of constitutionality, Parliament ought to be the one considering 
reforming the law on this area. 
 
The majority of the Supreme Court appealed to Parliament to debate and alter its stance. 
Lord Wilson, on the other hand, took a more stern approach, by stating that: 
 
Were Parliament for whatever reason, to fail satisfactorily to address the issue 
whether to amend the subsection to permit assistance to be given to persons in the 
situation of Mr Nicklinson and Mr Lamb, the issue of a fresh claim for a declaration 
is to be anticipated.679 
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It is argued that it seemed that Lord Wilson had a minatory manner in telling Parliament 
that they ought to consider the issue of reforming the law at the next opportunity, which 
was the Lord Falconer Bill, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, or the court system 
would do it form them.680 To this end, Mullock accurately encapsulates that: 
 
…the Supreme Court’s warning (that a future declaration of incompatibility might 
follow Parliament's failure to consider this question) has arguably had a similar 
impact to an actual declaration. As the warning was so timely in the light of the 
Assisted Dying Bill, Parliament is conveniently presented with the opportunity to 
do just as [the majority of the Supreme Court] has requested... the remarkable 
judgment in Nicklinson distinguishes itself from other end-of-life decisions by 
strongly directing Parliament to address this issue in order to avoid a future 
declaration of incompatibility.681 
 
It is further argued that since Parliament failed to reform the law with the Lord Falconer 
Bill in 2015, the Supreme Court may change the law as they have the opportunity to do 
so.682 The position of the Supreme Court on the issue of a declaration of incompatibility 
can be summarised as follows: 
 
In the Supreme Court, the appeal focused exclusively on the compatibility of 
Section 2(1) of the 1961 Act with Article 8… The majority declined to grant the 
declaration on the basis that it was a discretionary remedy and that Parliament was 
better placed to resolve the difficult moral, ethical and philosophical issues before 
them. However, two of the majority warned that they may be prepared to grant a 																																																								
680 Also see: Lord Mance [190] who stated that “I am also influenced in the view that this is 
not an appropriate time to contemplate such an investigation by, firstly, the very frequent 
consideration that Parliament has given to the subject over recent years and by, secondly, 
the knowledge that Parliament currently has before it the Assisted Dying Bill and the hope 
that this may also give Parliament an opportunity to consider the plight of individuals in the 
position of Mr Nicklinson and Mr Lamb. Parliament has to date taken a clear stance, but 
this will give Parliament the opportunity to confirm, alter or develop its position”. 
681 Alexandra Mullock, ‘The Supreme Court decision in Nicklinson: human rights, criminal 
wrongs and the dilemma of death’ (2015) 31(1) PN 18, 24-28 
682 Conway v Sectretary of State for Justice [2017] ECHC 640, where the High Court did 
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declaration in a future case in the event that Parliament did not satisfactorily 
consider the matter.683 
 
It is concluded that the two competing values in the debate and jurisprudence on assisted 
suicide continue to be the value of life and the right to self-determination. Since the value 
of life is a principle that needs protection, as is guaranteed under Article 2, especially to 
ensure that the rights and freedoms of weak and vulnerable individuals are not encroached 
upon, it cannot be extended to include a right to end life. However, the modern notion of 
value of life takes on quality of life considerations and is sometimes preferable to end life 
that the individual perceives to be undignified. Thus, the idea of autonomy – under the all-
encompassing, powerful Article 8 – is beginning to take over as the most important 
principle, which is clearly reflected in domestic and Strasbourg jurisprudence, under which 
the autonomous decision to choose the time and manner to end an undignified life in 
certain, safeguarded circumstances can be respected, including one which requires 
assistance from another individual. 
 
A further inquiry needs to be made here: if an individual holds particular beliefs about end-
of-life issues, would not respecting that individual’s autonomous decision to receive an 
assisted suicide constitute a breach of their right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion as protected by Article 9? The next section of this chapter analyses whether Article 
9 allows individuals to hold and manifest any religious or non-religious beliefs, particularly 
whether this protection covers an individual’s belief in assisted suicide for themselves 
along with the actions they take to fulfill and manifest their beliefs. 
 
5.4 The functioning of Article 9 
Europe was predominantly Christian and the countries “who drafted the European 
Convention on Human rights and the smaller subset who formed the EEC in the 1950s” 
saw themselves as a homogenous Christian community.684 Thus, the Convention was 																																																								
683 ‘Assisted dying: general prohibition on assisted suicide – absence of judicially-approved 
procedure for voluntary euthanasia’ (2015) 5 EHRLR 546, 547 
684 Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Religion or belief; aiming at the right target?’ in Helen Meenan (ed), 
Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union: Understanding the Article 13 Directives 
(CUP 2007) 202 
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drafted by individuals who possessed Christian values, which is reflected in the wording of 
the Convention to a certain degree.685 To this end, during the Parliamentary debate on the 
Human Rights Bill, Lord Lester stated that: 
 
…the founders of the European Convention on Human Rights were men and 
women imbued with religious values as well as with the secular values of the 
Enlightenment… the convention is steeped in Christian values. Indeed, it is part of 
our Christian and Judeo-Christian tradition. That is why… the guarantee of 
religious freedom is so ample in the convention.686 
 
This religious freedom is explicitly codified in Article 9 of the Convention. It is set out in 
two paragraphs, and provides as follows: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
																																																								
685 Note: The Convention does not provide absolute freedoms, especially in relation to the 
free practice of religion, as it is subject to the will of the democratic majority in a 
multicultural society. For a similar opinion: Malory Nye, Multiculturalism and Minority 
Religions in Britain: Krishna Consciousness, Religious Freedom and the Politics of 
Location (Curzon Press 2001) 228 
686 (Lord Lester of Herne Hill) HL Deb 5 Feb 1998, cols 752-753 (During the 
Parliamentary Debate on the Human Rights Bill) 
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Article 9 places two obligations on every Member State.687 The first is a negative obligation 
that requires Member States, and even arms of the State or public authorities, not to 
interfere with the right of an individual to hold a religious or non-religious belief.688 The 
second is a positive obligation that requires Member States to ensure that an individual’s 
enjoyment of Article 9 is protected under the law, for there to be sanctions and provisions 
in order to prevent a breach and remedies in case there is an interference with this 
Convention right by the State or its public authorities or even private parties where the 
State fails their duty to protect.689 
 
Even if a conviction does constitute a belief under Article 9(1), the right to exercise or 
actions taken pursuant to manifesting a belief can be restricted by the State under certain 
circumstances that are listed in Article 9(2).690 The State can only interfere with an 
individual’s enjoyment of Article 9(1) if the restriction is “prescribed by law”,691 
“necessary in a democratic society”,692 and pursues one of the legitimate aims namely 
“interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the 																																																								
687 Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of ECHR (Hart 2002) 96; and Ian Leigh, ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights and Religious Neutrality’ in D’Costa et al (n 200) 46 
688 Arai-Takahashi (n 687) 96; Leigh (n 687) 46; Russell Sandberg, ‘The Changing Position 
of Religious Minorities in English Law: The Legacy of Begum’ in RD Grillo et al (eds), 
Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity (Ashgate 2009) 269; and Mohammed Aziz, 
‘Religious Discrimination’ in Colin Harvey (ed), Human Rights in the Community: Rights 
as Agents for Change (Hart 2005) 202 
689 Arai-Takahashi (n 687) 96; and Leigh (n 687) 46 
690 Sandberg (n 688) 269; Aziz (n 688) 202; and Peter Edge, Religion and the Law: An 
Introduction (Ashgate 2006) 57 
691 For discussion on the ‘Prescribed by Law’ qualification: Malcolm Evans, Religious 
Liberty and International Law in Europe (CUP 1997) 319; and Mark Hill, ‘‘Bracelets, 
Rings and Veils’ The Accommodation of Religious Symbols in the Uniform Policies of 
English Schools’ in Myriam Hunter-Henin (ed), Law Religious Freedoms and Education in 
Europe (Ashgate 2011) 314 
692 For discussion on ‘Necessary in a Democratic Society’ qualification: Peter Danchin and 
Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Protection of Religious Minorities’ in Peter Danchin and Elizabeth Cole (eds), Protecting 
the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press 
2002) 199; Serif v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 20; David Feldman, English Public Law (OUP, 
2nd edn 2009) 371; Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion Under ECHR (OUP 2002) 145; R 
(Begum) v Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15; Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 
397; and Kristin Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual 
Human Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (Kluwer 2000) 112 
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protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.693 A claimant merely needs to demonstrate 
that there has been a violation of either their right to hold or manifest a religion or belief 
and the burden then falls upon the State to prove that the restriction was justified under the 
exceptions listed in Article 9(2).694 
 
The Strasbourg Court applies the definitions of religion or belief to the applicant’s 
individual circumstances and their conduct and actions in pursuit of manifesting a belief or 
religion when adjudicating on alleged Article 9 violations.695 The next part of this section 
analyses the scope of Article 9 by examining the definition of belief according to the 
Strasbourg Court, in order to determine whether individuals’ belief in assisted suicide for 
themselves falls within the scope of Article 9. 
 
5.4.1 The Definition of Belief 
The Strasbourg Court made it clear that a “belief” is a worldview that can be differentiated 
from “mere opinion”;696 and that “there must be a holding of spiritual or philosophical 
convictions which have an identifiable formal content.697 
 
It is submitted here that the test to determine whether or not a conviction constitutes a 
“belief”, which is protected under Article 9, is a subjective one and is entirely dependent on 
the individual circumstances of each case. The Strasbourg Court has accepted Islam (a case 
that concerned a school teacher who was refused permission to attend prayers at a mosque 
during work hours),698 the Church of Scientology (a case that concerned the advertisement 
by the Church of Scientology and whether it was a manifestation of their religion),699 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, (a case that established that proselytism was a genuine manifestation 																																																								
693 For discussion on ‘Legitimate Aim’ qualification: Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion 
(CUP 2011) 86 
694 Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton, Transitional Jurisprudence and ECHR: Justice, 
Politics and Rights (CUP 2011) 105 
695 For discussion on definition of religion: Silvio Ferrari, ‘Who needs freedom of 
religion?’ in Frank Cranmer et al (eds), The Confluence of Law and Religion: 
Interdisciplinary Reflections on the Work of Norman Doe (CUP 2016) 180-190 
696 Vereniging Rechtswinkels Utrecht v Netherlands (1986) 46 DR 200 
697 McFeekly v UK (1981) 3 EHRR 161 
698 Ahmad v UK (1982) 4 EHRR 126 
699 X and Church of Scientology v Sweden (1976) 16 DR 68 
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of religion),700 and veganism (where the Court protected a vegan from unfair treatment due 
to their beliefs in veganism)701 amongst other conceptions, to amount to “beliefs” under 
Article 9(1).702 
 
English Courts have applied this criterion to domestic case law. Lord Nicholls elaborated 
on the Strasbourg Court’s position by explaining that: 
 
Everyone… is entitled to hold whatever beliefs he wishes… a belief must satisfy 
some modest, objective minimum requirements… The belief must be consistent 
with basic standards of human dignity or integrity… It must possess an adequate 
degree of seriousness and importance… The belief must also be coherent in the 
sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood… Depending on the 
subject matter, individuals cannot always be expected to express themselves with 
cogency or precision. Nor are an individual’s beliefs fixed and static. The beliefs of 
every individual are prone to change over his lifetime. Overall, these threshold 
requirements should not be set at a level that would deprive minority beliefs of the 
protection they are intended to have under the Convention.703 
 
It is submitted that the definition of belief is very narrow in order to make it easier for the 
courts to limit the range of views that will be protected by Article 9 and for frivolous claims 
to be easily disregarded.704 However, the threshold to meet this definition is not 
unreasonably high to ensure that minority religious or non-religious beliefs do not get 
unfairly disregarded. The next section examines whether these definitions extend to 
safeguard an individual’s belief in assisted suicide for themselves. Moreover, does this 																																																								
700 Kokkinakis (n 675) 
701 H v UK (1993) 16 EHRR CD44 
702 For a distinction between the definitions of religion and belief: Ferrari (n 695) 180-183 
703 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others (Respondents) ex parte 
Williamson (Appellant) and others [2005] UKHL 15 
704 Once the claimant’s belief is held to fall within the ambit of Article 9, which did not 
happen in Pretty, then the second filter – “The Manifestation Requirement” – is applied to 
establish whether the State’s interference in their actions to express that belief constitutes a 
breach. A claimant’s conduct must also be an expression of the religion or belief and that 
the claimant must not be merely motivated or inspired by it. The leading authority on the 
manifestation-motivation filter is Arrowsmith v UK (1981) 3 EHRR 218. 
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belief amount to a sincerely held one with a philosophical underpinning and does it have 
the required “level of cogency, coherence, seriousness and importance”?705 
 
5.4.2 Does Article 9 protect a person’s belief in assisted suicide for themselves? 
Mrs Pretty’s claim in relation to Article 9, which was the first and only one of its kind in 
the Strasbourg Court, sought to protect her belief in assisted suicide for herself.706 She 
submitted that the State had interfered with this belief by “imposing a blanket ban which 
allowed no consideration of [her] individual circumstances” and by their refusal to grant 
immunity to her husband from prosecution if he helped her end her life.707 The Government 
argued that Article 9 does “not confer any general right on individuals to engage in any 
activities of their choosing in pursuance of whatever beliefs they may hold”.708 
Furthermore, it argued that even if there had been an interference with Mrs Pretty’s Article 
9(1) rights, it was justified under Article 9(2) as assistance in another’s suicide was 
criminal under national law.709 
 
The Strasbourg Court held that that they did not “doubt the firmness of the applicant’s 
views concerning assisted suicide” but not every opinion or conviction constitutes a belief, 
which can be protected under Article 9.710 Even though Diane Pretty firmly held her belief 
in assisted suicide for herself, her claim did not pass the first hurdle of meeting the 
Strasbourg Court’s definition of belief. Nor did her belief amount to a requirement that 
could allow her husband to assist her suicide and then exculpate him of committing a 
criminal offence even if it is in line with Mrs Pretty’s belief.711 The Article 9 right to 
religious freedom does not extend to provide immunity from complicity in another’s 
suicide.712 To this end, Merkouris argues that “Since the notion of assisted suicide would 																																																								
705 This is the test created by the Strasbourg Court of what constitutes religion in Campbell 
and Cosans v UK App no 7511/76 (ECtHR, 25 February 1982) para 38. 
706 Pretty v UK (n 57) para 80 
707 ibid para 80 
708 ibid para 81 
709 ibid para 81 
710 ibid para 82. Also see: Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human 
Rights Law and Practice (CUP 2005) 207 
711 Panos Merkouris, ‘Assisted Suicide in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: A Matter of Life and Death’ in Negri (n 24) 119 
712 Alec Samuels, ‘Complicity in suicide’ [2005] Journal of Criminal Law 535, 538 
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not seem to meet these criteria of ‘cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’ it is no 
surprise that the Court summarily rejected the claim that there was no violation of Article 
9”.713 
 
The main thrust of Merkouris’ argument is that Mrs Pretty’s claim under Article 9 was 
rejected because it did not meet the Strasbourg Court’s definition and criteria of belief. 
However, it is submitted here that the Court’s approach to Diane Pretty’s claim under 
Article 9 was unsatisfactory. Janis et al inquire: 
 
Is it satisfactory that the Court gives only four sentences to dismiss Mrs Pretty’s 
Article 9 claim as not involving ‘a form of manifestation of a religion or belief? Is it 
really that easy to decide that her claims were not made pursuant to ‘freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion’?714 
 
While the notion of pacifism, as in Arrowsmith v United Kingdom, 715 has been held to be 
sufficiently serious, coherent and important to amount to a protected belief, a sincerely held 
belief in assisted suicide was not protected under the scope of Article 9 as the Court held 
that it did not have the necessary degree of coherence.716 It is further submitted here that the 
Strasbourg Court should have examined the reasons behind the need to protect an 
individual’s belief in assisted suicide. This belief emanates from the argument that 
individuals should have the right to choose the time and manner of their death if they feel 
that the quality of their life, which is entirely dependent on every individual’s subjective 
viewpoint, is poor and deplorable and that, for example, an incurable, painful, disease 
stricken life is not worth living and they believe in assisted suicide for themselves in such 
circumstances. Most patients can end their life without assistance but those who are 
physically incapable should have this same freedom. Thus, it is submitted that the Court 
unsatisfactorily dismissed the claim in a very precipitous manner and without careful 																																																								
713 Merkouris (n 711) 119-120 
714 Mark Janis, Richard Kay and Anthony Bradley, European Human Rights Law: Text and 
Materials (3rd edn, OUP 2008) 338 
715 (1981) 3 EHRR 218 
716 Nicolas Bratza, ‘The “precious asset”: freedom of religion under ECHR’ [2012] Ecc LJ 
256, 259 
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consideration. Since detailed consideration was given to establish whether or not pacifism 
was a notion that would receive protection under Article 9 in Arrowsmith, the Court could 
have considered the individual circumstances of Mrs Pretty’s, the actions she sought to 
undertake in order to express her belief in assisted suicide, whether she was motivated by 
those beliefs to take those actions and whether or not those beliefs and actions were 
allowed under this Convention right. 
 
It should be noted at this juncture that there are other Convention rights that are claimed to 
have been breached in assisted suicide cases, such as Articles 3 and 14. The next section 
briefly discusses the Strasbourg jurisprudence in relation to these Convention rights. This 
discussion has been curtailed since neither Article plays a significant role in furthering the 
momentum to reform the law. 
 
5.5 What amounts to a breach of an individual’s human dignity under Article 3? 
The fundamental objective of human rights law is to preserve, protect and even develop 
human dignity and freedom for every individual.717 Human dignity has been defined as the 
worth of human beings, their higher rank or special place in nature.718 Human dignity is the 
state or quality of being worthy of honour and respect from others and having self-respect 
and a sense of pride in oneself. This particular genre of worthiness and self-respect also 
absorbs the concept of autonomy, which is ineradicable and inherent to all humans.719 
 
Even though the concept of human dignity has not been expressed as part of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it forms the basis of the entire Convention, in terms of the 
drafting history and its teleology.720 It broadens the scope of the Articles and strengthens 
																																																								
717 Marshall (n 600) 13  
718 George Kateb, Human Dignity (Harvard 2011) ix. Note: Equal human value, self-
respect, autonomy and positive mutuality have been described as the four dimensions of 
human dignity. For greater detail: Chak Chan and Graham Bowpitt, Human Dignity and 
Welfare Systems (Policy Press 2005) 4 
719 Bayertz (n 105) xiv. Note: The concept of autonomy is discussed in chs 2 and 5. 
720 Olha Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the 
Weaker Party (Sellier European Law Publishers 2007) 262, 263; and Andreas Dimopoulos, 
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the entire Convention as a whole.721 The Strasbourg Court confirmed in Christine Goodwin 
v United Kingdom that “the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity 
and human freedom”.722 To this end, Cherednychenko encapsulates that:  
 
Although the guarantee of human dignity is not explicitly mentioned in the text of 
the ECHR, there are important indications that human dignity constitutes its implicit 
foundation… Moreover, in its decision in the Christine Goodwin v UK case, the 
ECtHR explicitly emphasised that the ECHR is meant to protect human dignity. If 
one therefore accepts that human dignity is the infrastructure on which the entire 
superstructure of human rights is constructed.723 
 
It is submitted that the Convention is designed to protect every individual’s human dignity 
and the rights and freedoms that emanate from it; and that every individual’s dignity and 
freedoms should always be propagated and protected.724 
 
Certain kinds of treatment are incompatible with an individual’s inherent human dignity 
and infringe their Convention rights, particularly those guaranteed by Article 3. Article 3, 
provides as follows: 
 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. 
 
Article 3 is absolute: it has no exceptions or qualifications.725 Derogation is not permitted 
even in times of national emergency or war in order to protect prisoners from being tortured 
																																																								
721 Catherine Dupre, ‘Human dignity and the withdrawal of medical treatment: a missed 
opportunity?’ [2006] 6 EHRLR 678, 683; and Dimopoulos (n 720) 206 
722 App no 28957/95 (ECtHR, 11 July 2002) para 90 
723 Cherednychenko (n 720) 262, 263 
724 Wiater (n 240) 38 
725 Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in 
ECHR (MNP 2009) 83. In contrast, Foster argues that Article 3 has open-ended wording 
(Steve Foster, ‘Article 3 of the European Convention, the Human Rights Act and prison 
conditions’ (2004) 9(2) Cov LJ 25, 44) 
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into false confessions.726 To achieve this, the right does not allow for negotiation and is 
formulated in absolute terms in order to punish the authority or private party who infringes 
an individual’s Article 3 right.727 The Article itself does not state that it is absolute: 
however, the European Commission and the Strasbourg Court have always operated on the 
basis that it is absolute and non-negotiable.728 It provides absolute protection against 
conduct and treatment that has harmful physical or psychological effects on the victim.729 It 
is formulated in a manner that preserves the inherent dignity of every human being by 
creating absolute protection against torture and inhumane treatment.730 Even the use of 
proportionality or the margin of appreciation is not granted to Member States, in relation to 
Article 3, as it would compromise the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.731 
 
Certain actions, even if they breach the notion of human dignity – such as handcuffing or 
detaining a suspect in police custody – are an acceptable violation.732 However, this section 
determines whether the criminal embargo on assisted suicide, the compulsion to prolong 
life and the lack of lawful opportunity of requesting an assisted suicide, fall within the 
ambit of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and, thus, breach an 
individual’s Article 3 rights. More specifically, this section analyses whether this 
Convention right can be engaged by individuals, such as Mrs Pretty, who argue that the 																																																								
726 Elspeth Guild, Security and European human rights: protecting individual rights in 
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727 Catharine Estelle Rowe, ‘The Scope of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to Suspected 
Terrorists’ (2002) 10 Exeter Papers in European Law 35 
728 Michael Addo and Nicholas Grief, ‘Does Article 3 of ECHR Enshrine Absolute 
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730 David Feldman, ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 1’ (1999) PL 682, 682-691 
731 Magdalena Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of 
Human Rights (OUP 2010) 198; Howard Davis, Human Rights and Civil Liberties (Willan 
Publishing 2003) 32; and Stijn Smet, ‘The ‘absolute’ prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment in Article 3 ECHR: truly a question of scope only?’ in Eva Brems and 
Janneke Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in ECHR: The Role of the European Court of 
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State failed to protect them from the pain and suffering of their intolerable diseases by 
refusing to decriminalise assisted suicide or grant immunity to those who assist them to end 
their lives. 
 
As the drafters of the European Convention used the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as their model, Article 3 is identical to Article 5 of Universal Declaration.733 At first 
sight it appears that Article 3 only imposes a negative obligation on Member States to 
refrain from inflicting torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on their 
citizens.734 However, Article 3 also imposes a two-fold positive obligation on Member 
States. Firstly, it requires them to protect their citizens from being tortured or ill-treated by 
state authorities and even private parties and, secondly, to investigate allegations of torture 
and ill-treatment.735 
 
5.5.1 The limited role of Article 3 in assisted suicide cases 
In relation to Article 3, Diane Pretty claimed that the State owed to its citizens not only a 
negative obligation to refrain from inhumane or degrading treatment but also a positive 
obligation to protect individuals from suffering (which she would otherwise have to 
endure).736 Mrs Pretty further claimed that refusing to grant her husband immunity from 
prosecution, the DPP denied her the opportunity to bring her suffering to an end, and in 
forcefully prolonging her life, her Article 3 rights were breached.737 
 
Article 3 is not formulated in terms of a general, sweeping fundamental right to be free 
from suffering.738 A very high threshold must be met in order for this Convention right to 
be engaged.739 The ill treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to constitute 																																																								
733 Chris Ingelse, United Nations Committee Against Torture: An Assessment (Kluwer 
2001) 49 
734 Ugur Erdal and Hasan Bakirci, Article 3 of ECHR: A Practitioner’s Handbook (OMCT 
2006) 213 
735 Erdal and Bakirci (n 734) 213 
736 Pretty v UK (n 57) at para 44 
737 ibid para 14(11) 
738 Antje Pedain, ‘The human rights dimension of the Diane Pretty case’ (2003) 62(1) 
CLJUK 181, 188 
739 Laurens Lavrysen, ‘The scope of rights and the scope of obligations: positive obligation’ 
in Brems and Gerards (n 731) 178; and Jeff A King, ‘United Kingdom’ in Malcolm 
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torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and fall within the scope of 
Article 3.740 The threshold, that needs to be met in order for there to be a breach, limits the 
application of Article 3.741 The Strasbourg Court has held that Article 3 is generally applied 
in situations where an individual is under the risk or has been subjected to proscribed forms 
of treatment, which are intentionally inflicted by State agents or public authorities.742 The 
Court went on to state that: 
 
Where treatment humiliates… an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or 
diminishing, [their] human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear… or inferiority 
capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be 
characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article 3.743 
 
The Court accurately held that the pain and suffering that naturally comes from a physical 
disease or mental illness can only be covered by Article 3 if the State acts in a way to 
exacerbate or worsen the condition, which was not the case in Pretty.744 In Mrs Pretty’s 
situation, “the respondent State has not, itself, inflicted any ill-treatment on [her]”.745 
Neither was she complaining of receiving inadequate medical treatment.746 It was “the 
refusal of the DPP to give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her to 
commit suicide” to which she objected.747 Mrs Pretty argued that it was this refusal that 
was causing the inhuman and degrading treatment, as a lawful option to assisted suicide 																																																																																																																																																																									
Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 287 
740 Ireland v UK App no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978). Also see: Grice v UK App no 
22564/93 (ECtHR, 14 April 1994) para 90; Steward-Brady v UK (1999) 27 EHRR 284: “To 
fall within the scope of this provision, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
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would save her from an agonising and painful death (which was a natural occurrence of her 
terminal condition). The Strasbourg Court concluded that it was sympathetic to Mrs Pretty 
because she was facing a distressing death.748 However, this distress was not being caused 
by the State’s failure to prevent ill-treatment by public authorities or private individuals.749 
Furthermore, Article 3 did not require Member States to grant immunity from prosecution 
or provide a lawful opportunity to assist suicide.750 To this end, the Court concluded that: 
 
…no positive obligation arises under Article 3… to require the respondent State 
either to give an undertaking not to prosecute the applicant’s husband if he assisted 
her to commit suicide or to provide a lawful opportunity for any other form of 
assisted suicide. There has, accordingly, been no violation of this provision.751 
 
It is concluded here that the Strasbourg Court’s swift approach to dismiss Mrs Pretty’s 
Article 3 claim was appropriate. This Convention right has a very high threshold that must 
be met in order to constitute a breach. This threshold is not met unless there is direct 
infliction of torture or ill treatment, by a State authority or even private party, or a gross 
failure to protect individuals from it. Pain and suffering, and the subsequent sense of loss of 
dignity, that naturally emanates from a disease does not amount to a breach of Article 3, nor 
does a refusal to grant immunity from prosecution to family members. Thus, Article 3 does 
not play a significant role in informing the debate on end-of-life issues.752 
 
5.6 The scope and working of Article 14 
The Strasbourg Court similarly tackled the issue of indirect discrimination that engaged 
Article 14, in the Pretty case, in a swift and perfunctory manner. Article 14 provides as 
follows: 
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The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article 14 does not provide an “equality right”: it is merely a device to prevent unjust, 
unfair or prejudicial treatment of different groups and categories of people.753 Nor is it a 
“stand-alone Article” and cannot be used independently.754 It can only be engaged in order 
to protect the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.755 This is why Article 14 has 
been described as a “parasitic provision”.756 Thus, it is of no use to an individual claiming a 
breach of Article 14 by alleging discrimination by a Member State or its public authorities 
who cannot substantiate that another independent Convention Article has been engaged.757 
 
Diane Pretty submitted in the Strasbourg Court that the criminal embargo on assisted 
suicide in England, discriminated against her, on the basis of her disability; because it 
treated her in the same manner in which it treated individuals whose circumstances were 
significantly different.758 Mrs Pretty relied on Article 14 as an independent article, alleging 
that section 2(1) of the 1961 Act discriminates against those with disabilities as they are 
unable to take their own lives without the assistance of another. The Strasbourg Court 
explained that it had repeatedly held that Article 14 is not autonomous but had effect in 
relation to Convention rights.759 It is submitted here that this reluctance by the Strasbourg 
Court to extend the scope of Article 14 might be an attempt to avoid opening a floodgate of 
litigation, which would come through various forms of direct and indirect discrimination 
that individuals and groups may feel they have been subjected to and, thus, create a burden 
on the running of the Strasbourg Court and even unpredictably and extensively expand the 
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scope of Article 14.760 The Strasbourg Court went on to conclude that even if Mrs Pretty 
established that section 2(1) of 1961 Act is discriminatory against disabled individuals, if 
none of the Articles on which Diane Pretty had relied on proved in her favour – as was 
indeed the case – then the claim under Article 14 would automatically fail.761 
 
It is submitted here that there is a failure to extend Article 14 to cover situations of 
surreptitious, subdued and indistinct forms of discrimination and the Strasbourg Court’s 
approach to equality, fairness and prevention of unfairness, prejudice and bias has been 
insufficient and unsatisfactory.762 The Court’s decision to continually restrict the scope of 
Article 14 – by not providing individuals with a freestanding right against discrimination on 
the codified grounds – forms one of the main weaknesses of the Convention, which can be 
attributed to the failure of assisted suicide claims.763 To this end, various academics – such 
as Howard,764 O’Hare,765 Schokkenbroek766 and Grief767 – have criticised Article 14 as 
being a “prominent failure of the Convention system” 768 and “for falling short of the 
standard of protection provided in other international human rights instruments”.769 It is 
further submitted here that the application of Article 14 ought not to necessitate an 
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infringement of another right or freedom of the Convention.770 If an able-bodied individual 
has the right to privacy and self-determination, which includes a choice to commit suicide 
rather than go through pain and suffering then surely a disabled individual who makes the 
same choice – but requires assistance in carrying out that choice – would also be enjoying 
the same right to privacy and autonomy. However, this freedom ought to only be extended 
under certain circumstances where an individual is going through incurable pain and 
suffering an irreparable loss of dignity due to their medical condition. Furthermore, there 
would need to be appropriate safeguards namely ensuring that the individual is not mentally 
ill or being coerced or pressured and that their action is entirely voluntary, which is why 
assisted suicide must be allowed instead of euthanasia, which is discussed in the next 
chapter.771 However, as the law stands, Article 14 cannot be used in an independent manner 
and does not play a significant role in furthering the momentum to reform the law on 
assisted suicide under the human rights movement. 
 
5.7 The impact of human rights law on the movement to reform the law on assisted 
suicide 
As the analysis in this chapter has demonstrated, human rights law has had the most 
significant influence on the movement to reform the law on assisted suicide. The 
Strasbourg Court adjudicated on the issue of assisted suicide for the first time in the Pretty 
case and continued to develop the jurisprudence on this area of the law, along with 
domestic courts, in cases such as Purdy, Nicklinson and Koch. It not only clarified the role 
certain human rights provisions play within this debate but also set out the religious and 
non-religious values that influence the assisted suicide debate which would receive 
protection if invoked in such cases. For example, the Court stated that Article 2 could not 
be used to create an antithetical right to die as it was was formulated in order to protect life, 
which itself stems from the recognition of the doctrine of sanctity of human life. Preserving 																																																								
770 Olivier De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary 
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this doctrine, via Article 2, protects the views of various religious and even some non-
religious individuals and groups who oppose a change in the law. However, there has been 
a shift in societal attitudes, which now support a change in the law. Thus, the Strasbourg 
Court explained that Article 2 and the protection it provides this doctrine are not absolute 
and left an opening under Article 8, which provides every individual with the right to self-
determination, which allows them to choose the time and manner of their death. Article 8 
that protects the notion of individual autonomy, which is the most important principle that 
drives the contemporary debate on assisted suicide, is the most powerful Convention right 
in this area of the law. The notion of autonomy and the scope of Article 8 in relation to 
assisted suicide have been continually expanded by Strasbourg and domestic courts in cases 
such as Purdy, Nicklinson and Koch amongst others, which further demonstrates the 
significance this Convention right and the idea of autonomy have on this debate. Thus, 
Article 8, which protects the principle of autonomy, is the most important human rights 
provision on which a reform of the law could be based. 
 
Another value that influences the assisted suicide debate, along with the notions of 
autonomy and the religious and non-religious conceptions of the doctrine of sanctity of life, 
is the idea of human dignity that also receives protection under human rights law, namely 
Article 3. Human dignity – as argued in Chapter Two, is a concept that arguably emanates 
from the Christian faith – provides individuals with an innate respect that cannot be 
diminished or eradicated by disease or disability. However, over the years, this principle 
has transformed into a secular value that allows individuals to decide the value of their life 
based on their own conscientious views and subjective perception of its quality and worth 
along with the ability to make a decision to end their life if they perceive it to be of poor 
quality, undignified and degrading. Thus, the notion of dignity consists of possessing the 
right to self-determination. However, as argued earlier in this chapter, the Strasbourg Court 
has applied Article 3 in a manner that protects individuals from deliberate and intended 
torture and degrading treatment and it cannot be claimed to have been breached if the 
perceived indignity emanates naturally from a disease not from a lack of an available option 
of assisted suicide to end what they perceive to be an undignified life or if immunity from 
prosecution is not provided to a friend of family member who assisted an individual to end 
their life. Even though Article 3 was formulated to protect every individual’s dignity and 
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protect them against torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, it clearly plays a very 
limited role in assisted suicide cases. 
 
The transformation of all these values, over time, from having religious underpinning to 
becoming secular principles is traced throughout this thesis, particularly the next chapter. 
The predominant reason behind this discursive shift in language is that the cultural 
landscape of English society has changed from one that was historically deeply attached to 
the Christian faith but has become multicultural and increasingly secular. This has led to 
public attitudes shifting in favor of reform of the law based on the common and shared non-
religious values – such as autonomy and dignity that are grounded in human rights law – 
and a subsequent detachment of religious principles from this debate. However, as 
explained throughout this thesis, it is necessary to include the views of various religious 
groups since over three-quarters of the population identifies with a religion and to ensure 
equality and fairness in society and safeguard minority groups from being excluded and 
marginalised. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter Three and will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter, a reform of the law on the issue of assisted suicide and inclusion 
of religious views is no longer mutually exclusive. Lastly, human rights law protects the 
views of various religious (and non-religious) groups, under Article 9. It protects the 
religious and non-religious conceptions of the doctrine of sanctity of life, dignity and 
autonomy, which all need to be included and protected in a pluralistic society. However, 
since all these principles are contradictory, Strasbourg and domestic courts apply Article 9 
in a manner that protects the rights and freedoms of every individual and group in society. 
It preserves the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is protected by Article 2, by retaining the 
criminal ban on assisted suicide yet provides individuals the right to self-determine the time 
and manner of their death (or even to preserve life), under Article 8. An individual who 
believes in the doctrine of sanctity of life, based on their personal religious or non-religious 
conscience, has the option to not prematurely end it. However, others who do not share this 
belief have the option to end their life when and how they want. This option ought to be 
further extended to protect an individual’s belief in assisted suicide for themselves by 
providing them with a regulated and safeguarded lawful option of assisted suicide. This 
option would only be available to individual who are unable to end their life on their own 
and have a consistent, informed, autonomous wish to end life in a limited set of 
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circumstances after a number of safeguards have been met. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that human rights law has had the most significant impact on 
indirectly allowing, or at least not acting against, assisted suicide. However, not all human 
rights provisions have added impetus to reforming the law on assisted suicide. Article 2 
was formulated in order to preserve the sanctity and value of human life. This notion of the 
inviolability of the value of life, as protected by Article 2, is reflected in the decisions of 
domestic courts, which argues that the inceptive aim of this Article is to protect life and 
cannot be used to provide an antithetical right to die. However, the Strasbourg Court has 
created an opening, under Article 8, to allow every individual to choose the time and 
manner of their death. Article 8 has an open, constantly expanding and very broad scope: it 
has become a very powerful right, particularly in assisted suicide cases as is evident from 
Mrs Purdy and Mr Lamb being allowed to make judicial demands to codify and clarify the 
factors the DPP uses when determining whether or not to prosecute an individual for 
assisting the suicide of another, which, as this chapter argued, allows back-door assisted 
suicide. The significance of Article 8 is also reflected in the statistics that suggest that 
individuals who compassionately assisted mentally competent individuals to end their life 
at Dignitas, in Switzerland, have been not prosecuted under section 2(1) of the 1961 Act. 
Clearly, Article 8 has had the most impact on the movement to reform the law on assisted 
suicide in England as it has a very broad and constantly expanding scope. If an individual’s 
dignity is so eroded – due to the medical symptoms of their illness causing dependency on 
others, pain, suffering and humiliation – the quality of their life is deplorable and, thus, the 
subjective value of their life is insubstantial and depreciated; the individual is then allowed 
to choose the time and manner of their death under Article 8, and ought also to be allowed 
to receive assistance in doing so under certain, safeguarded circumstances. 
 
However, other Convention rights have not been developed and expanded in this manner. 
The Strasbourg Court took an inaccurate approach by summarily dismissing Mrs Pretty’s 
claim of a belief in assisted suicide for herself, which did not meet the definition of belief 
previously set out by the Court. Article 9 has been extended to cover, arguably 
inconsequential, notions such as veganism and pacifism. The Strasbourg Court extensively 
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examined the reason behind the claimant’s belief in these notions, the goals and actions 
they took or wished to take in order to fulfill their beliefs and the effect that their beliefs 
and actions would have on the rights and freedoms of others. A similar approach ought to 
have been taken in the Pretty case. Furthermore, the views and beliefs of various non-
religious and religious groups ought to have an independent and autonomous existence. The 
beliefs of one religion, namely the Christian faith, on which the criminal embargo on 
assisted suicide in England was originally based ought not to be imposed on individuals 
and communities who do not share this belief and instead, firmly hold a belief in assisted 
suicide for themselves. Thus, Article 9 ought to protect the conviction of those who share 
this belief in assisted suicide. 
 
As this chapter has argued, the human rights movement has been the most significant in 
fuelling the reform of the law on assisted suicide. The next chapter examines the historic 
and contemporary momentum to reform the law on assisted dying by analysing the Bills 
through Parliament, the values that drove the Parliamentary debates and concludes that 
assisted suicide, instead of euthanasia, would be a much more practicable and safeguarded 
option. 
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Chapter 6. The inclusion of religious and non-religious values in the 
legislative momentum to reform the law on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically reviews the historic legislative attempts, which began in 1936, to 
reform the law on assisted dying in order to establish the religious and non-religious values 
that influenced the historic debate and to analyse the extent of inclusion of religion in this 
debate. This chapter establishes that the Christian faith, which had deep-rooted ties with 
English society, has always opposed a change in the law. Historically, religious 
representatives used ecclesiastical language to describe their faith’s opposition to the issue 
of assisted dying. However, over the years, there has been a shift in language and religious 
representatives (and society at large) now base their opposition on secular values and use 
non-religious language when objecting to a change in the law. For example, the historic, 
religious belief in the sanctity of human life, which was seen as a gift from God, on which 
various faith groups, particularly Christianity, base their opposition was the main principle 
that influenced the law in this area. However, over time, with society becoming 
multicultural and increasingly secular, the debate is now influenced by non-religious values 
such as the notions of dignity, autonomy and compassion, which are each examined in 
significant detail in this chapter. This chapter traces this discursive shift in language, along 
with the reasons of this change, which forms part of the original contribution to knowledge 
by this thesis, by evaluating historic Parliamentary debates and contrasting the language 
used in the contemporary, recent debates on assisted suicide. 
 
This chapter argues that secular values, namely dignity and autonomy, were increasingly 
included, thus demonstrating a historical shift, in the debate on assisted dying in 1969, 
when the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill was being discussed in Parliament and stood the 
strongest chance of becoming law due to the societal and media attention it received. 
However, religious opposition led to the Bill being defeated. This led to the momentum to 
reform the law significantly diminishing until the Walton Committee was formed in 1993 
to consider whether voluntary active euthanasia or physician assisted suicide ought to be 
	 170	
decriminalised. This Chapter analyses the report of the Walton Committee and compares its 
findings with that of the Select Committee of 2005. These Committees attempted to 
distinguish between these terms “euthanasia” and “assisted suicide” and argued that the 
former affects everyone as it is seen as intentional killing (as stated by Walton Committee) 
but the latter only affects the individual ending their life (as established by the 2005 
Committee), with the latter being given preference for legislation. This chapter analyses 
this distinction and explains why this distinction is necessary for any future attempts to 
reform the law. 
 
This chapter analyses the contemporary attempts to reform the law in this area, which 
began with a series of Bills introduced by Lord Joffe between 2003-2005. It argues that 
even though there continued to be religious opposition, it was continually declining and the 
values that influenced this debate were increasingly secular principles rather than religious 
tenets. The language used by religious representatives is evaluated and compared to that 
expressed during the historic legislative attempts to change the law in order to trace the 
discursive shift in language and establish the values that influence the modern debate on 
assisted dying along with the extent of inclusion of various religious groups – not only 
Christian faith but also other minority groups such as the Islamic community – during the 
Parliamentary debates. This chapter establishes that even though there is some inclusion of 
minority religious groups’ viewpoints within this debate, it is not very significant due to the 
lack of representation because of the structure of the religion, particularly of the Islamic 
faith, which has led to intermittent and limited involvement from the Islamic community in 
this debate. 
 
Lastly, this chapter argues that the failure of all the aforementioned Bills to reform the law 
in this area led to the Commission on Assisted Dying being set up in 2010. It extensively 
analyses the aims and objectives of this Commission. For example, its main objective was 
to establish if the current law on assisted suicide and euthanasia was satisfactory and 
whether it needed to be reformed. It also examines whether the Commission satisfactorily 
accommodated the needs of various religious and non-religious communities by critically 
reviewing the evidence submitted to the Commission by both these groups particularly on 
assisted suicide. It also evaluates the Bill, in significant detail, which sought to allow 
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physician-assisted suicide that was produced by the Commission and introduced in the 
House of Lords by the Chair of the Commission, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, along with the 
ethical and religious issues that arose in the Parliamentary debate around this Bill. It 
examines the main reasons behind the failure of Lord Falconer’s 2015 Bill. It also 
establishes that there was very little evidence (for example, in the form of oral and written 
statements) submitted by Christian Churches and their representatives and a significant lack 
of evidence from minority religious groups. It argues that this lack of inclusion of religious 
beliefs can be attributed to the fact that this issue is a matter that only affects the individual 
requesting it and not an entire community within society (and if a person does not support 
the notion of assisted suicide, they have the option to simply not request it); and 
predominantly because the debate on assisted suicide has become a secular matter and is 
driven by non-religious values, such as the notion of individual autonomy, dignity and 
compassion. 
 
6.2 Historical momentum to reform assisted dying laws 
There is a lengthy history of legislative and social attempts to make euthanasia lawful; 
which began in 1935, with two British doctors, Sir Berkley Moynihan and Dr Killick 
Millard founding the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society (VES).772 The objective of 
the Society was to promote and change public opinion,773 particularly through separating 
the concept from religion by explaining that the notion of voluntary euthanasia is not 
against the Christian faith.774 The Society met with Christian opposition, which the Society 
sought to dissipate by publishing a statement, signed by fifteen Christian religious leaders, 
clergymen and principals and heads of institutions on the ethical and religious aspect of 
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euthanasia.775 The statement declared that in their opinion, voluntary euthanasia should not 
be seen as contrary to the teachings of Christianity.776 Kemp notes that: 
 
This [statement] came about as the result of a meeting between Millard and Dr 
Bardsley, Bishop of Leicester, in which they had discussed the religious aspect of 
euthanasia. Although Bardsley had registered an ‘instinctive feeling’ against the 
proposed Bill, he suggested that W R Matthews the Dean of St Paul’s might be in 
sympathy with the Society’s objectives. This was indeed the case, and Matthews 
suggested other figures who might be of a similar opinion. The resulting statement 
declared in their opinion, voluntary euthanasia under the conditions outlined in the 
proposed Bill, should not be regarded as contrary to the teachings of Christ or the 
principles of Christianity”.777 
 
The main thrust of Kemp’s argument is that the VES sought to distinguish the notion of 
“voluntary euthanasia” from suicide, by separating the stigmatised, criminal activity of 
suicide from the religiously justifiable notion of ending pain and suffering that occurs due 
to an untreatable illness, under definite circumstances set out in the 1936 Bill, which is 
discussed in the next section. Based on this evidence, it can be concluded that the 
movement to reform the law began with the necessity to separate religion from the debate 
on assisted dying, particularly euthanasia, in order to be able to reform the law. 
 
6.2.1 Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936 
In the same year, the movement to reform the law gained impetus when Lord Arthur 
Ponsonby of Shulbrede introduced the ‘Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936’ in 
the House of Lords. The Bill would have allowed voluntary active euthanasia for patients 
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of sound mind, over the age of 21, who request it because they are suffering from an 
incurable and terminal illness that causes them severe pain and suffering.778 
 
Lord Shulbrede opined that legalising euthanasia would not be contrary to the principles of 
Christianity,779 and that compassion should be administered to those who are in “agony of 
hopeless and helpless suffering”.780 Despite this, there was considerable religious 
opposition to the Bill that led to the majority of the House of Lords not supporting the Bill. 
The Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent noted further that: 
 
This Bill is not opposed only because it is condemned by the Church… but because 
the law of nature brands it as evil and a cowardly act. What about other people? 
What about the Jews?... I am assured that there is not an orthodox Jew in the world 
who would not oppose this measure tooth and nail. What about the Mahomedans? 
Do they approve a measure of this kind? Not at all. They consider it to be contrary 
to the natural law and the law of God.781 
 
As argued in Chapter Three, waves of immigration started from 1900 and minority 
religions began amassing around a decade later. This societal shift is the reason behind 
religious minorities beginning to be included in societal and Parliamentary debates such as 
the one in 1936.782 However, Viscount Derwent was the only member of the House of 
Lords to include minorities in the Parliamentary debates. Thus, it is submitted that this 
exiguity of including minority religions can be attributed to the fact that multiculturalism 
was not prominent enough in 1936. The Bill was ultimately defeated by 35 votes to 14;783 
on the grounds that it was against the Christian religion and that the medical profession’s 
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aim was to prolong and preserve life, and not end it by “killing” patients.784 Clearly, 
religion played a momentous role in informing the debate and shaping the law in 1936. 
 
Shortly after the failure of the 1936 Bill, various prominent members of the VES fell ill or 
passed away – such as the first President of the Society, Lord Moynihan, who died in 1936 
at the age of 71 and the Honorary Secretary, Dr Millard, resigned due to heart disease in 
1951 – which led to a decrease in the impetus for reforming the law on this issue.785 Further 
decline in this movement to reform the law came when the term “euthanasia” began being 
associated with Nazi brutality.786 However, during the 1960s, the movement for reform was 
brought back into the societal debate, in England, in wake of the decriminalisation of 
suicide in 1961, allowing medical termination of pregnancies in 1967, a high volume of 
media coverage on the issue of euthanasia and public surveys,787 which demonstrated an 
increased support for voluntary euthanasia. It is submitted here that there was clearly a 
growing acceptance of the right to self-determination, which ought to have translated into a 
tolerance for allowing assisted dying.788 Thus, with the shift in attitudes towards euthanasia, 
based on the notion of individual autonomy, the VES drafted a Bill, which was introduced 
into the House of Lords on 6 March 1969, by Lord Raglan.789 
 
6.2.2 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 1969 
This Bill stood a considerable chance of being passed to reform the law on euthanasia.790 																																																								
784 The Bill sought to allow voluntary active euthanasia. Even though it would be 
voluntarily requested, the idea that doctors would actively end their patients’ life meant that 
the doctor-patient relationship would be destroyed. (Lord Dawson of Penn) HL Deb 01 
December 1936, vol 103, cols 481-485 
785 Kemp (n 773) 149 
786 Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final 
Solution (University Of North Carolina Press 1995) 21 
787 National Opinion Polls (January 1965) asked 1000 doctors, with 76.2% agreeing that 
“some medical men do in fact help their patients over the last hurdle in order to save them 
unnecessary suffering, even if that involves some curtailment of life”; and around 36.4 % 
agreed that they would provide voluntary euthanasia to their patient’s if it was allowed by 
the law ((Lord Raglan) HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1148; and Kemp (n 773) 195). 
788 Dowbiggin (n 177) 123 
789 HL Deb 6 March 1969 vol 300 col 277-278 
790 Following the decriminalisation of suicide in 1961 and abortion in 1967, which created 
exceptions to the doctrine of sanctity of life, the notion of euthanasia came back up in the 
societal and subsequently Parliamentary debate in 1969. The Labour government was in 
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According to Lord Raglan, the Bill would: 
 
…provide in certain circumstances for the administration of euthanasia to persons 
who request it and who are suffering from an irremediable condition, and to enable 
persons to request in advance the administration of euthanasia in the event of their 
suffering from such a condition at a future date.791 
 
It is argued that the notion of autonomy was gaining ground (thus, creating tolerance for 
providing individuals assistance to end their life) and there was a reinterpretation of the 
relationship between dying from the religious doctrine of sanctity of life – and not a 
detachment of this doctrine from the issue – which ought to have fuelled a reform of the 
law on euthanasia.792 This argument is supported by the 1969 Parliamentary debates. For 
example, various Members of the House of Lords opined that public opinion was changing 
and had significantly shifted in favour of allowing euthanasia since 1936.793 To this end, 
the Earl of Listowel stated that: 
 
Voluntary euthanasia has certainly more adherents now in the professions, in the 
Churches and among… people in every walk of life than it had 33 years ago. It is 
also much more often discussed in the Press and in broadcasting, which shows a 
wider public interest in the whole subject. The legalisation of suicide in… 1961 is 
another symptom of this change in the climate of public opinion; because… if you 
say, as the law does now, that it is lawful to take your own life, it is surely a logical 
step to go on to say that if you have an incurable and distressing illness which 
makes you so weak physically that you cannot do this without help, it should also 
be lawful to take your own life with the help of a doctor – and that is really all this 
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has become so favourable to a change in the law”. Also see: (Lord Ailwyn) HL Deb 25 
March 1969, vol 300, col 1185 explained that public opinion on this matter has changed 
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Bill sets out to do.794 
 
The main thrust of Earl Listowel’s argument is valid in that public opinion was increasingly 
developing a more tolerant view of euthanasia, by taking a more compassionate stance on 
the issue and prioritising patient autonomy: not due to a detachment from religious 
doctrines, which continued to exercise influence throughout the debate.795 However, even 
though the 1969 Bill had much broader scope – in contrast to 1936, which was restricted to 
terminally ill patients, this Bill allowed euthanasia for non-terminal patients – it was 
defeated by 61 votes to 40.796 However, there seemed to be a growing acceptance and more 
support for a change in the law with only 60.39% of Members of Parliament opposing it, 
compared to the 71.43% who opposed the 1936 Bill. The main concerns in the House of 
Lords were the lack of protection for patients,797 the lack of safeguards for doctors and a 
modification of their duties and responsibilities,798 and ethical and religious objections to 																																																								
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that faces most of us today is not that of being killed off… but that of being kept alive too 
long” (Gillian Tindall, ‘A time to die’ The Guardian (7 May 1969) ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer p 9). 
796 Robert Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide, and the Right to Die (WBE 
1989) 194. The 1969 Bill would have allowed any individual over the age of 21 to request 
euthanasia as long as two physicians were satisfied that the individuals was experiencing 
pain and suffering due to an incurable illness that would cause them severe distress or 
render them incapable or a rational existence: Biggs (n 27) 13 
797 For example: (the Earl of Cork and Orrery) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, cols 1155-
1156; (Lord Newton) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, cols 1163-1164; and (Lord 
Strabolgi) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1241. Also see: Wennberg (n 796) 194: 
“…the incurable but non-terminal have longer to live, but they have more time to suffer as 
well; therefore, they become fitting candidates for euthanasia… it was the inclusion of this 
provision that in part caused the bill’s defeat in the House of Lords”. 
798 For example: (Lord Amulree) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1167 explained that 
it is “…important that the confidence of the patients in doctors and hospitals should be 
maintained. We do not want the patient to feel that the man with a syringe is going to be a 
killer”. Also see: (Lord Brock) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1177; Dan Brock, Life 
and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (CUP 1993) 299; and James Bernat, 
Ethical Issues in Neurology (3rd edn, Lippincott Williams and Wilkins 2008) 204. Various 
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allowing euthanasia, which are examined in the next section. 
 
6.2.3 Religious Objections to the 1969 Bill 
The House of Lords extensively discussed the need to include ethical and religious views in 
this debate, which vehemently opposed euthanasia.799 Firstly, various members of the 
House of Lords discussed the need to include the view of the Christian faith in the 
debate.800 Lord Balerno argued that “…life is sacred in the eyes of God”.801 The Lord 
Bishop of Durham – an Anglican bishop responsible for the Diocese of Durham in the 
Province of York, the fourth most senior bishop of the Church of England and an automatic 
Member of the House of Lords802 – further explained that: 
 
…there is no one Christian view on voluntary euthanasia… the theology… has 
changed enormously over the past three or four hundred years… on this issue all 
Christians will… share with all others a respect for human life… they will be 
guided by the work of Christ in healing and relieving distress, the parables of 
compassion.803 
 
The opinions presented in the House of Lords indicates that the Church of England 
continued its opposition against euthanasia, and strongly voiced it during the Parliamentary 
debate as is evident by the Lord Bishop of Durham’s speech. The Christian faith does not 
allow it: even if an individual compassionately assists a person to end their life to relieve 
them of their pain and suffering. The Christian faith uses the notion of compassion in an 
antithetical manner to that of the public opinion, which views it as a basis to reform of the 																																																																																																																																																																									
members of the House of Lords were satisfied that the Bill contained sufficient safeguards 
to protect the interests of the doctors. For example: (Lord Segal) HL Deb 25 March 1969, 
vol 300, col 1244; (Baroness Serota) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1170; and (Lord 
Raglan) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1144. 
799 (Lord Raglan) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1144 
800 HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300: (Viscount Barrington) cols 1237-1240; (Lord Brock) 
cols 1177-1178; (Lord Ailwyn) col 1187; (Lord Soper) col 1195-1198; (Lord Grenfell) col 
1216; and (Lord Ritchie-Calder) cols 1221-1223; in contrast, (Lord Poltimore) col 1227. 
801 HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1220 
802 The Archbishop of York, ‘Bishop of Durham Election Confirmed’ (20 January 2014) 
<www.archbishopofyork.org/articles.php/3035/bishop-of-durham-election-confirmed> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
803 HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, cols 1179-1185 
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law. Public opinion seeks to allow assisted dying, as it motivates a person to feel 
compassion and sympathy, which makes them provide the required assistance to another 
individual. 
 
6.2.4 Non-Religious Objections to the 1969 Bill 
The religious opposition that underpinned the movement for legalisation was further 
supported by the need to protect patients and even safeguard health care professionals 
especially doctors. Furthermore, the introduction of minority groups and the rise of 
pluralism and secularism in British society804 led to the religious tenets that fuelled the 
debate being reinforced by secular, non-religious values. To this end, Lord Platt, who was 
in favour of a change in a limited set of circumstances “if properly handled and controlled”, 
argued that:805 
 
The religious arguments may appeal to many people, but some of us believe that 
moral and ethical laws and medical ethics are not divinely sent to us but are the 
result of the evolution of thought in a society which is undergoing constant 
change.806 
 
Based on the evidence found in the 1969 Parliamentary debate, it is concluded that the an 
exiguous move away from religious tents began; and secular values started significantly 
influencing this debate, based on the grounds of conscience,807 were the need to administer 
compassion to individuals who need to be relieved from their pain and suffering;808 and the 
need to preserve their dignity.809 Furthermore, this notion of dignity began to significantly 																																																								
804 For discussion on secularisation of British society, refer to ch 3. 
805 HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1204 
806 ibid col 1205 
807 The Earl of Listowel HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1213-1214; and Lord Raglan 
HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1144-1145. 
808 Lord Brock HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1174 (“I am filled with compassion for 
those unfortunate individuals at whose release from pain and suffering this Bill is in some 
part directed”); and Lord Bishop of Exeter HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1242 (“… 
this Bill for voluntary euthanasia is by legislation out of compassion”). 
809 Lord Ritchie-Calder HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1225 (who felt that individuals 
have a right to human dignity and to make choices, including the decision of an assisted 
death); the Earl of Listowel (who supported the Bill) HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 
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influence the debate on this area from 1969. The majority of the members of the House of 
Lords felt that there was a need to protect the inherent value of human life and preserve 
human dignity by rejecting the 1969 Bill (which had the effect of dismissing the need to 
protect autonomous decisions). For example, Lord Ritchie-Calder stated that the House 
needed to: 
 
…take some account of human dignity and in any devout belief in the sacredness of 
human life have some concern for the dignity and the personality of the life that is 
being preserved, and the indignities and the sacrifices which others have to make in 
preserving that life. To me it is a mockery… of everything which is in the nature of 
man, that we should in fact, under the conditions in which we are trying to prescribe 
what in fact is the nature of life, bedamn the living and condemn people to a death 
in life.810  
 
The majority’s stance reflected a division concerning as to how human dignity is 
understood, a division that is still prevalent today. For example, Keown argues that the 
doctrine of sanctity of life dictates that human beings possess an innate dignity, which, 
whether underpinned by religious or secular thought, requires that individuals are not 
intentionally killed regardless of their illness or disability.811 However, it is submitted that 
Keown’s argument does not take into consideration that human dignity is the value that 
provides individuals with the inherent prerogative to decide the value of their life and the 
option to end it if they deem it to be undignified. To this end, Barilan rightly argues that: 
 																																																																																																																																																																									
1212; and Council of Europe, Euthanasia: Volume I – Ethical and human aspects (COEP 
2003) 49. 
810 HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1223. Also see: Lord Clifford of Chudleigh HL Deb 
25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1208-1209: “Ethically, we come back to the value that we have 
set on human life…  [vulnerable] people need the protection of society, not an added 
weapon in the armoury of suicide”. 
811 Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (n 10) 40. To this end, also see: Earl 
Ferizers HL Deb 25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1234; Baroness Serota (HL Deb 25 March 
1969 vol 300 col 1168) argued that “Others will maintain that any taking of human life, 
however well intentioned the motives, is indistinguishable from the act of murder and that 
it would be wrong in any circumstances to legalise such conduct”; and Lord Brock HL Deb 
25 March 1969 vol 300 col 1175. 
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…human dignity informs us not to force life on the conscientiously unwilling 
person or the person for whom existence has become undignified. People must not 
be forced into being living testimonies to the value of life.812 
 
Clearly, the notion of human dignity is closely tied with the need to respect the autonomous 
decisions of individuals to choose an assisted death in order to end their pain and suffering 
and not force them to live an undignified life. 
 
It is concluded that even with the religious opposition that the 1969 Bill met with, it stood 
the strongest chance of being approved (compared to the 1936 Bill) due to the media 
coverage it received, public awareness around the issue of euthanasia and the changing 
opinion of society and the new values of dignity and autonomy that were introduced in the 
debate (by Parliament).813 However, great significance was placed on the religious doctrine 
of sanctity of life and the views of the Christian faith in the 1969 debate, which ultimately 
led to the defeat of the Bill.814 
 
6.2.5 The Walton Committee 1993 
The momentum to reform the law on euthanasia drastically lessened and eventually 
completely ceased after a series of rejected Bills in the House of Lords in 1936, 1950,815 
and 1969 and in the House of Commons in 1970;816 in order to preserve the value of human 
life and avoid the slippery slope effect, which would lead to patients’ lives being ended 																																																								
812 Yechiel Michael Barilan, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Responsibility: The New 
Language of Global Bioethics and Biolaw (MIT Press, 2012) 187-188 
813 Kemp (n 773) 212-213 
814 (Baroness Summerskill) HL Deb 25 March 1969, vol 300, col 1228 explained the Bill 
was rejected because allowing assisted dying involved, the person whose life has become 
intolerable, the individual who will assist their death and “every other person in the country 
suffering from some incurable disease”. 
815 The 1950 debate on voluntary euthanasia was merely a motion in Parliament by Lord 
Chorley on 28 November 1950, further details of which can be found in the following 
Hansard record: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1950/nov/28/voluntary-
euthanasia> accessed 21 May 2017 
816 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1989) 367. 
The 1970 debate on voluntary euthanasia was merely a motion in Parliament by Lord 
Chorley on 7 April 1970, further details of which can be found in the following Hansard 
record: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1970/apr/07/voluntary-euthanasia> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
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without their consent. Keown accurately summarises the momentum to reform the law on 
this area as follows: 
 
Few, if any, legislative bodies can claim to have debated voluntary, active 
euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide (VAE/PAS) over so many years, and in 
such depth, and drawing on such wide range of expertise, as the House of Lords. 
The House first considered the issue three quarters of a century ago when a 
“Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation Bill) was introduced by Lord Ponsonby. In 
1969 another Bill was introduced by Lord Raglan. In 1993 the House established a 
Select Committee, chaired by Lord Walton, which considered, in depth, the case for 
decriminalizing VAE/PAS. In its valuable report, published in 1994, the Walton 
Committee unanimously rejected the case”.817 
 
The House of Lords established a Select Committee in 1993, which was chaired by Lord 
Walton, to consider in great detail whether voluntary active euthanasia or physician assisted 
suicide ought to be decriminalised. The Walton Committee, which consisted of thirteen 
members, was chosen to represent the increasingly secular British society. With members 
from legal, medical and even ethical and philosophical expertise, only one member on the 
Committee was a religious representative in the form of the Duke of Norfolk, who was the 
President of the Catholic Union and submitted evidence against reform, written in 
conjunction with the Guild of Catholic Doctors, to the Walton Committee.818 The following 
year, the Walton Committee published its report, detailing the various circumstances in 
which individuals advocate allowing assisted dying. The Committee explained that, firstly, 
it did not think it possible to create sufficient safeguards and limitations on the various 
forms of euthanasia and “it would be next to impossible to ensure that all acts of euthanasia 
were truly voluntary and that any liberalization of the law was not abused”.819 Secondly, 
even though the Committee acknowledged that it is possible to separate temporary distress 
or mental illness from a genuine, consistent wish to end life, it was concerned “that 
vulnerable people – the elderly, lonely, sick or distressed – would feel pressure… to request 																																																								
817 Keown, Law and Ethics of Medicine (n 226) 235 
818 John Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good: Collected Essays (OUP 2011) 263 
819 Select Committee 1993 (n 28) para 238 
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early death”.820 Furthermore, individuals who fear that the availability of advanced medical 
treatment and life prolonging options would mean that they would be forced to continue to 
live an undignified life ought not to have such concerns since the notion of withdrawal of 
treatment or not initiate treatment at all are also available options to them. 821 Lastly, the 
Committee went on to explain that there have been “outstanding achievements… in the 
field of palliative care”, that “the pain and distress of terminal illness can be adequately 
relieved in the vast majority of cases”, is widely available in hospitals and ought to be the 
promoted and preferred option (instead of euthanasia).822 
 
Clearly, the Walton Committee was vehemently opposed to allowing euthanasia under any 
circumstance. The Committee concluded that:  
 
…we do not believe that these arguments are sufficient reason to weaken society’s 
prohibition of intentional killing. That prohibition is the cornerstone of law and of 
social relationships. It protects each one of us impartially, embodying the belief that 
all are equal. We do not wish that protection to be diminished, and we therefore 
recommend that there should be no change in the law to permit euthanasia. We 
acknowledge that there are individual cases in which euthanasia may be seen by 
some to be appropriate. But individual cases cannot reasonably establish the 
foundation of a policy that would have such serious and widespread repercussions. 
Moreover, dying is not only a personal or individual affair. The death of a person 
affects the lives of others, often in ways and to an extent that cannot be foreseen. 
We believe that the issue of euthanasia is one in which the interest of the individual 
cannot be separated from the interest of society as a whole.823 
 
 
																																																								
820 ibid para 239 
821 ibid para 240. Note: Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 HL recognised a 
PVS patient Anthony Bland’s right to be free from unwanted medical treatment that 
prolonged his life and allowed his feeding-tube to be removed, resulting in his death. 
822 Select Committee 1993 (n 28) para 241 
823 ibid para 237 
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It is submitted here that the nature of euthanasia is such that it is not possible to always 
guarantee autonomy and voluntariness in the process, there is a much higher risk of abuse 
of legislation and unwanted deaths and it affects every citizen within society. Thus, the 
conclusions of the Walton Committee were accurate in not recommending a change in the 
law on “euthanasia”. Even though the Walton Committee discussed the various facets of 
euthanasia in significant detail, it summarily dismissed the idea of allowing assisted 
suicide. The Walton Committee unanimously made the report and rejected any idea of 
allowing assisted suicide.824 The Committee stated: 
 
As far as assisted suicide is concerned, we see no reason to recommend any change 
in the law. We identify no circumstances in which assisted suicide should be 
permitted, nor do we see any reason to distinguish between the act of a doctor or of 
any other person in this connection. 825 
 
It is argued here that there is a need to distinguish between the notions of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide. As discussed in Section 1.3, the final action in the process of euthanasia is 
taken by another individual (and not the person requesting an assisted death), which gives 
rise to the idea of “intentional killing” of another person as described by the Walton 
Committee. There is a risk of the slippery slope effect coming into action, which would 
give rise to abuse of legislation and unwanted deaths being given to individuals. However, 
the nature of assisted suicide is such that it does not give rise to the risk of slippery slope, 
since the final action that ends life is always taken by the individual who makes the request, 
they have the option to change their mind until the very last moment, which forms a 
safeguard and guarantees autonomy and voluntariness, and the idea of “intentional killing” 
of another person cannot be attached to a suicide.826 
 
 
																																																								
824 ibid para 277 
825 ibid para 262 
826 Note: This distinction between euthanasia and assisted suicide was created by the Select 
Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, ‘Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill’ HL Paper 86-I (2005). For discussion: ch 6 
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It should be noted here, when discussing the Walton Committee’s findings in the House of 
Lords, only a handful of Members viewed theological concerns to be significant enough to 
receive inclusion. For example, Baroness McFarlane of Llandaff accurately encapsulated 
the position of the Walton Committee in relation to religious concerns as follows:  
 
I came to the work from a background of traditional Christian belief which holds 
the view that human beings are created in the image of God, and as a consequence 
there is a sanctity or holiness in human life. Yet, as we discussed with those who 
gave evidence to us and read the evidence submitted it was clear that not everyone 
holds that view. I accept that for many in a secular society the phrase “the sanctity 
of human life” has ceased to have meaning. Yet we have to come together as a 
society and find a way of making decisions.827 
 
It is submitted here that even though Baroness McFarlane opposed a reform, the main 
thrust of her opinion is accurate. In a modern, multicultural society there are various 
religious and non-religious beliefs and principles. One of these is the notion of sanctity of 
life. Historically, this notion was rooted in the Christian religion and attached a religious 
sanctity to human life. Even though this notion has survived – and still remains in its 
historic form in the Christian religion and even amongst many minority religious groups – 
the meaning attached to this notion has drastically changed. However, Baroness 
McFarlane’s analysis was erroneous in that the notion no longer has any meaning or 
significance. The notion has changed by a detachment of its religious understanding and 
has now transformed into an idea that life has immense value attached to it (which arguably 
takes on autonomy and quality of life considerations). Furthermore, Baroness McFarlane 
did not support a change in the law based on her medical, particularly nursing background, 
and her belief in the Christian faith. However, she stated that her opinion was based on her 
medical background and not her faith. As previously mentioned, the Duke of Norfolk was 																																																								
827 HL Deb 09 May 1994 vol 554 col 1364. Also see: The Lord Bishop of Oxford (HL Deb 
09 May 1994 vol 554 col 1369) who quoted the Walton Committee and opined that there 
ought to be a distinction “between that which is intended and that which is foreseen but 
unintended” as this “distinction is fundamental to Christian moral reasoning”; and the 
Marquess of Hertford (HL Deb 09 May 1994 vol 554 col 1397) opined that “I cannot resist 
commenting that I find it odd that in a largely Christian assembly very few people seem to 
think that moving on into the next life might be rather a good idea”. 
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the only religious representative, particularly the Catholic faith, in the Walton Committee, 
yet he based his opposition primarily on secular idea and promotion of palliative care. 
There is a clearly a very significant decrease in inclusion of religion especially the Walton 
Committee. Opposition continues due to assisted suicide and euthanasia not being 
differentiated and the terms used interchangeably. Furthermore, increase in secularism and 
multiculturalism has led to this debate to become non-religious and there is a clear 
detachment of religion. 
 
It can be concluded that the movement to reform the law on assisted dying significantly 
diminished after the 1969 Bill and resurfaced after the Walton Committee of 1993-4’s 
findings; the Bland case in 1993, which recognised Anthony Bland’s right to be free from 
unwanted medical treatment that prolonged his life and allowed his feeding-tube to be 
removed, resulting in his death;828 the Pretty case in 2001;829 and the Re B case in 2002 
where a 41-year-old mentally competent woman with paralysis had her autonomous 
decision respected by having her ventilator switched off leading to her death.830 These 
events and cases revived the movement to reform the law, which led to a series of Bills, 
which reached policy-makers in 2003. 
 
6.3 Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill 2003 
Lord Joel Joffe introduced the “Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill” in 2003, in the House of 
Lords, which sought to allow physician assisted euthanasia at the voluntary request of a 
mentally competent adult who was in unbearable suffering from a terminal or incurable and 
progressive illness.831 Physicians would have been allowed to administer lethal injections to 
end the life of their patients. The Bill was debated in June 2003, but did not proceed beyond 
a second reading, predominantly due to religious opposition from both Christian and 
minority faiths.832 																																																								
828 Bland (n 821) 
829 Discussed in greater detail in ch 5 
830 Re B (n 61) 
831 For a list of definitions used throughout this thesis, refer to ch 1. The decision of the 
House of Lords reflected the popular opinion of doctors around that time, see: Carr (n 223) 
323. For a detailed discussion around this 2003 poll, refer to section 6.3.2. 
832 McLean, Assisted Dying (n 1) 147. For discussion on all the Bills introduced by Lord 
Joffe: L Wayne Sumner, Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law (OUP 2011) 142. 
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6.3.1 Religious Opposition to the 2003 Bill 
Based on the evidence found in the Parliamentary debates, it is contended here that the 
Christian faith remained opposed to allowing euthanasia.833 For example, Baroness Thomas 
of Walliswood opined that “…suicide is wicked and against God’s teaching and that 
therefore helping someone to commit suicide is equally wicked”.834 Similarly, Baroness 
Masham of Ilton noted that “One of the Ten Commandments states: Thou shalt not kill. If 
one believes in the sanctity of life, one cannot consider making the Bill law”.835  
Furthermore, both the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church maintained a 
united stance against euthanasia.836 To this end, the Lord Bishop of Oxford noted that “The 
Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England are totally one on this… assisted death 
is wrong in itself however compassionate the motive behind it might be”.837 
 
Christian doctrine was not the only opposition to a change in the law on euthanasia in the 
2003 debate and the House of Lords ought to “listen carefully to the leaders of the 
Churches and other communities on this issue”.838 Other religious groups also had an 
objection to allowing euthanasia. To this end, Lord Alton of Liverpool noted that: 
 
 
																																																								
833 Other examples of inclusion of Christian faith on the issue, HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 
648: Baroness Richardson of Calow col 1627-1628; Lord Beaumont of Whitley col 1640; 
and Lord Bishop of St Albans col 1654. Other members of the House of Lords also 
discussed the views of the Christian faith: Viscount Craigavon col 1674; Lord Maginnis of 
Drumglass col 1645; and Lord Mowbray and Stourton col 1630. 
834 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1639 
835 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1634 
836 The views of the Catholic Church were also included in the debate, which remained in 
harmony with the Church of England. The Earl of Arran (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 
1668) explained that the Catholic Church, the Church of England and the British Medical 
Association were strongly against the Bill. Other members of the House of Lords also 
discussed the views of the Catholic faith, HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648: Lord St John 
Fawsley col 1593-1594; and Lord Lester of Herne Hill col 1595-1597 
837 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1602 
838 Lord St John Fawsley (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1594). Also see: Lord Tombs 
HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1665 (“That special regard for human life is not 
restricted to Christians; on the contrary it is shared by most established religions and it 
forms an essential part of our legal system and of our way of life”). 
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…the views of which we certainly should not simply dispose of… including the 
most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of 
Westminster, the Chief Rabbi, Dr Jonathan Sacks, and the Islamic Medical 
Association have urged your Lordships to resist the Bill.839  
 
It is submitted here that even though, in recent years, there has been a shift in public 
attitudes, which now views non-religious values such as autonomy and dignity as being 
more common and shared between different religious and non-religious groups and ought 
to drive public debates on various issues, religion should not be excluded from these 
debates. Inclusion is necessary as religion is a vital ingredient in society since so many 
people and cultures are influenced by it. Thus, inclusion of religion leads to a fair and equal 
debate and congruent society.840 It is further submitted here that Lord Alton’s suggestion 
indicates that with pluralism being much more prominent in multicultural English society, 
the views of various minority religions were increasingly being included. For example, the 
views of the Islamic faith were extensively included in the debate. Lord Ahmed quoted 
numerous verses of the Quran on the issues of suicide and euthanasia. However, he went on 
to note that: 
 
I received only one letter from a Muslim urging me to oppose the Bill on the 
grounds of my religious beliefs… [The] reason why Muslims have not been writing 
to me over this religious and moral issue is that we have no choice in the matter. As 
Muslims, we believe that life is sacred and that only God, the creator of all, is the 
owner of life… No doctor, judge, MP, or Lord can give any ruling to end the life of 
any innocent human being. That is why in Islam and in all Holy Scriptures 
euthanasia and assisted suicide are prohibited... I believe 30,000 Muslim doctors 
and health professionals along with millions of British people would agree with me 
that life is precious and that, in spite of all the pain and suffering one experiences, 
only God can make the decision of cure or death.841 
 																																																								
839 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1615 
840 However, inclusion of religion and a reform of the law, on assisted suicide, are not 
mutually exclusive. 
841 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1641-1642 
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Lord Ahmed’s statement indicates that even with an increasingly prominent presence 
within English society,842 Muslim individuals do not engage in the debate on assisted 
dying. It is contended here that this lack of engagement of Muslim individuals can be 
attributed to three reasons. Firstly, assisted suicide and euthanasia are against the religion 
and deeply rooted within its tenets, which have been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Three.843 Secondly, the notion of individual autonomy is a deciding factor in this debate. It 
is a matter to be decided solely by the individual who seeks an assisted death based on their 
conscience: an individual, who opposes assisted dying on the grounds of their religion, has 
the choice to not request assistance. Lastly, unlike the Church of England and the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Islamic community does not have a head or leader to represent and 
voice the values and views of the religion. However, Muslim groups such as campaigners 
and pressure groups engage in the public debate on euthanasia. For example, the Islamic 
pressure group, “Pro-Life Muslims”, who campaign in favour of preserving the sanctity of 
life, explicitly stated that they were against the 2003 Bill: “…we hope all Muslims do write 
to their MPs and to the Lords to drop this inhumane barbaric euthanasia Bill”.844 It is 
further contended here that charities and institutions such as the Muslim Council of Britain 
and the British Islamic Medical Association sometimes attempt to present a collective 
opinion of the Islamic community in England but one is merely an umbrella representative 
for schools and mosques in Britain and the other provides networking opportunities for 
Muslim healthcare professionals and students respectively. The Islamic community does 
not have religious representatives or institutions that can issue official statements or even 
change or reinterpret the position of the religion – in the same manner that the Archbishop 
can for the Church of England or the Pope for the Catholic Church – on issues such as 
assisted dying. Thus, with limited, intermittent representation the role of the Islamic 
religion tends to be significantly restricted. However, with society being highly pluralistic, 																																																								
842 For discussion on multiculturalism, refer to ch 3 
843 For a detailed discussion on the views of the Islamic faith on suicide and assisted dying, 
see ch 2. Also note that the Islamic Medical Association was formed in order “to inform 
[Muslim doctors and students] about the Islamic view on different medical Ethic issues”. 
For a detailed discussion on the aims and objectives of this Assosciation: A Majid Katme, 
‘Islamic Medical Association – UK’ < http://www.islamicmedicine.org/imaUK.doc > 
accessed 21 May 2017 
844 A Majid Katme (Pro-Life Muslims: Muslims Campaign For the Sanctity of Life)  
<www.prolifemuslims.com/ISLAM%20AND%20EUTHANASIA.asp> accessed 21 May 2017 
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campaigners, charities, institutions and even individuals of the Islamic faith occasionally 
submitting evidence and responding to governmental policies and actions, the Islamic 
community does receive some inclusion and representation within policy-making and 
public debates on issues such as assisted dying and the religious sentiment and opposition, 
of the Islamic community, to this issue remains unchanged.845 
 
It is concluded that the theological opposition to euthanasia remains; and with the increase 
in secularism and pluralism within English society, minority religious views were being 
included in the debate along with those of the Christian faith. However, unlike the 1936 and 
1969 Bills, the paramount opposition to allowing euthanasia is not religious objection. 
Instead, the basis of rejecting the Bill was as follows: whether there was a sufficient 
amount of safeguards in the Bill for all the individuals involved in the process,846 altering 
the doctor-patient relationship,847 and the slippery slope argument.848 Furthermore, it is 
submitted that there is an increasing prominence of secular, non-religious views; which 
																																																								
845 Hassan Chamsi-Pasha and Mohammed Ali Albar, ‘Assisted dying: law and practice 
around the world’ BMJ 2015, 351:h4481. Also see: Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 
‘Muslim Council Responds to Assisted Dying Bill’ (17 July 2014) 
<http://www.mcb.org.uk/muslim-council-responds-to-assisted-dying-bill/> accessed 21 
May 2017 
846 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648: Baroness Howells of St Davids col 1592; Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill col 1597; Baroness Finlay of Llandaff col 1599; Lord Philips of Sudbury col 
1605-1606; Baroness Masham of Ilton (col 1634) who opined that “Many disabled people 
throughout the country feel threatened by the Bill”; and Lord Neil of Bladen (col 1658) 
who argued that “…the enactment of the Bill will by itself create that sense of a duty to die 
in old and vulnerable people”. In contrast: Baroness Young of Old Scone (HL Deb 06 June 
2003 vol 648 col 1646), who felt that the Bill was “…surrounded by careful safeguards, 
checks and balances against misuse” and the Lord Bishop of Oxford (HL Deb 06 June 2003 
vol 648 col 1600) argued that “I recognise that the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord 
Joffe, has a number of important safeguards”. 
847 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648: Lord Lester of Herne Hill (col 1595) who opined that 
“…doctors and nurses should not be under any duty or coercive pressure to do anything to 
which they have a conscientious objection”; Lord Bishop of Oxford col 1600; Lord 
Brennan col 1610-11; Lord Patten col 1612; Lord Alton of Liverpool col 1616; and 
Baroness Flather col 1663. In contrast: Lord Chalfont (col 1644) who opined that “[The 
Bill] provides robust safeguards against abuse and carefully protects the doctor-patient 
relationship”. 
848 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648: Baroness Wilkins col 1661; Lord Bridges col 1659; and 
Lord Taverne Deb col 1626 
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increasingly dictate public opinion on this issue.849 As the next section establishes, this 
prominence of a secular viewpoint led to non-religious values being extensively discussed, 
and even prioritised over theological doctrine, in the 2003 debate. 
 
6.3.2 Non-Religious, Secular Opposition to the 2003 Bill 
The debate clearly establishes that secular values were beginning to fuel this debate, and, 
thus, needed to be included in the Parliamentary discussions. Baroness Warnock explained 
that: 
 
…the arguments derived from religious beliefs should be kept to one side in this 
debate. Of course those who have beliefs derived from their religion… which would 
prohibit the legitimising of assisted death, should not be compelled either to accept 
such assistance or to proffer it… But it seems to me that the law should be based not 
on religious beliefs, but on a concept of morality separate from any particular 
religion… for many people their morality is derived from their religion. But for 
many, morality is essentially secular. It is this secular path that the law must 
follow.850  
 
As traced throughout this chapter, and will follow in this chapter, religion is a significant 
phenomenon that has historically, and continues to, play an important role in public debates 
and policy making on various issues. However, the public perception and attitude has 
changed over the years, due to the influence of multiculturalism and secularism, which now 
views non-religious, secular values as being more homogenous and shared between 
individuals and different communities. These common secular values are the reason behind 
increasingly less importance being placed on religious tenets. Furthermore, Baroness 
Warnock’s explanation indicates that in order to avoid giving one religion preference over 
the other, and to maintain neutrality and objectivity, Members of Parliament chose to 																																																								
849 For discussion on secularism in British society, refer to ch 3 
850 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1608. In contrast: Lord Bishop of St Albans (HL Deb 
06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1653) opined that British society was not secular. Also see: Lord 
Ahmed (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1642) felt that “Even if we put aside religious 
faith-based arguments to oppose the Bill, and just look at morals and ethics, we can still 
come to the conclusion. 
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express their opinions using a secular, non-religious viewpoint. The secular values that 
fuelled the debate 2003 Bill were as follows. Firstly, the principle of compassion was 
beginning to influence the debate on assisted death. There are arguments, based on the 
notion of compassion, against and in favour of reform. The principle of compassion is often 
limited in order to protect vulnerable individuals and avoid the risk of an unwanted death, 
and even protects doctors from unfair prosecution.851 However, other members of the 
House of Lords viewed compassion as a value that completely fuels the debate;852 and this 
paramount principle should dictate the law.853 Compassion is the most significant value that 
justifies the permissibility of allowing an assisted death for terminally ill patients in order 
to relieve them of their suffering.854 However, as will be discussed later in this chapter,855 
the notion of compassion has no legal grounding; and a change in the law can only be based 
on the notion of autonomy, thus, it takes over compassion as the most significant non-
religious principle on which the law can be reformed. 
 
Secondly, various members of the House of Lords opined that autonomy is a fundamental 
right, which allows individuals to choose the time and manner or their death. It is accepted 
here that it is the central value in support of reforming the law on assisted dying, on which 
a reform of the law can be based. To this end, Baroness Jay of Paddington stated that 
“…the role of individual autonomy in making decisions is fundamental… the individual 
human right to choose should be paramount”.856 However, the majority of members of the 
House of Lords argued that autonomy cannot be used as a basis to allow assisted dying: 																																																								
851 The limitations to the notion of compassion were discussed in the House of Lords: Lord 
Bishop of St Albans (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1653) “In the name of compassion 
the Bill could – not necessarily would – create a merciless society”; Lord Philips of 
Sudbury (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1605); and Baroness Greengross (HL Deb 06 
June 2003 vol 648 col 1651). 
852 Baroness Finlay of Llandaff HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1598 (“…this important 
debate is driven on all sides by compassion”). 
853 Baroness Warnock HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1608 (“morality of compassion… 
must be paramount and dictate what the law should allow”). 
854 Mary Hayden Lemmons, ‘Compassion and the Personalism of American Jurisprudence: 
Bioethics Entailments’ in Christopher Tollefsen (ed), Bioethics with Liberty and Justice: 
Themes in the Work of Joseph M Boyle (Springer 2011) 59 
855 Refer to Section 6.6.5 
856 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1604. Lord Alexander of Weedon HL Deb 06 June 
2003 vol 648 col 1622 held a similar opinion. 
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even though every individual has a right to choose; this right is not absolute and needs to be 
restricted in order to protect the rights and beliefs of other individuals or groups in 
society.857 To this end, Hamel argues: 
 
In such proposals [to allow assisted dying particularly active euthanasia]… we 
confront but another manifestation of our growing incapacity to recognize the 
demands of human solidarity, which can require sacrifice of individual autonomy to 
protect others from being brutally constrained to kill themselves or to ask others to 
kill them.858 
 
It is submitted that this argument is partly accurate: certain rights of an individual must be 
limited in order to protect other individuals and communities within the state. However, it 
does not take into consideration that autonomy is the notion, which allows individual to 
make decisions about their life, and even how and when to end it. Furthermore, allowing 
individuals to be able to exercise their right to self-determination, by having their 
autonomous decision to end life respected, is the most important value on which a reform 
of the law can be based, as long as the decision is an informed, settled and fully thought out 
one. Thus, the state should allow individuals to make their own decisions and choose which 
values inform those decisions, provided there are safeguards to protect them (and every 
other citizen) including the main safeguard by distinguishing between assisted suicide and 
euthanasia and only allowing the former. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
857 The Lord Alton of Liverpool (HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1617) argued that: 
“Autonomy is one of the buzzwords of the pro-euthanasia lobby and can clearly be seen in 
the wording of the Bill. However, autonomy is not an absolute right that each of us, as 
individuals, can exercise while living in our own little bubbles”. Also see: Lord Brennan 
HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1609. The majority of members of the House of Lords 
argued that autonomy cannot be used as a basis to allow assisted dying: Baroness Finlay of 
Llandaff HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1598; and The Lord Bishop of St Albans HL 
Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1652-1653 
858 Ronald Hamel,  Choosing Death: Active Euthanasia, Religion, and the Public Debate 
(Trinity Press International 1991) 111 
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Thirdly, the notion of human dignity was another principle included in the debate on the 
2003 Bill.859 The medical symptoms and manifestations of a terminal illness are generally 
the reason behind a loss of dignity.860 Individuals slowly lose control of their physical and 
mental abilities and functions and become helpless and completely dependent on others to 
look after them.861 Being in such a state of helplessness and incapacity is an undignified 
and degrading condition for them. Not being able to have an autonomous decision 
respected, to end life to stop this degradation and suffering, is the ultimate loss of 
dignity.862 Baroness Andrews accurately summarised the minority position of the members 
of House of Lords, who supported the Bill, as follows: “[The Bill] upholds the moral 
principle of autonomy by supporting the concept of choice; it upholds the human value of 
dignity; and it sets out some protections for individuals”.863 Thus, it is argued that human 
dignity dictates that life should not be prolonged and individuals – who conscientiously, 
autonomously and voluntarily choose to end life – should not be forced to continue to live 
what they perceive to be an undignified life.864 It is further argued that human dignity can 
only be preserved through allowing individuals to make autonomous decisions; by being 
released from a life that the individual perceives to be intolerable and undignified.865 To 
this end Biggs rightly notes that “in order to preserve their autonomy and dignity” they 
wish to have their “independent thought, will and action [which is] fundamental to 
autonomy and human dignity” applied by “seeking release from a life they perceive as 
intolerable and choosing to bring about their own death [and] shaping their own destiny”.866 
 
Lastly, as Rae argues, “the value of life and recognition of the intrinsic dignity of the 
human person are clearly linked”.867 This notion was included in the 2003 debate: the 
notion of value of life was viewed to be closely linked to that of human dignity. To this 																																																								
859 For discussion on Human Dignity; refer to chs 2 and 5. 
860 Lord Gary of Contin HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1649 and Lord Laing of Dunhill 
HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1638 who supported this notion. 
861 Herring (n 458) 520 
862 Lord Alexander of Weedon HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1622-1623 
863 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1686 
864 Barilan (n 812) 187-188 
865 Biggs (n 27) 106 
866 ibid 
867 Scott Rae, ‘The Language of Human Dignity in the Abortion Debate’ in Dilley and 
Palpant (n 241) 225 
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end, Lord Goodhart accurately noted that even though he did not have a religious belief or 
view life as a gift from God, life has immense value: 
 
However… when life becomes so burdened by suffering that that has no value to 
them and there is no prospect that it ever will have. For those people the greatest 
kindness is to help them to die, and that withholding that help is unkind. I do not 
believe that providing that help in strictly defined and limited circumstances, and 
with proper safeguards, should be a crime.868 
 
However, the decision to not change the law reflected the popular opinion of doctors at the 
time. For example, in a poll conducted around the time of the Bill, 74% of doctors stated 
that they would not perform assisted deaths even if they were allowed. The importance of 
this poll lies in the fact that the 2003 Bill sought to allow physician assisted euthanasia, 
where doctors would be carrying out all the actions that led to the death of the patient. 
Since another individual, even if it is a healthcare professional, is the one carrying out the 
final action in the process of euthanasia, which as explained in Section 1.3 and throughout 
this chapter, carries a risk of the slippery slope effect coming into play and is seen as 
intentional killing, thus, it can never be morally justified. For the assisted death to be truly 
autonomous and voluntary, and the only justifiable grounds on which is can be allowed by 
the law, is when the individual who seeks it always performs the final action that ends life. 
If a consistent, unchanging, informed and autonomous decision can be separated from 
mental illness; individuals ought to have access to a lawful option of assisted suicide. 
 
It is concluded that the opposition to making assisted dying permissible was not only based 
on theological doctrine but also secular values.869 Compassion, autonomy and dignity 
(which is entwined with the notion of value of life) were the main values that fuelled the 
debate. The idea of value of life was on par with the religious doctrine of sanctity of life, 
																																																								
868 HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1614. Other Members of the House of Lords also held 
similar views: Baroness Young of Old Scone HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1647; and 
Lord Russell-Johnston HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648 col 1633-1634. 
869 Mary Warnock and Elisabeth Macdonald, Easeful Death: Is there a case for assisted 
dying? (OUP 2008) 66 
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thus, both of them received equal consideration in the 2003 Bill.870 The need to uphold the 
value of life (whether based on religious or non-religious conceptions) and protect 
vulnerable individuals ultimately led to the Bill being defeated.871 
 
6.4 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004 
In light of the Parliamentary debates, Lord Joffe revised the 2003 Bill and reintroduced it as 
the “Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill” the next year.872 This Bill would have 
allowed doctors to provide both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.873 A Second 
Reading was delayed as this Bill was referred to the House of Lords Select Committee that 
produced a Report in April 2005.874 
 
The main findings of the Select Committee were as follows. There was a need to 
distinguish between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, with the latter to be given 
preference for legislation due to assisted suicide being where slippery slope cannot come 
into affect, is not seen as intentional killing and the final action is always taken by the 
individual who requests it and not another person, which acts as a safeguard from unwanted 
death. The Committee recommended that assisted suicide should only be made available to 
a select group of people, namely terminally ill patients who have a clear, informed and 
																																																								
870 For discussion on value of life, refer to ch 2 
871 The majority of the members of the Lords opined that allowing assisted death – even if 
an individual is mentally or physically suffering – would weaken the moral fabric of 
society and diminish the intrinsic value of life. See: HL Deb 06 June 2003 vol 648: Lord 
Alton of Liverpool (col 1616); Baroness Jay (col 1604) “I do strongly believe that the 
unique value of each individual human life should be respected”; Lord Alexander of 
Weedom col 1629; and Baroness Greengross col 1650. Other members of the Lords also 
felt that allowing assisted dying would decimate the value of life: Lord Plant of Highfield 
col 1619-1620; Lord Bishop of St Albans col 1654; and Lord Gary of Contin col 1648. 
872 Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The impact of 
criminal law concepts on euthanasia and assisted suicide (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
171; James Davey and John Coggon, ‘Life assurance and consensual death: law making for 
the rationally suicidal’ (2006) 65(3) CLJUK 521, 522; and Hazel Biggs, ‘The Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004: will English law soon allow patients the choice to 
die?’ (2005) 12(1) EJHL 43 
873 Sumner (n 832) 142 
874 Select Committee 2005 (n 826); Margaret Brazier and Emma Cave, Medicine, Patients 
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settled intention to end life.875 Furthermore, a significant number of other safeguards 
needed to be included in the Bill, including having considered the option of palliative care, 
establishing which patients would be allowed to have access to the option of ending life 
(for example, excluding patients with mental disorders) and the actions that would 
authorise a doctor to provide assistance.876 
 
The Select Committee received responses from various religious leaders and individuals. 
For example, the Chief Rabbi and the Archbishops of Canterbury and Westminster 
explained the importance of the doctrine of sanctity of life and the need to retain the 
criminal embargo in order to preserve it.877 Furthermore, a Muslim doctor, Khalid Hameed, 
also submitted oral evidence explaining that: 
 
In Islamic bioethics, the physician has… no right to terminate human life… To 
legalise assisted suicide, that is euthanasia, will lead to direct or indirect coercion of 
terminal patients to express a wish to die. Legislation would place unfair 
psychological pressure on all ill patients… [who] may be pressured to terminate 
[their] feeling that they are a burden to society and… family and friends… Hence, 
personal autonomy must give way to the interest of the society at large.878 
 
It should be noted here that the terms assisted suicide and euthanasia were used 
interchangeably in Mr Hameed’s submission. This denotes a lack of understanding of the 
significant difference between the two concepts. As explained earlier in this chapter, 
assisted suicide is generally always voluntary, with exception of susceptibility through 
mental pressure or coercion, as the individual who seeks the assistance to end their life 
takes the final action. However, even with safeguards, euthanasia is when another person 
assists that individual – for example, through actively injecting them with lethal medication 
to end their life – and there is a risk of the ‘slippery slope’ coming into effect and 																																																								
875 Select Committee 2005 (n 826) 7 
876 ibid 7 
877 Warnock and Macdonald (n 869) 66-68 
878 Select Committee on Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (Minutes of Evidence, 
13 January 2005) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/5011304.htm> 
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individuals being given unwanted deaths. Thus, assisted suicide only affects the individual 
seeking the assistance whereas euthanasia can affect every person within a community who 
is terminally ill, elderly or vulnerable and, thus, may be at risk of being prematurely killed 
off. 
 
Even though the theological debate was not an extensive one, the Select Committee gave 
significant consideration to various religions (and non-religious views) in the report. The 
main finding of the Select Committee was that values such as individual autonomy needed 
to make way for the value of human life, whether on religious or secular grounds, which 
needed to be prioritised and preserved. The value and sanctity of life was the paramount 
principle against the reform of the law. To this end, the Select Committee noted that: 
 
It was clear from the evidence which we took from representatives of religious 
organisations… that many people believe that life is God-given and cannot in 
consequence be terminated by others, even on request. For them the sanctity of 
human life is a concept which is closely linked with religious convictions… 
however… there is also a secular version of this principle… Human life is… special 
and to be treated with care. Intentional killing is not something any of us should be 
taking lightly, whether we are religious or not.879 
 
The Select Committee also noted the antithetical argument used in favour of allowing 
reform, which was accurately explained by Professor Blackburn as follows: “the sanctity of 
life is actually honoured when we give due weight to human suffering, human dignity and 
human self-determination”.880 Based on this argument, it is submitted that the value of 
human life is subjective: the individual uses the non-religious or religious beliefs they hold 
to decide its worth and quality and whether or not to end or preserve life.881 The doctrine of 
sanctity of life is not an absolute principle: respecting an individual’s choice, by 
																																																								
879 Select Committee 2005 (n 826) p 24 
880 ibid 
881 For discussion on autonomy, refer to chs 2 and 5. 
	 198	
acknowledging their pain and indignity, which they need to end, upholds the modern 
understanding of sanctity of life.882 
 
6.5 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2005 
Lord Joffe revised the 2004 Bill, in light of the Select Committee’s findings, and presented 
it in the House of Lords in November 2005.883 This Bill sought to legalise physician-
assisted suicide, and not active euthanasia, for terminally ill patients (to avoid the slippery 
slope effect and to ensure autonomy and voluntariness in the process). The Bill would have 
allowed doctors to prescribe lethal medication, or set up equipment to allow patients to self-
administer medication, to end their own life.884 It is submitted here that the change in these 
Bills from seeking to allow euthanasia to physician-assisted suicide was based on the Select 
Committees findings in 2004 that it was paramount to distinguish between assisted suicide 
and euthanasia, with the former given preference for legislation. As explained in Chapter 
One, assisted suicide is always voluntary as the final action that ends life is taken by the 
individual who seeks the assistance (as opposed to euthanasia where another person takes 
that action and there is the risk of the slippery-slope coming into effect).885 
 
With the inclusion and submission from religious groups, especially minorities, being 
subdued or even absent, this Bill met with an unprecedented response from six faith groups 
– Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and Buddhists – who collectively published an 
open letter to Parliament regarding their opposition to changing the law on assisted suicide 
and euthanasia.886 The letter largely had neutral, non-religious language. It is submitted that 
																																																								
882 For discussion on the changing conception of sanctity of life, refer to chs 2, 5 and 6. 
883 David Price, ‘What shape to euthanasia after Bland? Historical, contemporary and 
futuristic paradigms’ (2009) 125(Jan) LQR 142, 144. Lord Joffe failed to incorporate a 
number of key suggestions made by the Committee. As the revised Bill stood, individuals 
with impaired judgment could misguidedly request assistance and would be at a risk of 
abuse if physicians failed or chose not to report the cases. See: Keown, Law and Ethics of 
Medicine (n 226) 269 
884 House of Lords, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [HL Bill 36 – 54/1] 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/036/2006036.pdf> accessed 21 
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885 Refer to Section 1.3 
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this was an attempt to relate to individuals, not only from Christian and Islamic 
backgrounds, but also individuals who subscribe to a secular school of thought and to relate 
to society at large. The Bishop of Southwark, Church of England,887 the Catholic 
Archbishop of Cardiff,888 The General Director of the Evangelical Alliance, which is the 
largest and oldest body representing evangelical Christians in the United Kingdom,889 and 
the Chair of the Muslim Law Sharia Council,890 personally signed the letter. 
 
The faith groups raised five issues. Firstly, countries that have legalised euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide, such as Holland, are experiencing abuse of the system.891 For 
example, patients with manageable psychiatric disorders were receiving lethal 
medication.892 Secondly, medical opposition to allowing assisted suicide has increased in 
recent years and health care professionals, particularly doctors, have refused to be involved 
in the process.893 Thirdly, opinion polls, which demonstrate that a large majority of citizens 
would favour a change in law on assisted suicide are misleading; as they simplify very 
complex questions without providing any other options of explanatory context.894 Fourthly, 
instead of allowing access to an assisted death, patients should be given access to palliative 
care, which has advanced enough to greatly relieve the suffering of patients.895 
Furthermore, the expeditious advances being made in palliative care, which significantly 
diminish the suffering of patients, are done in an effort to preserve human life. To this end, 
Cohen-Allmagor, argues that “Good palliative care enables people to continue living and 
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coping with suffering without opting for euthanasia”.896  However, it is submitted that this 
argument does not take into consideration that there are a handful of patients, with certain 
diseases, who are irresponsive to palliative care and the only way to end their pain and 
suffering is through receiving an assisted suicide. It is further submitted that since patients 
with psychiatric disorders or mental illnesses can easily be separated from individuals who 
have an informed, autonomous and constant wish to end life; the very small number of 
individuals who are mentally competent and not under any pressure or coercion, have an 
informed and constant wish to seek an assisted suicide (as every individual with a disease 
or illness would not utilise such as option) and are unresponsive to palliative care ought to 
be allowed to receive assistance in ending their lives. 
 
The last issue raised by the faith groups was that allowing “Assisted suicide and euthanasia 
will radically change the social air we all breathe by severely undermining respect for 
life”.897 All the religions were in agreement that the main value that fuelled their opposition 
to reforming the law was the value of human life, which has both religious and secular 
grounding. The wording used did not have an inherently religious underpinning: it can be 
seen as sacred and having an intrinsic respect and worth (instead of a religious sanctity) 
attached to it.898 To this end, the faith groups stated that, “We… hold all human life to be 
sacred and worthy of the utmost respect”.899 However, it is submitted here that the value of 
human life is subjective and its worth can only be decided by the terminally ill patient (who 
can choose to preserve or end life). 
 
It is concluded that historically, the debate on assisted dying was largely influenced by 
religious values, particularly those of the Christian faith due to its deep-seated ties with 
England. However, over the years, with the influence of multiculturalism and secularism in 
society, there has been a steady decline of religious influence in this debate and secular 
values, which society perceives to be much more common and shared in a highly pluralistic 
and increasingly secular country. There has been intermittent inclusion of religious tenets in 																																																								
896 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: The Policy and Practice of 
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the Lord Joffe Bills and an incident of unprecedented opposition from religious groups. 
However, this opposition was based on secular values and was written entirely in non-
theological language in an attempt to relate to society at large, not just the religious groups 
whose representatives opposed the 2005 Bill. The next section critically reviews the extent 
and role of faith, and non-religious principles, in the Parliamentary debate in 2005. 
 
6.5.1 Parliamentary Debates on the 2005 Bill 
This Bill was a modified version of the 2004 Bill, was the third “assisted dying” Bill that 
Lord Joffe had tabled in the House of Lords in three years. It sought to allow mentally 
capable adults with an unchanging and consistent wish to die, who had unbearable pain 
from a terminal illness to receive a physician-assisted suicide (and not euthanasia). It 
received a Second reading in the House of Lords on the 12th of May 2006. Parliament 
debated this Bill for almost eight hours and more than ninety Members spoke on various 
ethical, social, medical, religious and non-religious issues that surrounded this Bill. When 
introducing the Bill, Lord Joffe explained that: 
 
The current law has the following defects. It results in unnecessary suffering by a 
significant number of terminally ill patients who are denied the right to end their 
suffering by ending their lives and the right, as they see it, to die with dignity. It is 
ignored by some caring doctors who, from time to time, moved by compassion, 
accede to persistent requests by suffering patients to end their lives. That results in 
grave risks to those doctors’ careers, reputations and possibly freedom. It is also 
ignored by loved ones who face a terrible emotional burden when helping with such 
a request. It places patients at risk of making spontaneous and ill formed decisions 
to end their lives. It influences patients with progressive physical diseases to end 
their lives earlier than they need to… because they fear that at a later stage they may 
not be physically able to do that. Finally, it results in patients leaving the United 
Kingdom to die lonely deaths at Dignitas in Zurich, without any legislative 
safeguards whatever.900 
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It is submitted here that Lord Joffe accurately encapsulated why there was a need to change 
the law. Firstly, even though the number of terminally ill patients is very significant, not all 
of them would seek an assisted death. Only a small number of these patients want the 
option to end their undignified life. Clearly, the notion of dignity continued to play an 
important role in this debate in 2006; as some patients who are terminally ill and 
unresponsive to treatment and palliative care, may feel their quality of life is deplorable due 
to their physical incapacity, dependency on their carers to do everyday tasks, and 
subsequently feel that their autonomy and dignity are compromised. The only way to 
restore their dignity is by providing them with a right to self-determine the time and manner 
of their death with a lawful option to end their undignified life. Secondly, not having a 
lawful option of assisted suicide leads to family members, friends and healthcare 
professionals providing the assistance in an unregulated manner, with no legal safeguards 
whatsoever that subsequently endanger the individual who provides the assistance and 
makes them vulnerable to emotional distress and even prosecution. Lastly, individuals, who 
are able to afford to go to Dignitas in Switzerland, prematurely end their lives – whilst they 
are still physically capable to travel in order to avoid putting their loved ones at risk of 
prosecution – in a foreign country without their family or friends around them. 
 
However, the majority of Members in the House of Lords did not share Lord Joffe’s 
opinion. For example, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who was an expert in the field of palliative 
care, opined that palliative treatment, available in Britain, was very advanced and “capable 
of meeting every need discussed in these debates”.901 Other Members, for example, Lord 
Wilson of Dinton stated that “it is much better to put effort into palliative care, which is a 
very positive approach to the end of life, rather than bring forward death”.902 Similarly, 
Lord Clement-Jones agreed that the way forward was through: 
 
…the development of high-quality palliative care, pioneered by the hospice 
movement in this country, in which we are now world leaders. We should not 
extend patient autonomy for a few by a dramatic change in medical ethics and 
																																																								
901 ibid Col 1192 
902 ibid Col 1229 
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practice, which could be detrimental to the many.903 
 
It is argued here that whilst palliative care was, and continues to be, a widely available and 
very effective option for the majority of patients, there is still a small number of patients 
who are unresponsive to palliative treatment and want to exercise their right to self-
determination by choosing the time and manner of their death. A lawful option of 
assistance ending their life as it is the only way to end their pain, suffering and indignity. 
To this end, Baroness Jay of Paddington, who was in the minority who supported this Bill, 
stated that “the vast majority of terminally ill patients can be helped by palliative care; for 
the minority, they may experience either intractable suffering or simply prefer to end their 
lives”.904 
 
The majority of the House of Lords clearly preferred to promote and further develop access 
to palliative care rather than allow assisted deaths. Clearly, assisted dying was seen to be “a 
complete ethical nightmare” as it causes serious concerns amongst vulnerable people – 
especially the elderly and disabled – who fear that they will be given unwanted deaths.905 
To this end, Lord St John of Fawsley stated that, “The trouble is that the Bill would open 
the way to abuse by the greedy and the acquisitive and bring pressure on those who are at 
their most vulnerable”.906 Lord Phillips of Sudbury further explained that the Bill would 
exert pressure “unintentionally though inescapably… on many vulnerable people to avail 
themselves of assisted suicide to avoid being a burden on their families or dissipating 
scarce resources”.907 
 
 																																																								
903 ibid Col 1210. Also see: Baroness Williams of Crosby (HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 
Col 1201); and Lord Elton (HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1213). 
904 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1195. Also see: Baroness Greengross HL Deb 12 
May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1240 (“Most people do not suffer if they receive good, 
comprehensive palliative care. That is why I support it so strongly. However, we know that 
a minority do not. For them, this Bill, were it an Act, would bring a sense of security and 
the knowledge that, if necessary, they can call on help. For most people, that knowledge is 
all they need”). 
905 As per Lord Carlile HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1192 
906 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1196 
907 ibid Col 1214 
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It is contended here that protecting vulnerable people remained a significant concern, which 
is present in every debate in relation to assisted dying. Even though “the vulnerability is 
very real”;908 it is possible to safeguard vulnerable individuals through tightening up 
legislation, including a number of safeguards such as only allowing assisted suicide 
(instead of euthanasia) in limited circumstances where the terminally ill patient has an 
informed, autonomous, voluntary and consistent wish to end life that can be separated from 
temporary depression or long term mental illness. It is further contended that not every 
disabled or elderly person is vulnerable nor being terminally ill make a patient vulnerable 
or more susceptible to coercion or pressure.909 Furthermore, only a handful of terminally ill 
patients would want to access the option to receive assistance in ending their life. However, 
the majority of the House of Lords were not convinced and Lord Tombs’ statement 
accurately summarised the position of the House on this issue: 
 
In seeking to change the law in order to help a small number of people to end their 
lives voluntarily within the law, they will imperil many others by creating a 
presumption that life has become worthless, or inconvenient to others, as a means of 
inducement to end their lives. That seems to me quite indefensible. Coercive 
pressures could change measures intended to be caring into aggressive ones against 
the terminally ill, the aged and the handicapped, who would rightly feel threatened 
in a way that no civilised society should accept. I believe that that argument alone is 
sufficient reason to reject the Bill.910 
 
It should be noted here that even though this Bill sought to allow physician-assisted suicide, 
because of its title, it was viewed as legalising assisted dying, an umbrella term for all 
forms of euthanasia and assisted suicide. To this end, Baroness Finlay of Llandaff noted 
that: 
 
 																																																								
908 As per Lord Elton HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1213 
909 Lord Ashley of Stoke HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1198 (“The public often 
misunderstand disability… but they surely cannot be so stupid as to believe that Britain's 11 
million disabled people are terminally ill”.) 
910 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1212 
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The Bill is not called “Assisted Suicide” for good reason, because that takes us to 
the very brink of euthanasia in one fell swoop. Doctors could supply a lethal 
overdose, which is assisted suicide in the Oregon law. But what are the alternate 
means, undefined in this Bill, by which those drugs could be taken? The doctor is 
not required to be present, so who knows whether the patient actually took the drugs 
themselves or was euphemistically “helped” by someone else? How could 
malpractice be proven if the principal witnesses were dead or would not come 
forward? The Bill ignores the recommendation that the doctor’s actions be clearly 
set out. As I listen today, there is still no clarity about precisely what “assisting to 
die” is… The Bill flies in the face of the committee's recommendation that, “a clear 
distinction should be drawn in any future bill between assisted suicide and 
voluntary euthanasia”.911 
 
It is submitted here that this Bill failed to differentiate between assisted suicide and 
euthanasia. To reiterate the definitions set out in Section 1.3, assisted suicide is when the 
individual takes the final action that ends life, which acts as a safeguard that ensures 
autonomy and voluntariness in the process. On the other hand, voluntary euthanasia is 
when an individual requests assistance and another person takes the final action such as 
administering lethal injections to that individual. The idea of a person ending the life of 
another is viewed as “intentional killing”; where there is potential for the slippery slope to 
be engaged and involuntary or non-voluntary euthanasia being effectuated. Thus, it is 
recommended that assisted suicide, instead of euthanasia, be the preferred method of 
providing the lawful option to end life. This should be made clear in any future Bill 
introduced for the purpose of reforming the law. To this end, Baroness McFarlane of 
Llandaff explained the importance of creating a distinction between these terms: 
 
It is important to look at the definition of euthanasia as a deliberate intervention 
undertaken with the express intention of ending life to relieve intractable suffering. I 
believe too, that the term “passive euthanasia”, which has been so commonly used, 
is misleading. It is important to make those distinctions.912 																																																								
911 ibid Col 1201 
912 HL Deb 09 May 1994 vol 554 col 1364 
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Simply put, due to the nature and process of euthanasia and the extent of involvement of a 
third person in ending the life of another, it is seen as intentional killing and can eventually 
lead to coerced or unwanted deaths. Assisted suicide on the other hand is a very 
individualistic process, where the person who requests it end their life and the risk of 
unwanted deaths is eliminated. Thus, it is vital to understand and promote a distinction 
between these two concepts, as the lack of differentiating between them has arguably been 
one of the reasons the law has not been reformed. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the 
main oppositions to the Bill was the need to protect vulnerable individuals, promote 
palliative care and treatment, the risk of engaging the slippery slope effect due to a lack of 
differentiation between assisted suicide and euthanasia;913 and changing the doctor-patient 
relationship.914 Amongst these objections were also religious and non-religious issues that 
the House of Lords considered in equal detail and are examined in the next section. 
 
6.5.2 Religious and Non-Religious Objections to the 2005 Bill 
Lord Joffe explained that the opposition to his Bill was from a “relatively small number of 
deeply committed Christian worshippers and are the result of a massive political campaign 
by the Churches” and that public opinion, including “about 80% of Christians of all 
denominations support assisted dying”.915 
 
Members who supported this Bill, such as Lord Pearson of Ranch,916 went into significant 
detail about the position of the Christian religion on this issue and argued that there is an 
“exaggerated fear of death” that guides the Christian community’s opposition of this Bill. 
Lord Laing of Dunphail further elaborated by stating that:  
 
 
 																																																								
913 The following Members discussed the slippery slope for and against allowing the Bill, 
HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681: Lord Ashley of Stoke Col 1198; Baroness Williams of 
Crosby Col 1200; Lord Nickson Col 1223; Earl of Glasgow Col 1239; Lord Swinfen Col 
1268; and Lord Patten 81 Col 1199. 
914 As per, HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681: Baroness Williams of Crosby Col 1200; 
Archbishop of Canterbury Col 1197; Lord Nickson Col 1222; and Lord Brennan Col 1236. 
915 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1185-1186 
916 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1215-1216 
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A person contemplating assisted suicide will no doubt bear in mind the views of the 
Church. But I believe that one has a personal relationship with God through Jesus 
Christ. If after prayer one chooses assisted suicide that is a personal decision 
between oneself and one’s maker. We should bear in mind that God gave us free 
will. It is a strange coincidence that we are debating this issue almost four years to 
the day that brave Dianne Pretty died. I, like the majority of the population at the 
time, did not believe that she should have had to suffer the indignity of dying in the 
manner she feared; a manner contrary to all her values. Since then, many others 
have been forced to go on living against their will and I hope that this House will 
have the compassion to spare others the same fate.917 
 
However, the majority of the House disagreed with this position and explained that they 
“believed in the sanctity of human life… the Christian argument”.918 Lord Ahmed even 
presented the views of the Islamic faith on this issue by quoting the Quran and stating that 
Muslims “believe that life is sacred and that only Almighty God, the creator of all, has the 
right and the power to end anyone’s life, even if the patient is old, disabled and terminally 
ill”. It is contended here that the views of the Christian and even Islamic faith received 
inclusion within this debate. Religious language and vocabulary via Biblical and Quranic 
texts was included and various Members of the House took theological standpoints against 
allowing this Bill. Other Members of the House of Lords also noted that there is a “strong 
opposition in principle from those whose ideological – usually religious – beliefs would 
forbid assisted dying”.919 For example, Lord Hayhoe opined that: 
 
There are many arguments against the Bill but for me… the most persuasive have 
been the clear and principled objections of religious leaders – Christian, Jewish, 
Buddhist, Islamic, Hindu, Sikh – who hold all human life to be sacred and worthy 
of the utmost respect. As a… Catholic, I judge the Bill to be ethically and morally 
wrong and my opposition is both principled and total. I will vote against the Bill.920 
 																																																								
917 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1220 
918 As per Lord Nickson HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1222 
919 As per Lord May of Oxford HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1278 
920 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1246 
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Lord Hayhoe’s opinion indicates that the views of various religions are homogenous on this 
issue: they view human life to be sacred and as having immense value that needs to be 
protected under all circumstances. Other Members of the House shared similar opinions by 
arguing that this Bill would not only change “the legal but also the general perception of the 
sanctity of human life”;921 and that in a pluralistic society, a belief in the doctrine of 
sanctity of life may not be shared by all but ignoring this doctrine all together and 
endorsing the view, by allowing this Bill, “that certain kinds of human life are not worth 
living… would bring disastrous risks”.922 Clearly, both the religious and non-religious 
traditional conceptions of the doctrine of sanctity of life (which do not consider it to take on 
quality of life considerations) continued to be a hindrance in the reform of the law. 
 
However, it is argued here that in a multicultural, increasingly secular society with varying, 
competing religious and non-religious beliefs and views, the importance of human rights, 
particularly that of the right to self-determination is increasingly valued. To this end, 
Baroness Jay of Paddington stated that: 
 
However much we may respect the opposition in principle to this Bill from those 
with religious faith and those of us who have a spiritual concern that perhaps may 
not be a formal religious faith, we live today in a diverse and predominantly secular 
society where the importance of individual human rights is increasingly valued. The 
Minister, my noble friend Lord Warner, made the point when winding up our 
previous debate. He also emphasised on that occasion that patient choice is a central 
theme in today’s healthcare.923 
 
Clearly, this debate has moved away from its religious rooting and is now influenced by 
secular values that are shared by society at large such as dignity and autonomy, which are 
grounded in human rights provisions and were discussed in greater detail in the previous 
chapter. Even when introducing the Bill, Lord Joffe explained that “The principle 
underpinning the Bill is one of personal autonomy – the right of each individual to decide 																																																								
921 As per Lord Elton HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1213 
922 As per the Archbishop of Canterbury HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1197 
923 Baroness Jay of Paddington HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1194 
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for himself or herself how best he or she should lead his or her life”.924 Other Members of 
the House of Lords seconded Lord Joffe’s opinion. For example, Baroness David stated 
that “I strongly believe in personal autonomy and the right of individuals to decide when 
and how they die”.925 Lord Desai further built on this argument by explaining that for 
individuals “who are not Christians, Muslims or Jews [and] have a mind of our own… 
[want to exercise their] personal autonomy. I cherish my personal autonomy, and if I were 
to lose it to some religious dogma, I would be very sorry indeed”.926 Lord Desai’s opinion 
is accurate in the sense that individuals who relate with a secular school of thought and do 
not identify with a religious faith ought to be allowed to access a lawful option of assisted 
suicide and a criminal prohibition, which disregards their right to self-determination and 
was historically based on Christian tenets, ought not to be imposed upon them.927 
 
It is submitted that the notion of individual autonomy continued to be one of the most 
important values that influenced this debate in support of assisted suicide. It was however 
perceived as conflicting with the religious and non-religious conceptions of doctrine of 
sanctity of life. Members of the House of Lords who opposed this Bill opined that this 
doctrine was a central value that needed to be preserved in a civilised society and allowing 
a handful of terminally ill patients to exercise their right to self-determination would put the 
lives of every citizen in society at risk and change the moral fabric of society. To this end, 
Lord St John of Fawsley stated that: 
 
There is tremendous interest in this topic simply because the life of a great society 
depends on a common possession of moral principles. If those moral principles 
disappear, the society disappears with them. People are so concerned about this 
issue because, at a time of great moral change and uncertainty, one of the 
fundamental pillars of our society is being shaken.928 
 																																																								
924 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1186 
925 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1203 
926 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1257 
927 Baroness Tonge (HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1256) opined that, “Patients want 
the right to make their own decisions about life and death, and opinion polls reveal that 
80% of the public support that right”. 
928 HL Deb 12 May 2006 Vol 681 Col 1195 
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It can be concluded that the House of Lords appreciated that society is multicultural with 
various religious and non-religious beliefs that led to all their views being included in this 
debate. The views of the Christian faith continued to receive the most inclusion and, due to 
the rise of pluralism in society, the views of the Islamic faith were also included. However, 
the non-religious values that fueled the debate, such as the notion of individual autonomy 
and the competing idea of sanctity or value of life were discussed in significant detail (with 
the latter continuing to be one of the reasons for defeat of this Bill). Thus, even though 
there was a significant amount of public support for a change in the law, the Bill was 
defeated in the House of Lords, in May 2006, by 148 to 100 votes.929 There were three 
main reasons behind the defeat of this Bill. Firstly, medical practices prohibited a change in 
order to preserve the doctor-patient relationship along with a failure to provide adequate 
safeguards to protect both the patients and physicians who would be involved in the 
process.930 Secondly, there was a preference for palliative care and not assisted death.  
Thirdly, the risk of the slippery slope coming into action with this Bill was greater as it did 
not distinguish between euthanasia and assisted suicide or set out the parameters of the 
physician-assisted suicide process that it sought to legalise. Lastly, the religious objections 
towards the issue of assisted dying,931 which sought to preserve the doctrine of sanctity of 
																																																								
929 Deebs Canning, ‘End-of-Life Issues’ in Carl Margereson and  Steve Trenoweth (eds), 
Developing Holistic Care for Long-term Conditions (Routledge 2010) 357; John Coggon 
and Soren Holm, ‘The Assisted Dying Bill: ‘Death Tourism’ and European Law’ in 
Jennifer Gunning and Soren Holm (eds), Ethics, Law and Society: Volume III (Ashgate 
2007) 233; and Sonya Donnelly and Sophia Purcell, ‘The evolution of the law on assisted 
suicide in the UK and the possible implications for Ireland’ (2009) MLJI 82, 85 
930 The following Members of Parliament who feared for disabled, old and vulnerable 
indivdiuals, HL Deb 12 May 2006, vol 681: (Baroness Chapman) col 1205; (Lord 
Turnberg) col 1208; (Lord Elton) col 1213; (Lord Brennan) col 1236; and (Lord Livsey of 
Talgarth) col 1222. Also see: (the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth) col 1226; (Lord MacKenzie 
of Culkein) col 1270; (Baroness Wilkins) col 1272 concluded that “If it were to succeed, it 
would remove the cornerstone of our law that protects us when we are at our most 
vulnerable. If we cross that threshold, society’s attitude will inevitably change. It is for that 
reason that we have all been inundated with pleas from disabled people to reject the Bill”. 
In contrast, the following Members felt that the Bill contained sufficient safeguards, HL 
Deb 12 May 2006, vol 681: (Baroness David) col 1203; (Lord Goodhart) col 1206; and (the 
Earl of Glasgow) col 1239. Also see: Coggon and Holm (n 929) 233 
931 HL Deb 12 May 2006, vol 681: (The Archbishop of Canterbury) col 1196-1199; (Lord 
Goodhart) col 1205; (Lord Pearson of Rannoch) col 1215; and in contrast, (Lord Joffe) cols 
1185-1186; (Lord Prior) col 1209; and (Lord Carey of Clifton) col 1235. 
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life, along with the non-religious viewpoints932 – such as changing the law being an ethical 
nightmare, which would change the culture of society by renouncing the doctrine of 
sanctity of life that single-handedly protects every citizen in society from an unwanted 
death – which were both of great significance as they were extensively included in the 
Parliamentary debates.933 
 
6.6 The Commission on Assisted Dying 
The failure of all these Bills led to the Commission on Assisted Dying being set up in 2010. 
It was an independent body set up with the funding of pro-assisted suicide campaigners, 
novelist Terry Pratchett and historian Bernard Lewis, in conjunction with the organisation 
‘Dignity in Dying’. The aim of the Commission was to establish whether the current law on 
euthanasia and assisted suicide was satisfactory and to suggest a system with appropriate 
safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and prevent abuse of that system, which would 
allow certain individuals to be assisted to die.934 This section examines the main objectives 
of this Commission and its final report. It critically reviews the subsequent Bill it presented 
in Parliament and the extent to which the religious and non-religious beliefs of individuals 
and groups were accommodated within this Bill. Lastly, it analyses the religious and non-
religious values that informed the recent Parliamentary debates (in 2015) on assisted 
suicide. 
 
 
 																																																								
932 The following Members of Parliament who argued that changing the law would be an 
‘ethical nightmare’ (as per Lord Carlile), which would change the culture of medicine and 
society (as per Lord Philips) HL Deb 12 May 2006, vol 681, col 1215. Furthermore, abuse 
of the system would begin (as per Lor St John); as the nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship would change (as per the Archbishop of Canterbury) HL Deb 12 May 2006, 
vol 681, col 1197; (Lord Carlile of Berriew) HL Deb 12 May 2006, vol 681, col 1192. 
933 However, religious opposition is not as resolute as it once was, there is a significant shift 
in public attitudes, particularly with the notion of autonomy gaining ground, yet sanctity of 
life continues to be a powerful obstacle to the movement to reform the law: see ch 3. 
934 Commission on Assisted Dying (CoAD), ‘Report: The current legal status of assisted 
dying is inadequate and incoherent’ (January 2012) 
<https://www.demos.co.uk/files/476_CoAD_FinalReport_158x240_I_web_single-
NEW_.pdf?1328113363> accessed 21 May 2017. Also see: Andrew Otchie, ‘A right to 
die?’ (2012) 176(4) C L & J 37 
	 212	
Lord Falconer of Thoroton, a British Labour peer in the House of Lords, chaired the 
Commission on Assisted Dying. There were 11 other commissioners: the criteria on which 
they were chosen are not mentioned in the report. The majority of commissioners, which 
identified with a non-religious viewpoint, had backgrounds in health, psychiatric and social 
services and even in palliative care. The only religious representative on the Commission 
was The Reverend Canon Dr James Woodward, an Anglican priest and Canon of St 
George’s Chapel in Windsor.935 
 
There was a public call for evidence by the Commission. The Commission received over 
1200 responses from health care professionals, academic experts, hospitals and hospices, 
organisations such as Dignity in Dying, the DPP, and even members of the public.936 There 
was very little evidence submitted from religious leaders and organisations.937 The evidence 
submitted by religious and non-religious groups included statements from the British 
Humanist Association, the Bio-Ethics Group of the Church of Wales, the Independent 
Methodist Churches,938 and individual clergy members of the Church of England.939 
 
It is submitted here that even though the doctrine of sanctity of life continues to be included 
in the debate, the power and influence of the religious formulation of this doctrine is 
exponentially reduced, especially compared to the significant consideration it received 
during the Parliamentary debates when suicide was decriminalised, which were examined 
in Chapter Four. Furthermore, the reaction of the other significant Christian denominations 
was subdued compared to the time of the earlier euthanasia Bills in 1936 and 1969 and 
even the recent Joffe Bills. For example, the Catholic Church did not submit evidence to 
																																																								
935 He submitted “…that until greater ethical, moral and social consensus has been 
generated on [assisted dying], it is not the right time to consider a change in the law” 
(CoAD (n 934) 20). 
936 CoAD (n 934) 39 
937 CoAD (n 934). There were no articles/explanations by organisations, such as the MCB 
and Mosque Websites, on why they chose not to submit evidence to the Commission. 
938 Brian Rowney, of the Independent Methodist Churches, was the only individual to 
submit evidence who viewed the religious doctrine of sanctity of life to be the highest value 
in the debate that needed preservation: “Many Christians view life as a gift from God, and 
the taking of life as taking what belongs to God” (CoAD (n 934) 75) 
939 CoAD (n 934) 39 
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the Commission, even though it remains opposed to euthanasia and assisted suicide.940 This 
is evident from Pope Francis’ “Day for Life” message where he stated that: 
 
…even the weakest and most vulnerable, the sick, the old… are masterpieces of 
God’s creation, made in His own image, destined to live forever, and deserving of 
the utmost reverence and respect… Care for life. It’s worth it.941 
 
However, other Christian denominations, such as the Church of England, continued to 
oppose a change in the law and submitted evidence to the Commission. As demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, the Christian faith states that the Bible protects and advocates human life as 
being innately valuable.942 The evidence submitted by Christian Churches and institutions – 
such as the Church of England’s Archbishops Council943 – viewed the value of human life 
(rather than the religious doctrine of sanctity of life) to be the central principle in the debate 
on assisted suicide; which would be devalued by allowing assisted suicide.944 It is 
submitted here that the tone of the Churches’ statement was neutral and did not have a 
religious underpinning. Within a secular society, Biblical concepts must be transposed into 
a context that is relevant for everyone:945 in a globalised, pluralistic society, there is a need 
to communicate various viewpoints, namely those of the Church, in a manner that allows 																																																								
940 For detailed discussion on the Catholic Church’s religious viewpoint on assisted dying, 
refer to ch 2. Note: Priest Vincent Harvey (The Commission on Assisted Dying, ‘Public 
Call for Evidence’), stated that he was personally against the issue and opposed a changed 
in the law; and a journalist from the Catholic Voices did submit that the basis of an 
opposition to any change in the law on assisted suicide by the Catholic Community is based 
on the equal dignity and worth of humans (CoAD (n 934) 75). 
941 Catholic Church in England and Wales, ‘Pope Francis sends ‘Day for Life’ message to 
UK and Irish Catholics’ (16 July 2013) <http://www.catholic-
ew.org.uk/Home/News/2013/July-Sept/Pope-s-Life-Message/(language)/eng-GB> accessed 
21 May 2017 
942 Kyle Fedler, Exploring Christian Ethics: Biblical Foundations for Morality 
(Westminster John Knox Press 2006) 81-83 
943 This Council explained that it viewed the debate on assisted suicide as one that promotes 
the affirmation of life rather than preserving the religious doctrine of sanctity of life (CoAD 
(n 934) 76). Also see: Church of England, On Dying Well: A Contribution to the 
Euthanasia Debate (2nd edn, Church House Publishing 2000) 18 
944 Individual members of the Church of England clergy, such as a Robert Fieldson (CoAD 
(n 934) 75), further noted that allowing it would devalue human life. 
945 Ambrose Mong, Are Non-Christians Saved? Joseph Ratzinger’s Thoughts on Religious 
Pluralism (Oneworld Publications 2015) 105 
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every citizen within that society (and not just followers of one single faith) to relate with 
that viewpoint.946 Thus, the submission of the Church needed to be neutral, non-religious 
and have a secular undertone. 
 
Other religious groups also submitted evidence to the Commission, such as the Bio-Ethics 
Group of the Church in Wales, who stated that the doctrine of sanctity of human life is no 
longer an absolute value in a multicultural society with various faith communities.947 As 
argued in this thesis, the terms that fuel the debate have remained the same yet the meaning 
attributed to these terms has significantly changed. This observation is supported by the 
fact that there was no evidence submitted by minority faith groups such as the Hindu, Sikh, 
or Islamic communities. Sanctity of life is no longer a value that receives absolute 
protection since the religious grounding has been largely detached from this doctrine. It is 
now primarily a secular matter, which includes a right to self-determine the time and 
manner of death, thus, it is a matter that only affects the individual seeking an assisted 
suicide and does not concern entire religious communities. The Commission did, however, 
consider evidence submitted to the Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill, by a Muslim doctor, who explained the traditional Islamic position on 
assisted suicide as being impermissible and a sin, and a believer who participated in any 
activity in relation to euthanasia and assisted suicide would “end up in hell”.948 It is 
submitted here that the structure of the Islamic religion is such that there is no one person 
or group who represents the views of the Muslim community, who can voice their opinions, 
thus there was a lack of submitting evidence. It is further submitted that heads of Islamic 
mosques such as Imams, individual Muslim legal scholars called Ulema, other leaders 
within the Islamic community or even followers of Islam submitted no evidence to 
reinforce and inform the Commission of the Islamic position on euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. This can be attributed to, as demonstrated previously in Chapter Two, euthanasia 																																																								
946 Mong (n 945) 104 
947 CoAD (n 934) 76. This notion is further supported by the fact that the only minority 
faith groups who submitted evidence to the Commission were Liberal Judaism and the 
Office for the Chief Rabbi (CoAD (n 934) 75, 77). For a detailed position of the Church of 
Wales on assisted death: Church of Wales, ‘Assisted Death: Bioethical Consideration – 
Assisted Death Notes for the Bench of Bishops’ 
<www.churchinwales.org.uk/society/science-and-society/assisted-death/> 16 February 2016 
948 CoAD (n 934) 75-76 
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and assisted suicide being strictly prohibited in Islam; and, thus, followers of the faith 
choose not to engage in the debate. 
 
It can be concluded that historically, this debate was driven by the religious understanding 
of the doctrine of sanctity of life, which attached sacredness to human life. However, with 
society becoming more multicultural and increasingly secular, non-religious values such as 
dignity and autonomy, which are protected by human rights provisions and have been 
discussed in the previous chapter, have begun to fuel this debate and drive this area of the 
law into a new direction where reform can be achieved. Furthermore, this is evidenced by 
the fact that there was very little consideration given to religious values by the 
Commission, mostly due to the lack of engagement from various religious groups. Any 
evidence submitted to the Commission had neutral vocabulary and non-religious wording. 
This suggests that the debate, particularly on assisted suicide, has become predominantly 
secular and non-religious values are the ones that significantly influence this debate. The 
next section establishes which secular values were considered by the Commission and 
influence the contemporary debate on assisted suicide. 
 
6.6.1 Secular principles considered by the Commission 
Non-religious ideologies and values were extensively considered and played a key role in 
the Commission’s examination. To this end, the principles of humanism, in relation to 
assisted suicide, should be noted here. Humanism is a system of thought, based on 
secularist, non-religious values rather than religious beliefs.949 Humanists have a very 
liberal attitude towards suicide and assisted death.950 The value of human life and an 
individual’s right to self-determination are on equal footing in the humanist system of 
thought.951 Humanists believe that individuals should have ultimate control over decisions 
regarding the continuation of their life, after they have considered the effect that ending 
their life may have on the individual or collective rights, freedoms and entitlements of 
																																																								
949 Jeaneane Fowler, Humanism: Beliefs and Practices (Sussex University Press 1999) 9-10 
950 Glenn Hardie, The Essence of Humanism: Free Thought Versus Religious Belief (Xlibris 
Corporation 2004) 53 
951 ibid. However, they do not encourage individuals who are, for example, mentally ill to 
prematurely end their lives. 
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others.952 The Chief Executive of the British Humanist Association, Andrew Copson, 
submitted this secular, non-religious humanist view on the debate to the Commission. In 
support of a change in the law, he explained that the two most important foundations, on 
which a reform in the law can be based, are human dignity and individual autonomy. He 
further stated that a good quality of life, and not just an extension of human life, is central 
to maintaining human dignity.953 He argued that: 
 
People should have the right to choose a painless and dignified end, either at the time 
or beforehand… Individuals should be allowed to decide on such personal matters for 
themselves… humanists defend the right of each individual to live by her own personal 
values, and the freedom to make decisions about her own life so long as this does not 
result in harm to others.954 
 
This argument indicates that an individual ought to be allowed to choose whether or not to 
end their life: it is simply a matter of choice. It is submitted that by making a decision to 
not request an assisted death, they inherently protect their beliefs and preserve the sanctity 
and value of human life and the intrinsic dignity they perceive to be attached to it. 
However, others who do not share this view can make the autonomous choice to end their 
pain, suffering and indignity (which stems from the loss of mental and physical bodily 
functions) and should be allowed to receive assistance in ending their life. Thus, the law 
needs to preserve every individual’s human dignity by striking a balance between the 
autonomous decisions to avoid pain and receiving assistance in ending life and protecting 
the intrinsic value and sanctity of human life.955 
 
 
 
 																																																								
952 ibid 
953 Andrew Copson, ‘Written Evidence to the Commission on Assisted Dying from the 
British Humanist Association (BHA), April 2011’ <https://humanism.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/bha-submission-to-commission-on-assisted-dying-april-2011.pdf> 
accessed 21 May 2017  
954 ibid 
955 CoAD (n 934) 283 
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Taking all the evidence – and the ethical, moral and religious aspects – into consideration, 
the Commission proposed that assisted suicide should be lawful for individuals, aged 18 or 
over, who have a terminal illness and have a prognosis of 12 months.956 These individuals 
must be adults, with the mental capacity to make an autonomous, “voluntary choice that is 
an expression of [their] own wishes and is not unduly influenced by others” and informed 
decision to request an assisted death.957 The decision can only be executed once it has 
passed all the necessary safeguards, namely, undergoing psychiatric evaluation to ensure 
that the patient’s decision is not due to a mental health problem such as depression and 
receiving independent advice from two doctors.958 Lastly, the Commission emphasised the 
need to ensure that “any decision to seek an assisted suicide is a genuinely voluntary and 
autonomous choice, not influenced by another person’s wishes, or by constrained social 
circumstances”,959 and that the patient must take the final action that ends their life.960 
Thus, the Commission proposed that assisted suicide be lawful (instead of euthanasia) to 
ensure that the decision is truly autonomous and voluntary as the final action that ends life 
is always taken by the individual who seeks assistance.961 
 
6.6.2 The Parliamentary debates around the Assisted Dying Bill 2014-2015 
The Chair of the Commission, Lord Falconer, introduced the Assisted Dying Bill in the 
House of Lords, as a Private Members Bill,962 which can be introduced by Members or 
Lords, in either Houses of Parliament, who are not governmental ministers. These Bills 
usually have less time allocated to them even though they go through the same stages as 
Public Bills.963 Lord Falconer’s Bill sought to allow assisted suicide for terminally ill 
individuals, over the age of 18, with a prognosis of 6 months (instead of 12 months, in 
order to further narrow down the number of individual who can request assistance) and the 
																																																								
956 ibid 26 
957 ibid 26 
958 ibid 26-30 
959 ibid 27 
960 Dickens (n 529) 82 
961 CoAD (n 934) 26 
962 This received its Second Reading on 18 July 2014 
963 For further details: UK Parliament, ‘Private Members’ Bills’ 
<http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/private-members/> accessed 21 May 2017 
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mental capacity to make a fully informed decision to end their life.964 An attending and 
independent doctor must sign off on their request.965 If either doctor has a doubt as to the 
individual’s mental capacity, they must refer the individual to a psychiatric specialist.966 
Once all the requirements are met, the attending doctor can prescribe the individual with 
lethal medication; which the individual can directly self-administer or an authorised 
healthcare professional, such as a nurse or doctor, can prepare a medical device that enables 
the individual to self-administer the medication.967 This Bill did not seek to allow 
euthanasia; instead it sought to regulate assisted suicide through self-administration of 
lethal drugs by the individual who seeks to end life.968 
 
This Bill was debated in the House of Commons on 11 September 2015.969 Rob Marris, the 
Labour party MP for Wolverhampton South West, moved for the Bill to be read for a 
second time explaining that the law needed to be reformed since it did not meet the needs 
of terminally ill patients, their friends and family, and even health care professionals.970 
Furthermore, amateur suicides and illegal assistance needed to be stopped and individuals 
without the means to travel to Switzerland needed an option to end their indignity, pain and 
suffering.971 However, the House was not unanimous in wanting to change the law on 
assisted suicide on the proposed Bill. 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
964 ‘Assisted Dying Bill [HL]’ (Explanatory Notes) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2015-2016/0025/160025.pdf> 
accessed 21 May 17 
965 ibid  
966 ibid  
967 ibid page 3. Also see: (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) HL Deb 18 Jul 2014, vol 755, col 792, 
“This Bill is about licensing doctors to supply lethal drugs to some of their patients and helping 
them to commit suicide, however long their life might otherwise have gone on for”. 
968 Rob Marris HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 659 
969 For a summary of the House of Common’s position, see Conservative MP for 
Montgomeryshire (Gyln Davies) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 706. 
970 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 656 
971 ibid 
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There were three main oppositions to allowing the Bill in both Houses of Parliament. 
Firstly, there was a need to protect vulnerable people.972 The House of Lords opined that 
patients who are suffering through an illness are much more vulnerable even though they 
may have the mental capacity to request an assistance in their suicide.973 Furthermore, 
various Members of the House of Commons – such as Caroline Spelman974, Lyn Brown975, 
Fiona Bruce976, Keir Stramer977 and Mary Robinson978 – viewed the current law to be 
beneficial as it protects disabled, elderly and vulnerable individuals from being coerced or 
pressured into an unwanted death and, thus, should be retained.979 
 
It is submitted here that the aforementioned Members of Parliament failed to appreciate that 
not all individuals who are terminally ill are vulnerable. To this end, Hamden cogently 
argues that: 
 
…being terminally ill does not necessarily make the patients part of a vulnerable 
category. Some terminally ill individuals within a group may lack the capacity to make 
clear decisions because of the illness… but that does not mean that the entire group is 
inherently vulnerable and unable to guard their interests through informed consent.980 																																																								
972 For example, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Morrow) col 891, “Pressure on 
vulnerable people at the end of life is not novel or imagined, it is very real. It is truly life or 
death”; (Lord Wills) col 901; (Lord Gold) col 886; (Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws) col 
874; (Lord Sheikh) col 856; (Baroness Masham of Ilton) col 865; (Baroness Finlay of 
Llandaff) col 792; (Lord Mawhinney) col 793; (Lord Brennan) col 802; and (Lord Bishop 
of Bristol) col 831. 
973 (Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 782 
974 (Meriden) (Con) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 664 
975 (West Ham) (Lab) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 669 
976 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 671 
977 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 672 
978 (Cheadle) (Con) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 720 
979 Also see: (Jim Fitzpatrick (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 
599, col 666 (who favoured a change in the law but appreciated that vulnerable individuals 
need to be protected). 
980 Mahmoud Hamdan, Cancer Biomarkers: Analytical Techniques for Discovery (John 
Wiley & Sons 2007) 343-344. Similar concerns were noted in the House of Lords; that the 
prohibition on assisted suicide, found in section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended 
by section 59 Coroners and Justice Act 2009) already provides them with the necessary 
protection against pressure and coercion and, thus, should be maintained as per (Lord 
Mackay of Clashfern) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 778. 
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The main thrust of Hamden’s argument is that being disabled or having a terminal illness 
does not necessarily make an individual vulnerable or prone to being coerced or 
pressured.981 Furthermore, the number of individuals who would access the option to 
assisted suicide is very small and would be further limited to individuals whose needs are 
not met via palliative care.982 Also, not every individual who is terminally ill, even if 
physically disabled, would opt to end life (for example, they may have religious or non-
religious objections to making such a request).983 
 
The second opposition to allowing the Bill was changing the doctor-patient relationship, 
which would increase the vulnerability of patients984 and have a negative effect on patients 
and their families.985 Members of the House of Lords, for example, opined that healthcare 
professionals, especially doctors, would experience the most serious effects of this change. 
If doctors were allowed to supply lethal medication to their patients, the doctor-patient 
would be severely prostrated and even destroyed.986 To this end, for example, Lord 
Brennan opined that demolishing the doctor-patient relationship would also create “… a 
danger to the medical profession”.987 Thus, in order to avoid changing the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship and prevent abuse of vulnerable individuals, by making them 
even more susceptible to coercion and pressure, various members of the House suggested 
that the option of palliative care should be preferred and promoted.988 However, it is 
submitted that this viewpoint fails to take into consideration that a handful of patients are 																																																								
981 Rob Marris HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 657 
982 ibid col 659 
983 ibid col 663 
984 The vulnerability of patients is intrinsically linked to changing the doctor-patient 
relationship. See: (Baroness Grey-Thompson) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 823; and 
(Lord McColl of Dulwich) HL 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 797-798 
985 (Lord Mawson) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, cols 799-800 
986 (Lord Hameed) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 834; and (Baroness Emerton) HL 
Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 893 
987 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 802 
988 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Tombs) col 816 who supported palliative 
medicine; (Baroness Greengross) col 787; and (Lord Dubs) col 780 who opined that 
individuals should have a choice between palliative care and assisted suicide. Other 
members of the House of Lords discussed palliative care, for example, HL Deb 18 July 
2014, vol 755: (The Earl of Sandwich) col 818; (Viscount Craigavon) col 814; (Baroness 
Blackstone) col 815; (Baroness O’Cathain) col 802; (Baroness O’Neill of Bengarve) col 
781; (Lord Purvis of Tweed) col 786; and (Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe) col 800. 
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disabled and have certain diseases, which lead them to being non-responsive to palliative 
treatment;989 and, thus, require an assisted suicide to end their pain and suffering.990 To this 
end, Ferguson et al rightly argue that: “…palliative care is available for those who wish to 
take advantage of it, while those for whom this is either not effective or not desired may opt 
for [an assisted death]”.991 It is further submitted here that due to the irreversible nature of 
assisted suicide, it ought to be the last course of action, for an individual with an incurable 
illness or disease, who has made an informed decision and tried all available options, 
particularly palliative care. After a number of safeguards have been met to ensure that the 
individual has a consistent and unchanging wish to receive an assisted suicide, is not under 
any pressure or coercion or temporarily going through a treatable mental illness, they 
should be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination to choose the time and 
manner of their death and receive assistance in doing so. 
 
Lastly, the third opposition was to ensure that the decision to receive an assisted suicide 
was the informed, voluntary and autonomous choice of the patient requesting it. Without 
ensuring voluntariness, a patient who is not mentally capable of making such a decision or 
physically able to end their life is at risk of being given a premature death by a proxy, 
relative or healthcare professional.992 Thus, it is submitted here that it is essential that the 
patient, who requests the assistance, be the one taking the final action that brings about 
their death in order to ensure that the request is autonomous and entirely voluntary.993 To 
this end, Lord Joffe opined that this protects vulnerable individuals by requiring “… that 
both assessing doctors must be satisfied that the informed decision is voluntarily made”.994 
This distinction, which differentiates assisted suicide from euthanasia, forms the basis of 																																																								
989 Jean-Paul Harpes, ‘The contemporary advocacy of euthanasia’ in Council of Europe 
(ed), Euthanasia: ethical and human aspects (COEP 2003) 28 (“…in 2-3% cases, palliative 
care is ineffective or not effective enough”). 
990 (Lord Clinton-Davis) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 844 opined that “Palliative care 
can bring some relief but cannot ensure a compassionate death”. 
991 Tom Campbell, ‘Assisted Dying: Humanity or Autonomy?’ in Pamela Ferguson and 
Graeme Laurie (eds), Inspiring a Medico-Legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila 
McLean (Ashgate 2015) 267 
992 (Baroness O’Neill of Begarve) HL Deb 16 January 2015, vol 758, col 1004 explained 
that there needed to be a clarificatory amendment that this is not a euthanasia Bill. 
993 (Baroness Howells of St Davids) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 915. In contrast: 
(Lord MacKenzie of Culkein) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 794. 
994 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 789 
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increased acceptability of assisted suicide and impermissibility of euthanasia.995 
 
6.6.3 The influence of religious and non-religious values on the Assisted Dying Bill 
Non-religious viewpoints received much greater consideration; and even though the views 
of various religions were included, they did not receive significant inclusion in the 
Parliamentary debates. The four central non-religious values that drove the debate were the 
notions of dignity, compassion, autonomy and the intrinsic value of life: each of these is 
considered in turn. 
 
6.6.4 Dignity 
The first non-religious value that continued to influence this debate was the idea of human 
dignity. As was evident in previous debates, this idea can be used both against and in 
support of allowing a change in the law. The majority of Members of the House of 
Commons, who were against reform, voiced their opinion by arguing that the notion of 
dignity ought to be used in a manner to reject the idea of reform. For example, MP Jim 
Fitzpatrick996 stated that “it is about treating every citizen with the same degree of respect 
and dignity, and affording them the opportunity to access the best advice and professional 
help available”.997 Dr Philippa Whitford998 further explained that: 
 
…we should support palliative care and we must ensure that it is available to people 
who are dying, regardless of their illness. We should support letting people live 
every day of their life until the end, and make sure that, as legislators, we provide 
the means for them to live and die with dignity and comfort. We should not say, 																																																								
995 Members of the House, in support of the Bill, believed that it contained sufficient 
safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals from being coerced or forced into a premature 
death. For example, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Aberdare) col 836; (Lord 
Clinton-Davis) col 844; (Lord Stone of Blackheath) col 815; (Lord Alli) col 808; (Lord 
Wigley) col 787; (Lord Dubs) col 780. In contrast, some members of the House felt that the 
safeguards were not adequate and that there needed to be stronger protection, HL Deb 18 
July 2014, vol 755: (Baroness Wheatcroft) col 823; (Lord McColl of Dulwich) col 798 
(“The safeguards in the Bill are not safe; they are defective”); and (Baroness Greengross) 
col 787. 
996 Labour MP (Poplar and Limehouse) 
997 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015 vol 599 col 666 
998 MP for Central Ayrshire (SNP) 
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“When you can’t thole it, take the black capsule.” We should vote for life and 
dignity, not for death.999 
 
It is contended that opponents of a change in the law continue to view assisted suicide, or 
any form of assisted dying, as an attack on human dignity. They do not view it as a 
subjective value that is dependent on that individual’s self-worth or autonomy but as an 
inherent value that is attached to individuals by virtue of being human that cannot be 
diminished or eradicated by disease or illness. It is further contended that instead of an 
option to end life, these opponents propose that individuals be given extensive palliative 
care and forced to continue with their life and disregard the subjective valuation of their 
quality of life or autonomous decisions to end life. 
 
In contrast, a handful of Members of the House of Commons who were in favor of reform, 
such as MP Crispin Blunt, stated that individuals who seek an assisted suicide “want to 
exercise the option of ending their life with dignity, at a time of their choosing”.1000 MP 
Huw Merriman1001 further explained that: 
 
This Bill is for the smaller number of people who wish to exercise their right to die 
earlier in their final six months – before they fade away in front of their family, 
before they enter a desperate period that they feel they cannot face, before they 
believe they will lose their dignity. It is for those people, with their own individual 
reasons, that I will cast my vote today to allow them this right.1002 
 
It is submitted that the purpose of this Bill was to allow a small number of individuals – 
with an incurable illness who have an unfavorable prognosis but have the mental capacity 
to make such a decision and feel that their quality of life is deplorable and undignified – a 
lawful option of a death with dignity at the time and manner of their choosing, surrounded 
by their loved ones. 
 																																																								
999 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015 vol 599 col 692-693 
1000 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015 vol 599 col 668 
1001 Conservative MP for Bexhill and Battle 
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6.6.5 Compassion 
The second non-religious principle that received considerable inclusion was the idea of 
compassion. The notion of compassion relies on the response of another individual to a 
patient’s suffering.1003 Thus, a patient’s autonomy is submerged in the observer’s emotion 
of compassion.1004 Pellegrino argues that: 
 
Compassion is a universal emotion generated in all persons of goodwill in the face 
of another’s suffering. It is accompanied by a desire to help the one who suffers 
and, as such, it can be a motive for beneficent acts that are essential to a good death. 
Compassion is not, however, a self-justifying reason for relieving pain or suffering 
at any cost, including taking the life of the sufferer. Compassion has its own… 
limitations as a sole basis for professional or personal ethics.1005 
 
It is argued that the notion of compassion is separate from the idea of sanctity of life.1006 
The idea of compassion rests on the force of feeling and emotional response, to relieve the 
suffering of an individual, of another person; who then decides the appropriateness of an 
action to bring about an individual’s death.1007 It is further submitted that these persons, 
who are motivated by compassion to assist an individual to end their life, are arguably 
preventing the value or sanctity of life of that individual from being diminished. To this 
end, Dworkin argues that “People who want an early peaceful death for themselves or their 
relatives are not rejecting or denigrating the sanctity of life; on the contrary, they believe 
that a quicker death shows more respect for life than a protracted one”.1008 
 
 																																																								
1003 Lysaught et al (n 262) 1079 
1004 Edmund Pellegrino, ‘Compassion is Not Enough’ in Kathleen Foley and Herbert 
Hendin (eds), The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (John 
Hopkins University Press 2002) 48. The slippery slope argument (discussed in Section 1.3) 
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Compassion: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Broadview Press 2010) 14). 
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1008 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and 
Individual Freedom (Harper Collins 1993) 238 
	 225	
The notion of compassionately assisting individuals, to have their autonomous choice 
respected, to choose the time and manner of their death in order to preserve their dignity by 
ending their pain and suffering,1009 led to various members of the House stating that public 
opinion was now strongly in favour of changing the law.1010 For example, Lord Vinson 
argued in favour of the Bill because “… it deepens compassion; and it reduces suffering. 
We should support it”.1011 However, the majority of the members of the House of Lords 
opined that allowing the Bill, based on the need to administer compassion to end the 
suffering of patients, would put other members of society at risk. For example, Baroness 
Grey-Thompson argued that: “It is too simplistic to suggest that this is… a debate about 
compassion versus suffering… we should not pass legislation based on emotion; it is about 
protecting the whole of society”.1012 This argument indicates that, for the opponents of 
allowing assisted suicide, the notion of compassion is closely tied with the need to 
safeguard vulnerable individuals and to protect the rights and interests of other members of 
the society. 
 
The notion of compassion was also extensively discussed in the House of Commons. The 
Conservative MP Glyn Davies explained that both the proponents and opponents of 
assisted suicide are driven by compassion.1013 Labour MP Robert Flello further explained: 
 																																																								
1009 (Lord Purvis of Tweed) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 786 
1010 For example, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Hollick) col 881 “Currently, public 
opinion is clearly behind the law”; (Lord Dubs) col 780 “… public opinion is 
overwhelmingly on our side; 70% to 80% of the public consistently want a change in the 
law”; and (Lord Dholakia) col 913. 
1011 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 894. Other members of the House of Lords who 
supported the notion of compassion included, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Purvis 
of Tweed) col 786; and (Baroness Morgan of Huyton) col 912; other members of the House 
of Lords also viewed it as a compassionate Bill, which would put an end to the suffering of 
terminally ill patients: (Baroness Jay of Paddington) col 784; and (Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill) col 781. Also note: The Bill ensures that individuals, particularly doctors, who 
compassionately assist their patients to end their lives, are not commissioning a crime as 
per (Lord Rees of Ludlow) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 874-875. 
1012 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 823. Other members of the House of Lords who had 
a similar view included, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Lord Bishop of Bristol) col 832; 
(Lord Browne of Belmont) cols 854-855; (Lord Singh of Wimbledon) col 869; and (Lord 
Bishop of Carlisle) col 909. 
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…the people who are promoting this Bill are motivated by the desire to alleviate 
suffering… by compassion… we are all moved and saddened by what we hear and 
want to act with compassion, but that compassion is misguided if we think that by 
prematurely ending someone’s life, we are alleviating suffering. There are ways to 
alleviate physical, mental and emotional suffering and they are done extremely well in 
this country.1014 
 
The main thrust of MP Flello’s argument is that the notion of compassion is an inexpedient 
value in the movement to change the law as the motive behind this notion is misplaced if it 
is used, to relieve mental or physical suffering and preserve dignity, by allowing assisted 
suicide. However, this argument does not take into consideration that there is a very small 
minority of individuals whose pain and suffering is incurable, untreatable and cannot be 
alleviated via palliative care and need an option to end, what they perceive to be, an 
undignified life.1015 These individuals ought to be allowed to exercise their right to self-
determination under certain circumstances and after a number of safeguards have been met. 
Furthermore, the notion of compassion is generally a driving force behind the decision of a 
third party, including health care professionals, to provide assistance to the individual who 
seeks it.1016 To this end, during the Nicklinson case, Lord Sumption opined that: 
 
…whatever right a person may have to put an end to his own life depends on the 
principle of autonomy, which leaves the disposal of his life to him. The right of a 
third party to assist cannot depend on that principle. It is essentially based on the 
mitigating effect of his compassionate motive.1017 
 
 																																																								
1014 ibid col 699. Also see: (Sir David Amess (Southend West) (Con)) HC Deb 11 Sep 
2015, vol 599, col 698 
1015 In conformity with this idea, the former DPP (Keir Stramer) HC Debate 11 Sep 2015, 
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Compassion is a significant value in the contemporary debate on assisted suicide. To this 
end, Lord Wilson further stated that “compassion… is critical in most of these cases”.1018 
However, it is submitted that the notion of compassion has no legal grounding in domestic 
or human rights law and cannot form the basis for a change in the law. Thus, autonomy is 
the paramount value in the debate on assisted suicide and the main principle on which a 
reform of the law, under Article 8, could be based. 
 
6.6.6 Autonomy 
The third non-religious principle that fuelled the debate was the notion of autonomy, which 
would allow the small number of people that need assistance in their suicide to end their 
pain, suffering and indignity.1019 To this end, Baroness Greengross stated that: 
 
…if people have had enough of suffering, for whatever reason, they should surely 
have the right to that choice. The Bill is not about a small number of malevolent 
people trying to pressurise those who are vulnerable; it is about a small number of 
people, near to death, sometimes dying in agony.1020 
 
Furthermore, some members of the House of Lords argued that this right to choose how to 
end life was grounded in human rights law and should be more readily available.1021 For 
example, Baroness Blackstone opined that: 
 
We live in a society that promotes individual autonomy and values allowing its 
members to choose how they spend their lives… We value tolerance and allowing 
people to make their own choices, even if we wish to make different choices. The 
same freedom of choice that applies to how we live should also apply to how we 
die. If we respect human rights, we should not deny those who know that they are 																																																								
1018 ibid [247] 
1019 Various members of the House of Lords opined that individual autonomy should be 
guaranteed by allowing patients to choose the time and manner of their death by receiving 
an assisted suicide, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Viscount Craigavon) col 813-814; 
(Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury) cols 841-842; and (Lord Morrow) col 890. 
1020 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 787 
1021 For a detailed discussion on the human rights movement in the context of the assisted 
suicide debate, refer to ch 5. 
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dying the right to bring their lives to a more rapid end to alleviate their misery.1022 
 
It is submitted here that the main thrust of Baroness Blackstone’s argument is valid as it 
suggests that both secular and religious beliefs exist in a multicultural, pluralistic society 
that do not consider ending life when terminally ill a wrong, immoral or sinful act.1023 This 
also forms one of the central arguments of this thesis. Furthermore, in a multicultural 
society, where various beliefs, views, and opinions are tolerated,1024 the freedom to control 
their own lives by providing them with the option to choose the time and manner of death 
should also be provided in order to relieve patients of their pain and suffering.1025 In 
contrast, Gert et al argue that the risk of abuse of physician-assisted suicide exponentially 
increases “…in a multicultural society where doctors and patients sometimes do not even 
speak the same language”.1026 It is submitted here that this argument is partly inaccurate. 
Whilst absolute protection can never be provided, the Bill itself included a number of 
safeguards, namely the patient having the capacity to make an informed decision, more 
than one doctor being satisfied that the patient’s wish is informed, settled and voluntary and 
the final action needing to be taken by the patient (which forms the most important 
safeguard). To this end, Prado correctly argues that: 
 
…assisted suicide, to be that, must be autonomous, knowing, and competent self-
killing, even if assisted in the sense of being enabled in some way… For it to be 
suicide, the person dying must be the primary agent in the causing of death, in the 
sense of both deciding to act and enacting the decision”.1027 
 																																																								
1022 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 804 
1023 Victor Cicirelli, ‘Healthy Elders’ Early Decision for End-of-Life Living and Dying’ in 
M Powell Lawton (ed), Annual Review of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Volume 20, 2000: 
Focus on the End of Life: Scientific and Social Issues (Springer 2001) 175 
1024 They are also guaranteed under the right to freedom of thought conscience and religion 
and the right to freedom of expression. Furthermore, the right to self-determination is also 
guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR. For a detailed discussed on human rights, refer to ch 5. 
1025 (Lord Vinson) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 894 opined that, “People should have 
the right to choose. Freedom begins with freedom of choice and should be extended as 
widely as possible into all areas of society at all levels”. Also see: (Lord Hollick) HL Deb 
18 July 2014, vol 755, col 882 
1026 Bernard Gert et al, Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals (OUP 1997) 305 
1027 CG Prado, Choosing to Die: Elective Death and Multiculturalism (CUP 2008) 13 
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However, Members of the House of Lords argued that allowing some individuals this 
freedom to self-determination would diminish the value of human life (which is the fourth 
principle that drives this debate). Thus, they would be failing to protect the rights and 
freedoms of other members within that society, which would negatively change the fabric 
of society.1028 
 
6.6.7 Sanctity of Life 
The idea that the worth of human life is diminished, if assisted suicide is allowed, is 
predominantly secular but was once rooted in religious tenets particularly those of the 
Christian faith.1029 To this end, opposing the Bill, Lord Mawhinney stated that his opinion 
was embedded in his belief in the Christian faith and that “… life stems from and is a gift 
from God… this belief, widely shared, should govern our views on the end of life”.1030 It is 
submitted here that the opposition of the Christian faith on this issue remains (as has been 
the case in previous debates since the 1930s). However, there was a considerable absence 
of the Christian faith in this debate. A clear shift can be seen, compared to debates from a 
decade ago and especially the 1936, 1961 and 1969 debates (on euthanasia and suicide for 
both terminally and non-terminally ill patients),1031 with greater significance being placed 
on non-religious values and the legal, societal and medical aspects of assisted suicide. 
 
It is submitted that this shift can be attributed to the fact that Christian and religious 
underpinnings and doctrines are increasingly being separated from the debate on assisted 
suicide, as the debate is now influenced by the need to respect an individual’s right to self-
determination. To this end, Labour MP Sarah Champion opined that: 																																																								
1028 HL Deb 18 Jul 2014, vol 755: (Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws) col 872; (Baroness 
Berridge) col 898; and (Baroness Sherlock) col 888. 
1029 This principle has been historically grounded in religious ideology; but, in recent years, 
has transformed into a secular doctrine, due to the influence of multiculturalism. For greater 
discussion: ch 3. 
1030 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 793. Similarly opinions were held by, HL Deb 18 
July 2014, vol 755: (Archbishop of York) col 782; (Lord Bishop of Carlisle) col 909; (Lord 
Baker of Dorking) col 810; (Lord Alli) col 808; and (Lord Elton) col 819. 
1031 This shift can be attributed to the increasing abandonment of the Christian religion by 
citizens in England. The ONS has estimated that between 2001 and 2011, there has been a 
significant decrease in the number of people who identify with Christianity as their 
religion, from 71.7% to 59.3% (ONS, ‘Religion in England and Wales 2011’ (n 91)). For 
detailed discussion on decline of religion in modern English society, refer to ch 3. 
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There is the argument that it is God’s will that we should suffer, if necessary, and that 
it is God’s choice how we end our lives. I have 100% respect for that view. If that is 
someone’s position and choice, this Bill is not for them and I do not expect them to 
seek to make use of its provisions. I feel, however, that I should be able to make a 
different choice and that others should not be able to stop me.1032 
 
However, the views of the Christian religion were still being included in the debate; but 
only by a handful of Members of Parliament – such as Crispin Blunt,1033 Jim Shannon,1034 
Steve Brine,1035 and Karl McCartney1036 – when debating the Bill. 
 
Furthermore, there is a significant increase of minority subcultures and religious groups in 
society, which also received some consideration within the debate. This inclusion can be 
attributed to the prominence of multiculturalism in modern English society.1037 For 
example, the views of Judaism,1038 Sikhism,1039 Hinduism1040 and Buddhism1041 were 
included. However, the views of Islam were not submitted in the debate. Lord Sheikh, the 
former Chairman of the Conservative Muslim Forum and also the Chairman of the 
Conservative Ethnic Diversity Council, mentioned that “Life is sacred” and opposed the 
Bill on the basis that vulnerable individuals needed protection;1042 but did not discuss the 
views of the Islamic faith on the issue. Even though there was no submission from Islamic 
groups and consideration by MPs, which may also be because of a lack of knowledge of the 
Islamic viewpoint, there was some, even though very little, reaction of the Islamic 
community on this Bill. For example, an article found in the ‘Islamic Today’ magazine 
states “Amongst the British public there is overwhelming support for the Bill…. However, 
on matters of death, the Islamic revelation makes it very clear where the line should be 																																																								
1032(Rotherham) (Lab) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, cols 680-681 
1033 (Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, cols 667-668 
1034 (Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 677  
1035 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 683 
1036 (Karl McCartney (Lincoln) (Con)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 693 
1037 For greater discussion on multiculturalism and role of minority subcultures, see: ch 3. 
1038 (Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 842 
1039 (Lord Singh of Wimbledon) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 869 
1040 (Lord Dholakia) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 913 
1041 (Lord Avebury) HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 790 
1042 HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755, col 856 
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drawn”. The article then goes on to quote two verses from the Quran that oppose suicide 
and seek to preserve life at all costs. The Islamic religion continues to seek to preserve life 
and still attaches a religious sanctity to it. The article went on to explain that: 
 
In such serious matters of life and death, we must make sure we have developed well-
considered opinions as a duty of care to ourselves and to our fellow citizens. Many 
arguments have been put forward for and against the Assisted Dying Bill, and as 
Muslims living in a democratic society we have a duty to get to grips with such 
debates, form an opinion and lobby our political representative appropriately.1043 
 
The Islamic belief has remained consistent in its opposition to assisted suicide and, as 
explained previously, religious views ought to be included but not imposed on every 
individual in society. In a liberal democracy, the non-religious views and religious beliefs 
are both taken into consideration, however, a change in the law and the inclusion of various 
religious and non-religious credos is no longer mutually exclusive. Furthermore, an 
autonomous decision to end life is a human rights matter and should be left to the 
individual. If they believe in the sanctity or value of life, they will not request it. However, 
if they do not share this belief then a lawful option of assisted suicide should exist. 
Religious views ought not to be imposed on everyone else, especially those who do not 
share them. 
 
It is submitted that this lack of submission of the Islamic viewpoint on the issue of assisted 
suicide is based on the notion of preserving life being traditionally grounded in religious 
tenets as has been discussed in Chapter Two. However, in a multicultural, pluralistic 
society – which is becoming increasingly secular – the notion of the worth of human life is 
a non-religious, secular concept,1044 as it is entirely a matter of an individual’s own 
conscience and autonomy and does not affect the community at large. In an increasingly 
secular society, this view is perceived to conflict with the right to self-determination, which 																																																								
1043 Hannah Smith, ‘An Islamic response to the Assisted Dying Bill’ Islam Today (issue 22 
vol 2) p27 
1044 For example, HL Deb 18 July 2014, vol 755: (Baroness Howells of St Davids) col 915; 
and (Lord Tombs) cols 815-816; and in contrast: (Lord Berkeley of Knighton) col 872; 
(Lord Judd) col 884; and (Lord Pearson of Rannoch) col 896. 
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includes choosing the time and manner of death,1045 and as long as that choice does not 
harm others, in a free, multicultural society we should allow that choice.1046 Many 
Members in the House of Commons explained that the right to choose, and subsequently 
have control over the end of their life, was a driving factor on which the decriminalisation 
of assisted suicide could be based.1047 For example, Conservative MP Crispin Blunt opined 
that: “…the Bill will provide the comfort of having a degree of control over the end of their 
life. [We] ought to have a right to choose, despite the concerns about what a valid choice 
looks like”.1048 It is submitted here that choice is entirely a subjective issue and allows 
individuals the right to choose the time and manner of their death or to preserve life by not 
making such a choice. Thus, the right to self-determination is the most significant value 
that informs the debate on assisted suicide and on which a reform of the law could be 
based.1049 
 
It can be concluded that the criminal embargo against assisted suicide was initially based on 
religious tenets, which are increasingly absent from Parliamentary debates. However, the 
2015 Bill was defeated by a very significant majority of 330 to 118. The MPs in the House 
of Commons were overwhelmingly opposed to a change in the law. Many of them spoke of 
their personal experiences about terminally ill relatives. A handful even cited religion as the 
main opposition such as Crispin Blunt who stated: 
 
I understand the Catholic and faith lobby will have in-principle objections, but I am 
slightly appalled that they should seek to sustain legislation that limits my personal 
autonomy when 80% of the population… would support it.1050 
 
 																																																								
1045 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 663 
1046 (Rob Marris) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 663 
1047 (Jim Fitzpatrick (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 666 
1048 (Reigate) (Con) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 668 
1049 For discussion on the link between autonomy and neoliberalism and healthcare ethics: 
Ronald Labonte, ‘Health promotion and the Common Good: Toward a Politics of Practice’ 
in Daniel Callahan (ed), Promoting Healthy Behavior: How Much Freedom? Whose 
Responsibility? (Georgetown University Press 2000) 95-97 
1050 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 668 
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However, the reasons for defeat of the Bill were not theological, unlike previous assisted 
dying debates. To encapsulate, the main reasons for the defeat of the Bill were as follows. 
Firstly, to invalidate the notion that assisted suicide is accepted, or encouraged, by society 
or Parliament.1051 Secondly, the doctor-patient relationship would change drastically due to 
the promotion of death instead of care for patients.1052 Thirdly, there was a need to protect 
vulnerable individuals in society from being pressured into an unwanted death. Lastly, 
Members of Parliament opined that life was precious and needed to be valued,1053 
individuals should be dissuaded from ending life,1054 and, instead of allowing assisted 
suicide, palliative and end-of-life care should be improved.1055 
 
6.7 Reaction to Lord Falconer’s Bill 
Twenty-two faith leaders and representatives issued a statement against the Lord Falconer 
Bill.1056 These leaders and representatives included the Dean of International Colleges of 
Islamic Studies, Ayatollah Fazel Milani; the Secretary General of the Muslim Council of 
Britain, Dr Shuja Shafi; Director Al-Khoei Foundation (A Shia-Muslim Organisation), Mr 
Yousif Al-Khoei; Chief Imam of the Central Mosque Leicester, Shahid Raza; Archbishop 
of Wales, Most Rev Dr Barry Morgan; Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Vincent 
Nichols; Archbishop of Canterbury, Rt Hon Justin Welby; and many other representatives 
of the Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and Zoroastrian faiths.1057 They stated that: 																																																								
1051 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599: (Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)) cols 669-670; (Fiona 
Bruce) col 671; and (Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab)) col 703 
1052 HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599: (Mrs Caroline Spelman (Meriden) (Con)) col 664; (Lyn 
Brown (West Ham) (Lab)) cols 669-670; and (Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)) col 679 
1053 (Lyn Brown) HC Debate 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 670 
1054 (Sir David Amess (Southend West) (Con)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 698 
1055 ibid. (Robert Flello ((Stoke-on-Trent South) (Lab)) HC Deb 11 Sep 2015, vol 599, col 
699 even felt that care for suffering and alleviating pain is done extremely well in England. 
1056 CoAD was an independent body, which is why faith groups may have not engaged 
through submissions to the Commission. For example, the Bishop of Carlisle Rt Revd 
James Newcome called for the Commission’s Bill to be withdrawn and a Royal 
Commission on assisted dying to be convened instead. See: Madeleine Davies, ‘Welby 
gives warning ahead of assisted dying Bill’ 
<https://www.churchtimes.co.uk/articles/2014/18-july/news/uk/welby-gives-warning-over-
assisted-dying-bill> accessed 21 May 2017 
1057 ‘Assisted dying bill: faith leaders’ statement’ (The Telegraph, 16 July 2014) 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10970955/Assisted-dying-bill-faith-leaders-
statement.html> accessed 21 May 2017 
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Every human life is of intrinsic value and ought to be affirmed and cherished. This is 
central to our laws and our social relationships; to undermine this in any way would be 
a grave error… Vulnerable individuals must be cared for and protected even if this 
calls for sacrifice on the part of others.1058 
 
The faith leaders went on to argue that allowing assisted suicide would turn society into 
“one in which life is to be understood primarily in terms of its usefulness and individuals 
evaluated in terms of their utility” and instead recommended: 
 
Better access to high-quality palliative care, greater support for carers and enhanced 
end of life services will be among the hallmarks of a truly compassionate society and it 
is to those ends that our energies ought to be harnessed.1059 
 
The entire statement was phrased in non-religious terms, which seems to be an attempt to 
relate to all faith groups and even individuals and communities who do not identify with 
any religion. It is submitted here that religious groups are in harmony on the issue of the 
legalisation of assisted suicide. They remain opposed to a change in the law on the basis 
that life possesses great value, which would be eradicated, and, thus, put vulnerable 
individuals at risk. They seek “sacrifice” of the principle of autonomy to make way for the 
preservation of life and ask that compassion be administered by providing greater care, 
support and alternative options such as palliative care for patients and vulnerable 
individuals. It is further submitted that there is a shift in understanding of terms, such as the 
sanctity of life, which historically had a theological understanding with a religious sanctity 
attached to it; but is now understood as having infinite value. It can be concluded here that 
even though theological opposition, not only from the Christian faith but also minority faith 
groups such as Islam, Judaism, Hinduism amongst many others, was included in the 2015 
Bill and religious groups reacted to this Bill, which they previously did not do in the Joffe 
Bills (except in 2005), in the Select Committee’s and even to the Commission on Assisted 
Dying – this opposition was not an extensive one as was in 1936 and 1969. The paramount 
principle against reform was the modern notion of sanctity of life (instead of the historic 																																																								
1058 ibid 
1059 ibid 
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religious understanding of this doctrine). 
 
6.8 Role of Faith in Policy-Making 
This section briefly examines the inclusion of faith in policy-making on other issues such 
as abortion and same-sex marriage in order to determine the extent and role of faith in 
policy making in England and compare it to the amount of inclusion and role it plays within 
the assisted suicide debate. 
 
6.8.1 Abortion 
In England, the laws against abortion could be found in the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, which dictated that abortion was a criminal offence under all circumstances; and 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, which placed a prohibition on aborting a fetus that 
was capable of being born alive, unless the termination of the pregnancy is necessary to 
save the life of the mother.1060 The 1967 Act updated these Acts but did not decriminalise 
abortion. It merely clarifies the circumstances in which a doctor, acting in good faith and in 
order to protect the life or health of the pregnant women, can terminate a pregnancy.1061 
The Abortion Act 1967 provides a defence against abortion under certain circumstances 
and only if the prescribed procedures and set out conditions are fulfilled.1062 The Abortion 
Act placed therapeutic abortion on a statutory footing1063 and regulated the practice of 
abortion: the practice of abortions needed to be regularised because “abortion has become a 
matter of great public concern and discussion in this country”.1064 The Abortion Bill, 
introduced by Lord Silkin in the mid-1960s, brought public attention to the need of 
																																																								
1060 These laws are still valid with modifications found in the Abortion Act 1967, Criminal 
Justice Act 1948; and Statute Law Revision Act 1892/1893. 
1061 John Kenyon Mason and Sheila McLean, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Healthcare 
(Greenwich Medical Media Ltd 2003) 137 
1062 Wai-Ching Leung, Law for Doctors (Blackwell 2000) 58 
1063 John Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of 
Abortion in England from 1803 to 1982 (CUP 2002) 84 
1064 As per HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270: (Lord Wells-Pestell) col 1210; (Joint 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Stonham)) col 1162-1163; and 
(Lord Denning) col 1181. The law needed to be reformed in order to put an end to maternal 
deaths caused illegal and unauthorised abortions performed in unsanitary and dangerous 
conditions. Also see: Jerome Legge, Abortion Policy: An Evaluation of the Consequences 
for Maternal and Infant Health (State University of New York Press 1985) 75. 
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reforming the law on abortion.1065 The 1967 Bill was based on a previous Bill, titled 
“Medical Termination of Pregnancy”, which was introduced by Mr David Steel in the 
House of Commons and had six failed predecessors.1066 
 
In the House of Lords, the concerns revolving around the Abortion Bill were the protection 
of the mother or baby’s physical and mental health,1067 to stop unauthorised or botched 
medical abortions from being performed,1068 to protect the doctor from being unfairly 
charged or convicted,1069 and the need to include the views of the Christian religion on 
abortion.1070 For example, Lord Craigmyle, a Catholic opposed to a change in the law, and 
was one of many Lords who based their opposition to reforming the law on abortion on 
their Christian faith, stated that “…the sun of Christian ethic… has illuminated the law of 
the land for a 1000 years”.1071 There were similar concerns in the House of Commons, such 
																																																								
1065 British Academy of Forensic Sciences (BAFS), Medicine, Science and the Law (Sweet 
and Maxwell 1967) 2; Roger Davidson and Gayle Davis, The Sexual State: Sexuality and 
Scottish Governance 1950-80 (EUP 2012) 102; and Sally Sheldon, Beyond control: 
medical power and abortion law (Pluto Press 1997) 38 
1066 Carr (n 223) 243; BAFS (n 1065) 2; and Davidson and Davis (n 1065) 109. Also note 
that The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill was also debated in the House of Lords on 
19 and 26 July 1967. 
1067 Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law (n 1063) 84-86. Note: There was a need to 
prioritise and preserve the mother’s life, and the physical and mental health of the mother 
and the baby. To this end, HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270: (Viscount Dilhorn) col 
1152; (Lord Denning) col 1182; and (Lord Bishop of Exeter) col 1231. Also see: Davidson 
and Davis (n 1065) 102. 
1068 Dickson (n 23) 111. Regularising abortion law in order to prohibit unauthorised or 
botched operations was a concern in the Lords HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270: (Lord 
Silkin) col 1141-1143; (Lord Wells-Pestell) col 1211; and (Lord Amulree) col 1185-1186. 
Also see: Jackson (n 457) 675. 
1069 There was a need to protect the doctor from being unfairly charged or convicted. See: R 
v Bourne [1938] 3 All ER 615, [1939] 1 KB 687; where a doctor who had acted in good 
faith was acquitted of terminating a 14-year-old rape victim’s pregnancy. Also see, HL Deb 
30 November 1965, vol 270: (the Lord Bishop of Southwark), col 1166; (Lord Craigmyle) 
col 1224-1230; (Viscount Waverley) col 1199; (Viscount Dilhorn) col 1153. Also see: 
Jackson (n 457) 675. 
1070 The need to include the views of the Church of England were discussed by various 
members of the House of Lords, HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270: (The Earl of 
Iddesleigh) col 1173; and (the Lord Bishop of Southwark) col 1162; and (Lord Wells-
Pestell) col 1210. 
1071 HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270, cols 1229-1230 
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as the need to reduce the number of back-street abortions,1072 the need for a medical 
practitioner to be involved in the termination of the pregnancy and to safeguard these 
practitioners,1073 the need to protect the mother’s life and health,1074 the need to preserve the 
child’s life1075 and the respect for life and the need to preserve the sanctity of life. It is 
argued here that priority was clearly being given to medical reasons over the religious 
viewpoint, which led to the second exception – after the decriminalisation of suicide, 
discussed in Chapter Four – to the religious doctrine of sanctity of life being created in 
English law. These two events were the original impetus for the list of exceptions made 
into this doctrine and on which a change in the law on assisted suicide could also be based. 
 
Religious opinion on the issue of abortion was divided at the time this Bill came into 
Parliament. In 1965, the Board for Social Responsibility of the Anglican Church published 
‘An Ethical Discussion’ on the issue, which acknowledged that abortion could be justified 
if a pregnancy threatened a woman’s life and or even her well-being.1076 Other members of 
the Anglican Church, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, disagreed with the Board’s 
position by opposing it on religious grounds.1077 The movement against reforming the law 
on abortion gained further impetus after the formation of the Society for the Protection of 																																																								
1072 Various members of the House of Commons felt that illegal abortions would be 
prohibited under this Act, HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 732: (Mr Norman St John-Stevas 
(Chelmsford)) col 1154; (Mr Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, North)) col 1124; (Dr 
John Dunwoody (Falmouth and Camborne)) col 1094-1095; (Mr Jenkins) col 1142; and 
(Mr David Steel) col 1075. 
1073 HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 732: (Mr Deedes) col 1091-1092; (Mr Charles Pannell 
(Leeds, West)) col 1091-1092; and (Mr William Wells (Walsall, North)) col 1080. 
1074 HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 732: (Mr Angus Maude (Stratford-on-Avon)) col 1119; 
(Dame Joan Vickers (Plymouth, Devonport)) col 1110; (Mr Norman St John-Stevas 
(Chelmsford)) col 1153; and (Dr Dunwoody) col 1098. 
1075 Various members of the House of Commons discussed that a pregnancy should be 
terminated if the child was likely to be mentally or physically deformed and the child may 
not be viable: (Mr Edward Lyons (Bradford, East)) HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 732 col 1089-
1090 deformity in children; (Mr Charles Pannell (Leeds, West)) HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 
732 col 1092; and (Mr Kevin McNamara (Kingston upon Hull, North)) HC Deb 22 July 
1966 vol 732 col 1128. 
1076 Stephen Brooke, Sexual Politics: Sexuality, Family Planning, and the British Left from 
the 1880s to the Present Day (OUP 2011) 170; and Melanie Latham, Regulating 
Reproduction: A Century of Conflict in Britain & France (Manchester University Press 
2002) 93 
1077 Brooke (n 1076) 170 
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the Unborn Child in January 1967, in which many Catholics citizens were involved.1078 The 
Society even launched an anti-abortion campaign and gathered half a million signatures on 
a petition it sent to the Prime Minister.1079 Finally, Members of Parliament, such as Norman 
St John Stevas, and even newspapers such as The Times and the Daily Telegraph continued 
to oppose the change in the law.1080 It is submitted here that the cultural landscape at the 
time was greatly influenced by religion, particularly the Christian faith, which was opposed 
to allowing abortion under any circumstance. This opposition was voiced by religious 
leaders and even reflected in the news media and public debate at the time.1081 The 
theological opposition to reforming the law was also present in the Parliamentary debates. 
Both Houses of Parliament prioritised the tenets of the Christian faith on abortion.1082 For 
example, Mr Bernard Braine Rose, in the House of Commons, stated that “There are 
thousands of Roman Catholic doctors who may well have a clear conscientious objection 
on religious grounds… to terminations of pregnancy”.1083 Since the Churches were 
vehemently opposed to reforming the law on abortions and wanted the Bill to be voted out 
on the basis that the doctrine of sanctity of life needed to be preserved.1084 To this end, 
Dame Joan Vickers, a Conservative MP, stated that all the members of the House of 
Commons “…have the sanctity of life in mind”.1085 Based on the evidence found in the 
Parliamentary debates, it is argued here that the doctrine of sanctity of life was a paramount 
																																																								
1078 Note that almost three decades after abortion was made lawful, the Catholic Church 
maintained its opposition to it. See: Pope John Paul II (n 136). 
1079 Brooke (n 1076) 170 
1080 Brooke (n 1076) 170; and Latham (n 1076) 93 
1081 The religious opposition to abortion is not traced in Biblical or Quranic texts since this 
issue is not in the scope of this thesis. 
1082 Various members of the House of Commons discussed the views of Christianity, 
particularly the Catholic Church HC Deb 22 July 1966 vol 732: (Dame Joan Vickers 
(Plymouth, Devonport)) col 1109 (who discussed a letter she received from St Paul’s Union 
of Catholic Mothers); (Mrs Jill Knight (Birmingham, Edgbaston), a Conservative MP, col 
1100; Mr William Wells (Walsall, North), a Labour MP who was educated at a Church of 
England independent school, Lancing College) col 1080 and 1096-1097; and (Mr David 
Steel, a Lib Dem MP and the son of a Church of England Minister) col 1077. 
1083 HC Deb 13 July 1967 vol 750 col 1323. In order to accommodate the non-religious and 
religious viewpoints of every citizen, particularly the Christian faith, a conscientious 
objection clause, contained in Section 4, was included in the 1967 Act. 
1084 Latham (n 1076) 93 
1085 HC Deb 22 July 1966, vol 732, col 1108 
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value that fuelled the debate on abortion in 1967.1086 It is further argued that even though 
there was significant religious opposition to changing the law on abortion, the law was 
changed in order to reflect the social, medical and religious changes in society and of the 
changing public attitudes towards the issue of abortion and the doctrine of sanctity of life as 
it applied to an unborn fetus.1087 
 
In the House of Lords, the Earl of Huntingdon, accurately encapsulated the effect a change 
in the law would have on individuals who have a religious objection to abortion by stating 
that it is vital for “people who have sincere religious beliefs on this subject to remember 
that this Bill is not going to interfere with those beliefs or their habits at all: it is merely 
extending a right to other people who think differently”.1088 Clearly, changing the law on 
abortion merely provides an option to women who do not have a religious or non-religious 
objection and want to access this option: every woman would not be compelled by law to 
terminate her pregnancy. Similarly, providing individuals with a lawful option would not 
mean that the law would require each citizen to seek an assisted suicide. It would merely be 
providing individuals a lawful option to end an undignified life at a time of their choosing 
in a limited set of circumstances, where all other treatment options have been exhausted 
including palliative care, and after a number of safeguards have been met – such as 
ensuring there is no mental illness, pressure or coercion – to ensure that their wish to end 
life is informed, voluntary, unchanging and autonomous. 
 
 																																																								
1086 Stockley rightly argues that the 1967 Act dealt with “…twin issues of sanctity of life 
and the provision of healthcare” (David Stockley, ‘The increasingly strange case of 
abortion: Scots criminal law and devolution’ (1998) 2(3) Edin LR 330, 335) 
1087 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Scientific Developments 
Relating to the Abortion Act 1967: Twelfth Report of Session 2006-2007 Volume II (The 
Stationary Office Ltd 2007) 199. Note: Even though multiculturalism was not prominent 
enough for minority religious groups, such as Islam, to be discussed in greater detail, the 
need to include the views of religious groups was based on the notion, as per (Mr Mahon) 
HC Deb 13 July 1967, vol 750, col 1324, that it was not only Catholic doctors or nurses 
who may have a religious objection, but “…there are thousands of people who are not 
Roman Catholics who have exactly the same objection”. Similarly, (Mr Leo Abse, a Labour 
party MP, who identified with the Jewish faith) HC Deb 22 July 1966, vol 732, col 1148 
felt that “Respect for life is the cornerstone of our society”. 
1088 HL Deb 30 November 1965, vol 270, cols 1220-1221 
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It should be noted here that a far greater number of individuals access the option to 
terminate a pregnancy than assisted dying. For example, the number of abortions in 2010, 
in the Netherlands – where abortion and assisted dying are allowed – was 26,724.1089 In 
contrast, the number of deaths from euthanasia was 3859 and assisted suicides were 
192.1090 These numbers have increased over the years, with 30,803 abortions reported in the 
Netherlands;1091 and 5277 euthanasia cases via doctor administered death and 208 assisted 
suicide cases in 2015.1092 It is contended here that even though it may seem that these 
numbers are high and have significantly risen over the years, the number of assisted suicide 
cases is still fairly low and has not risen considerably over this time. It is further contended 
here that assisted suicide would only be an available option to a very small number of 
individuals, who have no religious or non-religious objection to requesting assistance, in a 
limited number of circumstances and only after a significant number of safeguards have 
been met. Thus, abuse of legislation and risk of unwanted deaths is greatly reduced. Since 
abortion has been allowed – despite vociferous theological opposition and created an 
exception to the doctrine of sanctity of life – a lawful option of assisted suicide also ought 
to be created in order to relieve the pain and suffering of the small number of people who 
are unresponsive to palliative care and is their only option to end, what they perceive to be, 
an undignified life. 
 
It is concluded that even though the issues are not analogous – as they concern an unborn 
fetus and ending the life of patient – the religious belief that fuelled the debates, on abortion 
and euthanasia and assisted suicide, is the same, namely the doctrine of sanctity of life; and 
this section examined the role of faith in policy-making in comparison to assisted suicide 																																																								
1089 Wm Robert Johnston, ‘Historical abortion statistics, Netherlands’ (27 December 2014) 
<www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-netherlands.html> accessed 21 May 2017. 
For a similar opinion: Mary Warnock, Dishonest to God: On Keeping Religion Out of 
Politics (Continuum 2010) 60 
1090 Statistics Netherlands, ‘Deaths by medical end-of-life decision; age, cause of death’ (11 
July 2012) 
<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLen&PA=81655ENG&LA=en> 
accessed 21 May 2017 
1091 Johnston (n 1089) 
1092 Dying for Choice, ‘Netherlands – 2015 Euthanasia Report Card’ 
<http://www.dyingforchoice.com/resources/fact-files/netherlands-2015-euthanasia-report-
card> accessed 21 May 2017 
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and extracted the religious values that influence public debates. Furthermore, judicial 
acceptance of patients being allowed to refuse or request the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration, decriminalising suicide in 1961 and allowing the medical 
termination of pregnancies in in 1967 are all exceptions to the doctrine of sanctity of life, 
which English law has historically protected.1093 Even though the debates reflect a concern 
to protect this doctrine, allowing assisted suicide would only add to the list of exceptions to 
this doctrine and is not an unprecedented action being sought to be done by Parliament. 
 
6.8.2 Same-Sex Marriage  
This subsection analyses the inclusion of faith when the recent same-sex marriage Bill was 
being debated in Parliament in order to determine the extent and role of faith in policy 
making in contemporary, increasingly secular England and contrasts it to the amount of 
inclusion and role it plays within the modern debate on assisted suicide. 
 
The main purpose of the 2013 Act was to bring gay citizens on an equal statutory footing 
with heterosexual couples. Laverack rightly argues that “…the Marriage (Same  Sex 
 Couples)  Act  2013, is one of several laws passed in recent years that have gradually 
brought the legal position of LGBT people into parity with the rest of society”.1094 The 
2013 Act was formulated to extend equal marriage to same-sex couples.1095 Wilson et al 
argue that “In July 2013, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Act 2013, which states in section 1 that ‘marriage of same sex couples is lawful’. 
This marked a major extension to the previous definition marriage in English law, which 
has been limited to opposite couples”.1096 
 
 																																																								
1093 Blackburn (n 564) 78 
1094 Peter Laverack, ‘Recent LGBT-friendly legislation and the House of Lords’ use of 
“wrecking amendments”’ (2014) 2 EHRLR 89, 89 
1095 Jonathan Herring, ‘Making family law more careful’ in Julie Wallbank and Jonathan 
Herring (eds), Vulnerabilities, Care and Family Law (Routledge 2014) 50 
1096 Steve Wilson, Rebecca Mitchell, Tony Storey and Natalie Wortley, English Legal 
System (OUP 2014) 59. Also see: Hyde v Hyde (1865-69) LR 1 P & D 130, which 
established the common law definition of marriage, “as understood in Christendom… as 
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others” (as 
per Lord Penzance). 
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When the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill was being debated in Parliament, almost all 
the members of the House of Lords extensively discussed the position of the Church of 
England on same-sex marriage.1097 The Archbishop of Canterbury stated that “…the 
majority of faith groups remain very strongly against the Bill, and have expressed that view 
in a large number of public statements… [such as] The House of Bishops of the Church of 
England”.1098 The Archbishop opined that the opposition to legalising gay marriage was 
based on the notion that as a result of the new Bill: 
 
Marriage is abolished, redefined and recreated… The concept of marriage as a 
normative place for procreation is lost. The idea of marriage as a covenant is 
diminished. The family in its normal sense, predating the state and as our base 
community of society, as we have already heard, is weakened.1099 
 
There were similar concerns, in relation to the definition and institution of marriage being 
devalued, in the House of Commons. Jim Dobbin felt that “Changing the definition of an 
institution that has served society well is hasty and destructive”.1100 Furthermore, William 
McCrea opined that:  
 
 																																																								
1097 Almost all the members of the House of Lords discussed the views of Christianity 
(particularly Church of England) on the issue of gay marriage HL Deb 3 June 2013 vol 745: 
(Lord Cormack) col 993; (Lord Black of Brentwood) col 987-988; (Lord Blair of 
Boughton) col 994; (The Lord Bishop of Chester) col 994-996; (Lord Edmiston) col 1003-
1004; (Lord Deben) col 1026-1027; (The Lord Bishop of Exeter) col 1038-1040; (Lady 
Saltoun of Abernethy) col 1040-1041; (Lord Alli) HL Deb 4 June 2013, vol 745, col 1061; 
and (Viscount Colville of Culross) HL Deb 4 June 2013, vol 745, col 1078-1080. Also see 
HL Deb 3 June 2013 vol 745: (Baroness Richardson of Calow) col 1002-1003 who spoke 
about the views of the Methodist Church; (Baroness Neuberger) col 999-1000 even 
discussed the views of Judaism on the issue of gay marriage; and (Lord Singh of 
Wimbledon) col 1008-1009 spoke about Sikh teachings on gay marriage; and (The Duke of 
Montrose) HL Deb 4 June 2013, vol 745, col 1090. 
1098 HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, col 953 
1099 HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, col 953-954. Also see: (Robert Flello) HC Deb 5 Feb 
2013, vol 558, col 146-147; and (Lord Bishop of Leicester) HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, 
col 962-963. 
1100 (Jim Dobbin (Heywood and Middleton) (Lab/Co-op)) HC Deb 5 February 2013 vol 
558, col 152 
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Most people, even to this day, regard the United Kingdom as a Christian country… 
For thousands of years, in almost all cultures, marriage has been defined to be a 
lifelong union between a man and a woman… and has been the bedrock institution 
of family and society, but today our Government intend to sweep away a definition 
that has served our nation well for centuries and to impose new standards and values 
on the whole of society, irrespective of religious beliefs or personal convictions.1101 
 
It is submitted here that the idea that the definition of marriage would change was at the 
heart of the debate. Barker notes that in 2001, the world’s first legally recognised same-sex 
marriage took place in the Netherlands after the law was reformed to amend the definition 
of marriage to include same-sex couples.1102 Both Houses of Parliament was opposed to a 
change in the law based on the notion that the definition of marriage would change that 
would lead to an institution that has been consistent for centuries being weakened and 
subsequently the moral fabric of society would also change. It is further submitted that even 
though the aforementioned Members of Parliament used non-religious language to express 
their opposition, other Members extensively discussed the effect of the Bill on the 
Christianity.1103 In the House of Commons, Helen Goodman stated that: 
 
The reason why the Church of England, unlike the other faiths, needs special 
mention is not to introduce a new hurdle, but to reflect its position as the established 
Church… Canon law, which embodies the teaching of the Church, is also part of the 
law of England… the Church of England is not, in the foreseeable future, going to 
change its teaching on marriage, so this statute needs to reflect that position if the 
Church of England is not going to be subject to successful legal challenges. To put 
it another way, we need to balance people’s rights under articles 12 and 14 in the 
European convention of human rights to marry and be free from discrimination 																																																								
1101 (Dr William McCrea (South Antrim) (DUP)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 198 
1102 Nicola Barker, Not The Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage 
(Palgrave-Macmillan 2012) 67 
1103 HC Deb 5 Feb 2013 vol 558: (Jim Dobbin (Heywood and Middleton) (Lab/Co-op)) col 
151; (Nick Herbert (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)) col 154; (Mr Ben Bradshaw 
(Exeter) (Lab)) col 156; (Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)) col 
158; (Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-opcol 175; and (Steve McCabe 
(Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)) col 183. 
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against the equally important right under article 9 to freedom of religion. 
Consequently, it is vital that that part of the Bill is not weakened in Committee.1104 
It is argued that Helen Goodman’s opinion accurately noted that the Christian faith has 
deep-seated historical ties with England, which is why it receives special consideration in 
Parliamentary debates. Furthermore, the Church wanted to preserve the institution of 
marriage by refusing to change the definition of marriage by extending it to include same-
sex marriage. Given the deep-rooted ties of Christianity with English law, Parliament felt 
the need to provide it with special protection in order to protect the rights and freedoms of 
individuals who wanted to have a same-sex marriage and the protect freedom of religion of 
others, especially the Church of England and its clergy members, who would refuse to 
participate in or conduct same-sex marriages.1105 
In contrast, Geraint Davies noted that “When considering in detail the position of the 
Church in Wales and the Church of England, we should be under no illusion that those 
Churches are under an obligation to marry all comers. Therefore, when this Bill goes 
through they will, as an arm of the state, be open to legal challenge in Strasbourg”.1106 
However, Margot James explained that the Church of England issued a statement in which 
it felt that “…it was not realistic or likely that churches would be forced to conduct same-
sex weddings” if the Bill was allowed.1107 Furthermore, Toby Perkins pointed out that 
“…there is no compulsion on faith groups to do anything and that, while the Church of 
England will have the opportunity to opt in, it will not be forced to do something that it 
does not want to do”.1108 It is submitted that allowing same-sex marriage brought same-sex 
couples on an equal legal footing with heterosexual couples that have always had the option 
to get married. However, providing same-sex couples with this option did not mean that the 
law would require every same-sex couple to get married neither would it compel religious 																																																								
1104 (Helen Goodman (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 177-178 
1105 This special protection came in the form of a “quadruple lock”, which is discussed 
below in this subsection. 
1106 (Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 203. 
Mr Davies went on to state that “we are taking to create more stable families and a better 
society will be enhanced by this Bill to bring about equality in marriage (col 204)”. 
1107 (Stourbridge) HC 5 Feb 2013 vol 558, col 131 
1108 (Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 148. Also see: 
(William Fittall Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill Deb 12 February 2013, col 20 
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institutions or their members to conduct or participate in same-sex marriages. Similarly, if 
assisted suicide were a lawful option in England, it would merely provide individuals, in a 
limited set of circumstances after a number of safeguards have been met, an option to end 
their life at the time and manner of their choosing: not every individual would be compelled 
or required to seek an assisted suicide. 
 
Even though the position of the Church of England received the most consideration of all 
the religious and non-religious views on gay marriage, minority religious groups also 
received significant attention in the Parliamentary debates, especially the Islamic faith.1109 
Lord Dear noted that “Quakers, Unitarians and Liberal Jews of course support the Bill but 
we should remember that together they represent less than 1% of the religious community. 
The largest bodies – the Church of England, Roman Catholics, Sikhs, Muslims and others – 
all adamantly oppose it”.1110 Similarly, The Lord Bishop of Norwich pointed out that “It is 
no secret that the majority of Christian churches and other world faiths do not believe that 
same-sex marriage accords with their understanding of marriage itself”.1111 Lord Flight 
even pointed out that: 
 
…all the faiths came together – not just the Anglican church, but the Catholic, 
Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist faiths sent a letter with 53 signatures to 
the Prime Minister urging caution and that he should think again before he pushed 
through this legislation to rewrite the meaning of marriage. In the world of faith, 
this is not just an Anglican issue; it is fundamental for all faiths, going back into the 
mists of history, that whether one likes it or not marriage is essentially about a man 
and woman getting together to have children and to bring them up as securely as 
possible. Just redefining, like that, what marriage means will understandably upset a 
large number of people.1112 
 
 																																																								
1109 (Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 127; 
and (Maria Miller) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, col 127-129 
1110 HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, col 946 
1111 HL Deb 15 July 2013, vol 747, col 537 
1112 HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, col 1047 
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It is argued that this is a significant step taken by religious groups. Leaders and 
representatives of various faiths, from both the dominant culture and minority subcultures, 
came together and publically voiced their unified opinion against same-sex marriage. 
Same-sex marriage is a significant issue for religious groups as it goes to the centre of each 
faith.1113 Leaders and clergyman of all these faiths would be conducting same-sex marriage 
ceremonies, in worship places such as churches and mosques. Their opposition is based on 
the opinion that allowing same-sex marriage would affect every individual in society, 
particularly members of their respective faiths, as it would change the nature of the 
institution of marriage and even the foundation of society. In contrast, as traced throughout 
this chapter, there have not been similar significant reactions to assisted suicide Bills by 
Christian or minority faiths. This lack of involvement or submission from religious groups 
can be attributed to the fact that assisted suicide is primarily an individual choice, a matter 
of that person’s conscience and does not affect the entire religious (or non-religious) 
community. Furthermore, assisted suicide does not require clergyman and places of 
worship to be involved in the process; it does not adversely affect them by distressing their 
congregation or followers, unlike same-sex marriage that supposedly alters the moral fabric 
and norm of society by negatively changing the definition of marriage and requires direct 
involvement from religious institutions and their representatives. 
 
It is accepted here that the main themes that emerged from the Parliamentary debate in the 
House of Lords were whether the Bill protects individuals and faith groups and their 
religious freedom; and that English society has evolved to become more tolerant and now 
accepts the notion of same-sex marriage.1114 The Parliamentary debates also reflect the 
considerable amount of concern for various religious groups and the need to include their 
																																																								
1113 MCB voiced their opposition to gay marriage, on the basis of it being against Islamic 
doctrine, but did not oppose the Act. Society and even faith and its representatives, seem to 
be demonstrating a great degree of tolerance for religious and moral diversity. A further 
reason behind the greater degree of tolerance on this issue could be that ecclesiastic 
members and mosque officials have the option to refuse to conduct gay marriages. See: 
Tim Ross, ‘Muslims and Sikhs attack Cameron’s gay marriage plan’ The Telegraph (19 
March 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9154043/Muslims-and-Sikhs-
attack-Camerons-gay-marriage-plan.html> accessed 21 May 2017 
1114 For example: (Baroness Stowell) HL Deb 3 June 2013, vol 745, col 938-940 (“…the 
majority of people in this country are now ready to open up marriage to everyone”). 
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views in the debate on same-sex marriage.1115 The need to protect the religious or non-
religious views and conceptions of conscience were a priority in the Parliamentary debate. 
To this end, the Act contains a “quadruple lock” which protects the religious freedom of 
individuals who oppose same-sex marriage. A same-sex religious marriage ceremony can 
only be conducted if the governing body of the relevant religious organisation has opted in 
by giving explicit consent and their premises are registered for marriages of same-sex 
couples.1116 Furthermore, the individual minister of the relevant organisation does not 
object to conducting the marriage ceremony.1117 No religious organisation or minister can 
be forced to opt-in or conduct a same-sex marriage ceremony.1118 Lastly, the Act protects 
the Canon law which states that marriage is the union of a man with a woman by ensuring 
that the common law legal duty on members of the Church of England and the Church of 
Wales to marry their church parishioners does not extend to same-sex couples.1119  This 
freedom to choose – through a conscientious objection clause, which allows individuals and 
organisations to choose whether or not to opt-in and conduct same-sex marriages – is what 
provides freedom of religion.1120 To encapsulate, religion continues to play a part in 
societal issues and subsequently receives consideration during policy making as is evident 
from the above the analysis of the Parliamentary debates around the Same-Sex Bill. 
Different religions – such as Islam and Judaism – receive inclusion due to their stabilised 
presence in society; yet the Christian faith receives much greater consideration, along with 
special accommodation during policy making, to protect its doctrines and beliefs. Clearly, 
even with modern English society being increasingly secular and multicultural, religion 																																																								
1115 Also see: (Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)) HC Deb 5 Feb 2013, vol 558, 
col 141; and the (Second Church Estates Commissioner (Sir Tony Baldry)) HC Deb 5 Feb 
2013, vol 558, col 143-145 (who mentioned that the Church of England, Islam, and the 
Roman Catholic Church do not support the Bill). 
1116 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Equal Marriage a step closer as legislation 
published’ (25 January 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/equal-marriage-a-
step-closer-as-legislation-published--6> accessed 21 May 2017 
1117 ibid 
1118 ibid 
1119 ibid 
1120 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University Press 2012); and Roger 
Trigg, ‘Why Tolerate Religion: Publication Review’ (2014) 16(10) Ecc LJ 106. Note: 
Religious and non-religious conscientious are protected by Article 9 (Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Taking 
Religion Seriously’ (2013) 42(4) ILJ 398. For a detailed discussion on Article 9, and the 
role of the human rights movement in this debate, refer to ch 5). 
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continues to play a vital role in society and various public debates, especially the recent 
debate on same-sex marriage. However, religion plays an intermittent and increasingly 
diminishing role in the debate on assisted suicide due to the nature of assisted suicide being 
very individualistic and entirely a matter of a person’s own conscience and not an issue that 
affects an entire religious or non-religious community. Furthermore, even though the 
historic debate significantly included theological viewpoints, the contemporary debate on 
assisted suicide is greatly influenced by the human rights movement and is driven by non-
religious principles such as the notions of autonomy and dignity. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the historical and contemporary movements to reform the law on 
assisted dying. Even though the aim of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, in 1935, was to 
separate religion from this debate, in order to be able to reform the law, religion continued 
to play a central role in informing this debate. This influence of religion was not only seen 
in the 1936 and 1969 Bills but also the Lord Joffe Bills from 2003 to 2005. However, over 
the past decade, the debate has moved into a different direction. Even though the influence 
of religion did not completely detach from this debate, non-religious values – such as 
dignity and autonomy – began to take over and are the most significant principles that are 
extensively discussed throughout the public debate, such as in Parliamentary debates and 
statements from religious and non-religious groups. 
 
The aforementioned presence of religion in this debate is due to the doctrine of sanctity of 
life – which is historically rooted in the Christian religion but is also a principle found in 
various minority faiths particularly the Islamic religion – acting as the most significant 
obstacle against reform. As the language in the Parliamentary debates evidences, even 
though the terminology has remained the same, this doctrine has lost its religious 
attachments and has transformed into a non-religious, secular idea that attaches an intrinsic 
value to human life rather than a religious holiness. This doctrine has evolved even further 
in recent years, particularly over the past decade, which is reflected in the Joffe Bills and 
especially the Lord Falconer Bill, into an idea that takes on quality of life considerations 
and absorbs the notions of dignity and autonomy, which are the main non-religious values 
that influence the modern debate and movement to reform the law. 
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The notion of human dignity, which was identified as an influencing value in the 1969 
Parliamentary debate, was present throughout the years and even included in the 2015 
Parliamentary debate, is another significant principle that drives the momentum to reform 
the law on this area. According to the traditional conception of dignity, every individual’s 
life has value and dignity by virtue of being human. Disease or illness cannot decimate or 
destroy dignity as it is attached to life. Thus, opponents of reform argue that the only way 
to preserve dignity is by protecting human life (and rejecting the idea of assisted death). 
However, similar to the doctrine of sanctity of life, this concept has also gone through 
modernisation. It is now seen as a principle that allows individuals to determine the value 
of their life, according to its quality, and gives them the right to self-determine when to end 
life if they deem their life to be of very low quality and in a deplorable and undignified 
state. 
 
The right to self-determination or autonomy, which is guaranteed under human rights law 
and was discussed in the previous chapter, is the most influential value in the debate and 
reform of the law. It began gaining ground when significant exceptions were being made to 
the doctrine of sanctity of life, by decriminalising suicide in 1961 and allowing the medical 
termination of pregnancies in 1967, which suggests that the relationship between this 
doctrine and the idea of death was changing around that time. This shift ought to have led 
to a change in the law when the next Bill was debated in Parliament, in 1969. However, 
theological opposition, particularly from the Christian faith, in the form of the doctrine of 
sanctity of life, did not let the 1969 Bill succeed. This theological opposition continued 
over the years and when the Lord Joffe Bills were introduced into Parliament, there was 
opposition not only from the Christian faith but also minority faith groups such as Islam, 
Judaism, Hinduism amongst many others. However, their opposition to the Joffe Bills was 
entirely in neutral language with no religious terminology or references to theological 
principles. Furthermore, the concerns raised by these faith groups were the need to protect 
vulnerable individuals especially those who have mental illnesses, changing the doctor 
patient relationship and promoting palliative care instead of allowing assisted suicide (and 
not traditionally theological opposition). This shift in language and approach towards the 
issue of assisted suicide also clearly demonstrates the changing relationship of religion and 
the law; and that the societal and governmental approach towards assisted suicide has 
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changed from theological to an increasingly secular, non-religious one. Historically, the 
debate on assisted suicide was predominantly influenced by religious tenets, particularly of 
the Christian faith, which sought to protect the religious sanctity of human life. However, 
with the significant change in the cultural landscape, brought on my multiculturalism and 
secularism, which were traced in Chapter Three, the religious undercurrent diminished 
from this debate and non-religious values began to drive it into a new direction. Unlike 
religious tenets, which tend to exclusively relate to the followers of that faith; these secular 
values include the notions of dignity and autonomy, which are protected by human rights 
law and were discussed in the previous chapter, are perceived by society as being common 
and shared amongst different individuals and communities. Clearly, the debate has moved 
away from its religious ties and is now a predominantly secular matter. 
 
Even though all three Lord Joffe Bills were defeated, the opinion polls and surveys at the 
time demonstrated a considerable amount of public support for a change in the law, from 
both religious and non-religious groups and individuals. These polls reflect the shift in 
public attitude and societal approach towards allowing assisted suicide. This public support 
along with the failure of the Joffe Bills, cases such as Pretty and Purdy and media attention, 
led to the Commission on Assisted Dying being set up in 2010, which established that 
physician-assisted suicide ought to be allowed for mentally competent terminally ill 
patients with a prognosis of 6 months, who are over the age of 18 as long as a significant 
number of safeguards that were suggested are met. As this chapter has established – by 
analysing the reports of the Walton Committee 1993-1994 and the Select Committee 2004-
2005 – physician-assisted suicide is the only justifiable option, instead of euthanasia, since 
only a doctor can provide emotionally detached, objective, safe and effective assistance to 
end the pain, suffering and indignity of patients. Furthermore, the nature of the assisted 
suicide process, with the individual taking the final action that ends life, generally ensures 
voluntariness and autonomy, and, thus, acts as a safeguard against individuals being killed 
off against their will. 
 
The Commission received very little evidence from faith groups and its representatives and 
even though their views were considered, the influence and amount of inclusion was greatly 
reduced. The Bill that was produced by the Commission, and debated in Parliament in 
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2015, also reflected this detachment of religion: allowing assisted suicide was viewed as 
diminishing the “fundamental belief in the intrinsic value of every human life” compared to 
it being regarded as “sacred in the eyes of God” in 1969. Furthermore, the main values that 
influenced the Parliamentary debates were the need to protect the intrinsic value of life that 
needed to be balanced with the demand to respect the autonomous decisions of individuals 
to seek an assisted suicide in order to end their pain and suffering and preserve their 
dignity. An innovative value that was extensively discussed in the 2015 debate was the 
notion of compassion. An individual’s request to receive an assisted suicide is entirely 
dependent on the person providing the assistance feeling compassion for that individual. It 
is an emotional response, upon seeing the pain and indignity of another individual, which 
leads a person to providing compassionate assistance. Compassion is a separate, 
independent idea from the notions of autonomy and value of life. However, since this idea 
does not have any legal grounding in national law or human rights provisions, it cannot 
form the basis for a change in the law and the right to self-determination, which is 
guaranteed under Article 8 and was discussed in the previous chapter, becomes the most 
significant value in favour of reform. Clearly, the contemporary debate on assisted dying, 
particularly assisted suicide, has become secular in nature and is no longer influenced by 
religious tenets. Thus, when an individual views their life and its quality to no longer have 
any value and makes an autonomous, informed and consistent wish to end life, which can 
be separated from mental illness and coercion, assisted suicide ought to be a lawful option.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter returns to the key themes explored throughout this thesis. It explains how the 
three central research questions were answered during the course of this thesis and 
recapitulates the main arguments developed throughout the previous chapters. 
 
7.2 Is there a discursive shift in language, over time, which demonstrates the changing 
relationship of law and religion in assisted suicide policy implementation? 
Religion is one of the most important ingredients of a multicultural society. Depending on 
the degree of religiosity of an individual, religion may greatly impact their important life 
decisions such as seeking an assisted suicide. Thus, their views and beliefs on the issue 
need to be included in societal and governmental activity. 
 
Christianity and Islam are the two largest religions in England and Wales. The belief in 
protecting the doctrine of sanctity of life, can be found in both religions, as established in 
Chapter Two, and directly emanates from religious texts namely the Bible and Quran. This 
doctrine is rooted in religious ideology, which attaches a holiness and sacredness to life. 
This can be seen by former Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher’s 1948 statement where he views 
human life to be a “sacred thing” and it ought not to be ended through (suicide or) assisted 
suicide. Even though the Church has maintained its stance against assisted suicide, the 
manner in which this position is expressed is significantly different to 55 years ago. The 
current Archbishop, Justin Welby, has explained that human life garners “respect” and 
allowing assisted suicide would not only alter the moral fabric of society by devaluing life 
but would also put vulnerable individuals at great risk of being given unwanted or 
premature deaths. This comparison, between the statements of the two Archbishops, found 
in Section 2.2, clearly demonstrates that even though the terminology has largely remained 
the same, the meaning and understanding attached to it has significantly changed. The 
religious undertone and Biblical references can no longer be found in statements, 
announcements and declarations made by the Church, its official bodies, institutions and 
representatives, such as bishops and reverends. Non-religious, neutral wording is 
increasingly being used to communicate its stance on assisted suicide. Even though the 
	 253	
Church of England has maintained its opposition to reforming the law on assisted suicide, 
in recent years, it has clearly changed its approach towards this issue. Even the Islamic faith 
has adapted to the changing society with the Muslim Council of Britain explaining that 
“Life should be preserved, cherished and protected” instead of setting out religious texts 
and references to explain their opposing stance to assisted suicide.1121 Faith and its 
representatives are adapting to changing multicultural English society by attempting to 
relate to, not only those who are followers of their faith but also all other Christian and 
Islamic denominations, individuals of other faiths and even those who do not identify with 
any faith group. 
 
This shift in language can also be attributed to the fact that, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
in a multicultural, liberal democratic society, the worth of human life has become a non-
religious, secular concept as there has been a reinterpretation of the relationship between 
the doctrine of sanctity of life and dying (rather than a detachment of this doctrine from the 
issue of assisted suicide). This shift in understanding has created two principles based on 
the doctrine of sanctity of life. The first is the historical understanding that human life has 
an intrinsic value, or even religious sacredness, attached to it and should be preserved at all 
costs. The second is that it takes on quality of life considerations and cannot be viewed in 
isolation from the pain, suffering and indignity that individuals feel that their illness or 
disease is causing them. This second, newer understanding dictates that the value of human 
life is a subjective commodity; deciding its worth is solely a matter of a person’s own 
conscience and autonomy. If an individual feels that their life is undignified and appropriate 
safeguards can be put in place, there ought to be a lawful option to receive an assisted 
suicide. 
 
Even some notable members of religious faiths, particularly the Church of England, have 
even gone on to change their opinion to incorporate the new understanding of the doctrine 
of sanctity of life, which now takes on quality of life considerations, such as the former 
Archbishop, George Carey, who now opines that human dignity ought to come before 
religious dogma and compassion ought to be administered by allowing individuals with a 
lawful option to a dignified death. The notion of protecting the doctrine of sanctity of life at 																																																								
1121 MCB (n 845) 
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all costs has shifted to an idea that takes on quality of life considerations. This notion of 
quality of life includes the idea of respecting autonomous decisions, which allows an 
individual to end what they subjectively perceive to be an undignified life and is the most 
important value in the modern debate on assisted suicide. This idea of autonomy, which 
continually conflicts with the doctrine of sanctity of life and on which a law can be based as 
it is grounded in human rights law and is discussed in significant detail in Section 2.5.1 and 
Section 5.3. 
 
7.3 What impact have human rights provisions had on reforming the law on assisted 
suicide in England? 
The two contradictory notions of the right to self-determination and the inviolability of 
human life are held by many religious and non-religious groups and individuals within a 
pluralistic society, which all need to be included and protected. This protection of various 
beliefs and viewpoints is guaranteed under Article 9 and it ought to be extended to allow 
individuals who believe in assisted suicide for themselves to receive assistance to end their 
lives. At first glance, it seems that all the Conventions rights are separate and independent 
from each other, for example, Article 2 seeks to protect the right to life and Article 8, on the 
other hand, protects the right to self-determine how to live and even end life; and these two 
Articles do not have a congruent relationship. However, all these Articles are 
complementary and can be used in an interdependent manner. For example, an individual 
who believes in the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is protected under Article 2, can rely 
on Article 9 to protect their religious or non-religious belief in this doctrine to preserve life. 
Similarly, Article 9 ought also be allowed to be used to uphold the right to self-
determination, under Article 8, to protect an individual’s belief in assisted suicide for 
themselves. 
 
Article 9 of the Convention is designed to protect the thought, conscience and beliefs of 
individuals and it ought to be extended to cover the belief of a person in assisted suicide for 
themselves. In a multicultural, liberal democracy, where the Church and State are separate 
entities, the government ought not to use one religion as a constitutive device to control 
societal issues. This separation also prevents the State from exerting influence and 
controlling or even challenging the validity and legitimacy of an individual or community’s 
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conscientious decisions and belief in assisted suicide for themselves. Furthermore, religious 
and non-religious groups need to have an independent, free and autonomous existence and 
no one religion ought to be allowed to impose their beliefs – against assisted suicide – on 
everyone else, when so many individuals and communities do not share the same faith or 
even identify with a religion.1122 Thus, the need to preserve the doctrine of sanctity or value 
of human life ought not to be allowed to act as an obstacle against the popularly held belief 
of others in assisted suicide for themselves by the State’s refusal to provide them with a 
lawful option of assisted suicide. 
 
Some religious groups, particularly the Church of England and Islamic faiths, institutions 
and individuals oppose such a suggestion. Non-religious individuals, and even a significant 
amount of members of religious communities, hierarchise the right to self-determination for 
disabled or terminally ill individuals, tend to support a change in the law, as they do not 
view the value of life to be an absolute principle: respecting an individual’s autonomous 
choice, by allowing them to end their indignity, pain and suffering upholds the modern, 
secular understanding of this principle. Thus, the right to self-determination – or autonomy, 
guaranteed under Article 8 – is based on the subjective valuation of life that is defined in 
terms of its quality rather than ideal set by a religion and is the most important value on 
which a change in the law can be based. 
 
Not every individual would seek an assisted suicide, and, generally, it is not difficult to end 
life by committing suicide. However, this option is only available to able-bodied 
individuals. A small handful of persons who are physically incapacitated – because they 
have a certain terminal illness or disability that causes a considerable amount of pain and 
suffering, renders them incapacitated and leads them to become non-responsive to palliative 
and medical treatment – ought to be allowed the freedom to end their life, which able-
bodied individuals already enjoy, by having the lawful option of assisted suicide. This 
option can be provided under Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to 
self-determination that allows every individual to choose the time and manner of their 
death. 
 																																																								
1122 Unless it is a matter of maintaining national security, public order etc. 
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Autonomy has become a trump card, under the human rights movement, for reforming the 
law on assisted suicide. Strasbourg jurisprudence on end-of-life cases is a reflection of the 
evolution of the legal understanding of the immense, non-restrictive power of Article 8. The 
Strasbourg’s decision in Pretty, which was the first assisted suicide case it adjudicated on, 
was applied by the House of Lords, now the Supreme Court, in Purdy and Nicklinson 
respectively. The Purdy decision led to the publication of the DPP policy and now, 
arguably, an individual who provides compassionate assistance in the suicide of another is 
no longer prosecuted, which is evidenced by the fact that of approximately 110 cases 
recorded as assisted suicide only one conviction, in the Howe case, was handed down 
where the vulnerable victim, who was able-bodied and physically healthy, did not have the 
mental capacity to make an informed decision to end their life and, thus, the assistor could 
not have had compassionate motives or merciful intentions.1123 The Nicklinson decision 
extended this notion – of tolerating compassionate assisted suicides – to holding that the 
absolute prohibition on assisted suicide, under every circumstance, is an infringement of the 
freedoms and rights of individuals. However, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, there was a 
need to protect vulnerable people since there is a lack of safeguards in place to allow 
assisted suicides and the Supreme Court had to constitutionally ask Parliament to reform 
the law, but did strongly hint that the Court would strike down the criminal embargo on 
assisted suicide at the next opportunity if Parliament did not do so. The “Noel Conway 
Case” is worth noting here.1124 A man with motor neuron disease sought judicial review 
that could have ultimately changed the law on assisted suicide as contained in the Suicide 
Act 1961. However, the High Court decided that since Parliament had already considered 
this issue, in line with the Supreme Court’s decision and decided not to change the law, it 
would be inappropriate to strike down the criminal prohibition on assisted suicide. Even 
though the High Court decided not to change the law in this instance, if this case or a 																																																								
1123 Another case, in July 2015, where the defendant was given a guilty conviction was the 
Lyndsay Jones case. The defendant provided and prepared heroin and a syringe for the 
suicidal and depressed defendant Philip Makinson. However, this has not been included in 
the thesis since the original charge was murder. The defendant denied that and accepted the 
lesser charge of assisted suicide. See: Ian Proctor, ‘Killer overdose: Junkie jailed for 
sourcing heroin and preparing syringe for suicidal man’ (The Daily Star, 5 July 2015) 
<www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/451968/heroin-assisted-suicide-murder-
manslaughter-junkie-injection-self-administer-overdose> accessed 21 May 2017 
1124 Conway (n 682) 
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judicial review in the future reaches the Supreme Court, it is still a possibility, as per its 
powerful judgment in Nicklinson, that the criminal embargo on assisted suicide will be 
struck down. 
 
There are other human rights provisions, such as Article 3 that prohibits torture or 
inhumane and degrading treatment, which have been invoked in assisted suicide cases but 
are not as significant in fuelling a reform of the law. However, Article 3 does protect every 
individual’s inherent human dignity, which is an important principle that influences the 
debate on assisted suicide. Opponents of reform argue that the notion of dignity is an 
objective, innate state of being worthy of respect by virtue of being human. This innate 
dignity does not diminish or cease if the individual has a disease or disability. Nor is it 
dependent on the individual’s own or others’ subjective judgement of that person’s quality 
or value of life. However, this argument does not take into consideration that the idea of 
dignity provides individuals with the right to decide the worth of their life based on their 
own perception of its quality and value. Thus, dignity consists of the ownership of a right to 
self-determination, or autonomy, to which allows individuals to make free choices and 
decisions on how to live their life and even when and how to end it. This idea of dignity is 
protected under Article 3 of the Convention. However, Article 3 is formulated to protect 
individuals against intentional and deliberate torture or inhuman and degrading treatment 
and, as per Strasbourg jurisprudence, cannot be claimed to have been breached when the 
perceived indignity and degradation has been caused by a disease or illness. 
 
7.4 What role is there for faith in policy-making on assisted suicide in multicultural 
and increasingly secular English society? 
This thesis established, in Chapter Three, that society has become multicultural primarily 
through immigration (3.3). This pluralism has led to the subjective perception that the way 
of life and values of subcultures, particularly the Islamic community (3.4.1), conflict with 
the dominant culture of the country (3.5), which has deep-seated ties with the Christian 
faith but is now increasingly secular (3.5.1). Even with the governmental accommodations 
made to integrate minority subcultures into society (3.4.2), there continues to be a negative 
perception of them, which has led to segregation and a loss of societal coherence and unity 
(3.4). As discussed in Section 2.4.1, in a multicultural English liberal democratic setting, 
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there ought to be a newer approach towards all governmental activities, particularly policy-
making, which is much more open, transparent and inclusive of both religious and non-
religious views in order to ensure that no one religion is favored over the other neither are 
non-religious, secular views given priority over religious ideology. It is essential to have 
societal cohesion and harmony in order to find mutual ground on public debates and issues, 
namely assisted dying, for the State to be able to regulate and reform the law. Since the law 
on this issue has the potential to directly affect the lives of every citizen in society, it is 
essential that the religious beliefs and non-religious viewpoints of every community are 
included in the debate. 
 
The historic ties of this country with the Christian religion are evident in Parliamentary 
debates around abortion and suicide, traced in Section 6.8 and Section 4.3, where the 
principles and viewpoint of the Christian faith received a significant amount of inclusion. 
Even though it has deep-seated ties with the Church of England, the pluralism and fluidity 
that define multicultural, increasingly secular English society mean that it is no longer 
deeply tied to the tenets and historical traditions of the Church. However, a considerable 
majority of the population still identifies with it as their religion and the views of the 
Christian faith are still included in public debates as was reflected in the recent 
Parliamentary debates around same-sex marriage. Pluralism in society has also led to 
various minority religious views, such as those of the Islamic faith, being extensively 
discussed in these debates, particularly the same-sex marriage Bill. In spite of the extensive 
Christian theological opposition, and recently from the Islamic faith, during the debates on 
abortion and same-sex marriage, the law was changed. Clearly, a reform the law on issues 
that seem to go to the centre of these religions and inclusion of their views is not mutually 
exclusive. Firstly, there needs to be inclusion of religion, particularly minority groups, to 
ensure that there is no inequality within society and to deduce a homogenous opinion of the 
majority of citizens; it is necessary to include the views of both the dominant culture and 
minority subcultures on societal issues and debates. Furthermore, if the views of minority 
groups are excluded from public debates it would lead to them being further marginalised, 
discriminated against and isolated. In order to avoid this segregation and to promote 
equality, the government has attempted to assimilate minority groups into the culture of 
English society – through judicial and statutory acceptance of their beliefs and customs – to 
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bring them on an equal footing with individuals from the dominant culture. Secondly, in 
recent decades, with the cultural landscape transforming into an increasingly secular one, 
there has been a shift in society’s perception, which favours common, shared non-religious 
values – such as the ideas of dignity and autonomy that are protected by human rights 
provisions – over exclusively religious principles. Thus, it is time to move away from 
religious principles and reform the law on assisted suicide, which is a very individualistic 
process and entirely a matter of each person’s own conscience. 
 
Various legislative attempts have been made to reform the law on assisted suicide, which 
are traced in Chapter Six, and all of them have been unsuccessful. However, in recent years, 
unlike between 1936 and 1961, the reasons behind this defeat were not predominantly 
theological opposition. For example, the criminal embargo is contained in section 2(1) of 
the Suicide Act 1961 and was updated by section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
Religious beliefs did not receive any explicit consideration during the Parliamentary 
debates on the 2009 Bill, especially compared to the extensive consideration given to 
religious viewpoints, particularly through the inclusion of the opinions and doctrines of the 
Christian religion, in the debates in 1961. Even in the most recent Parliamentary debate on 
assisted suicide in 2015, there was a negligible amount of consideration of religious beliefs; 
and the need to preserve the doctor-patient relationship, the lack of safeguards such as 
ensuring that the decision to seek an assisted suicide is informed, autonomous and 
voluntary and the need to protect vulnerable individuals were the main reasons behind the 
defeat of the Bill as discussed in Section 6.6.2 and 6.6.3. However, these objections are 
flawed. 
 
Firstly, physician-assisted suicide is the only option in which objectivity and, to a 
significant degree, benevolence can be guaranteed. The patient is safeguarded from 
pressure or coercion by family and friends and can end their life in a safe and sterile 
environment through medically prescribed lethal medication, which quickly and painlessly 
ends life as suicide has been traditionally known to be much more painful, and in some 
cases ineffective, than sanctioned lethal injections which are designed to cause death 
without any pain or prolonged suffering. Furthermore, even the family and friends of that 
patient are safeguarded from negative mental and emotional stress that would be caused if 
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they were required to provide the necessary assistance. 
 
Secondly, allowing assisted suicide is an entirely voluntary and autonomous process, as the 
individual who requests the assistance always takes the final action that ends life. In 
contrast, even with safeguards, euthanasia is when another person assists that individual – 
for example, through actively injecting them with lethal medication to end their life – and 
there is a risk of the ‘slippery slope’ coming into effect with individuals being given 
unwanted deaths. Thus, assisted suicide only affects the individual seeking the assistance 
whereas euthanasia can affect every person within a community who is terminally ill, 
elderly or vulnerable and, thus, may be at risk of being given a premature death. Thus, 
allowing assisted suicide, instead of euthanasia, acts as a safeguard itself. 
 
Thirdly, the paramount concern in Parliament was to protect vulnerable individuals, such as 
terminally ill patients. However, being terminally ill does not necessarily make patient 
vulnerable or susceptible to coercion and pressure. The significant majority of terminally ill 
patients have the mental capacity to make clear, settled and autonomous decisions to end 
their life. Thus, having an illness or disability does not mean that the entire group 
mandatorily becomes vulnerable and unfit to protect their wishes and interests. This 
number is further reduced, as not all of them would seek an assisted suicide on the basis of 
their conscientious decision or because the pain and suffering caused by their illness is 
manageable, for example, through palliative care. 
 
The last objection to reforming the law was that Parliament did not want to send out the 
message that assisted suicide was being accepted or encouraged because human life was no 
longer of immense value. However, as explained throughout this thesis and earlier in this 
chapter, the understanding of the value of human life has significantly changed over the 
years and it now takes on quality of life considerations. Where an individual 
conscientiously opines that their life has no sanctity or value, as the quality of their life is 
so poor and deplorable, and that their dignity is deteriorated and irreparable, there ought to 
be a lawful option to receive an assisted suicide. Allowing individuals to make an 
autonomous decision to end an undignified life honours human life as it respects that 
individual’s right to self-determination by providing them with an option to preserve their 
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human dignity by ending their pain and suffering. However, even a lawful option of 
assisted suicide would need to be carefully regulated. Firstly, the option ought to provide 
assisted suicide instead of euthanasia. For example, as discussed in section 1.3, if 
euthanasia were allowed, there would be a risk of the slippery slope coming into play and 
individuals being given premature or unwanted deaths. Secondly, the nature of assisted 
suicide is such that it is exclusively a matter of an individual’s own conscience and 
autonomy rather than a decision that encroaches on the rights and freedoms of others. The 
final action that ends life is taken by the individual who seeks as assisted suicide (unlike 
active euthanasia, where another person takes the finals steps to end that individual’s life) 
and only affects the individual requesting it. This personal nature of assisted suicide and the 
constantly transforming societal and cultural landscape of contemporary English society are 
also the reasons behind religion not receiving a significant amount of consideration in the 
Parliamentary debates on assisted suicide. Thus, lastly, assisted suicide ought only be 
acceptable under limited and definite circumstances, where there are a number of 
safeguards in place to ensure that the individual is not being coerced or pressured, is not 
vulnerable or mentally ill and has explored all treatment options including palliative care. If 
all the safeguards are met then a lawful option of assisted suicide ought to be provided to 
individuals who need assistance in ending their undignified lives. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Historically, society’s belief in the doctrine of sanctity of life, which is rooted in both Islam 
and Christianity, has led to the cultural and legal landscape seeking to protect life at all 
costs. There is clearly a deep-rooted instinct that intentionally ending life is unacceptable; 
even if a human being is terminally ill or physically disabled and is living what they 
perceive to be an undignified life. All other rights and freedoms that an individual enjoys 
seem to be attached to the continued existence of life. Thus, prosecuting individuals who 
are willing to assist another to end their life raises a significant degree of public interest. 
Even though it seems that the movement to reform this area of the law has failed since 
every legislative attempt met with defeat; the medical, legal and religious attitudes have 
significantly shifted since 1936. Over the years, due to the shift in attitudes and the 
changing cultural landscape of English society, there has been a move away from the 
religious meaning of the doctrine of sanctity of life. The belief in this doctrine has clearly 
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survived in the absence of religious dogma. However, it is no longer the most powerful 
obstacle to the movement of reform. The newer, secular understanding of this doctrine 
takes on quality of life considerations and its value is dependent on the rights and freedoms 
every human being is able to enjoy; including the right to self-determination, which allows 
every individual the freedom to choose the time and manner of their death. Certain 
consequences have followed this newer understanding. The doctrine of sanctity of life is no 
longer absolute. There are a number of exceptions to this doctrine including allowing 
patient’s to refuse or withdraw medical treatment and food and hydration, the notion of 
double effect and decriminalising suicide. Thus, allowing individuals a lawful option of 
assisted suicide would only add to this list of exceptions as long as it is under definite 
circumstances, where the individual perceives their life to have no value as their dignity is 
severely eroded; and after a number of safeguards have been met such as ensuring that the 
individual is not vulnerable, for example, with a treatable mental health illness, has a clear, 
settled and informed wish to end life, is not being coerced or pressured into making such a 
request, and every treatment option including palliative care, has been explored. Thus, 
under precise circumstances and after a significant amount of safeguards have been met, an 
individual’s right to choose the time and manner of their death by receiving an assisted 
suicide ought to be a lawful option under English law. 
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